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ABSTRACT 
The media long regarded as a characteristic element of state propaganda in 
authoritarian regimes have become a key interest for western academic literature. Yet 
little attention has been paid to the fact that media within an authoritarian country may be 
influenced by external factors as well. This work addresses this issue and explores the 
roles external factors like media globalization and transnational media corporations 
(TNMCs) play in the transition of China's media governance. It argues that transnational 
forces have increasingly imposed insurmountable politico-economic pressures on the 
Chinese media regime, leading the state to further embrace the globalised economy and 
thus promote market-driven policies. As such, the ongoing task of media governance 
transition has a far-reaching impact upon socio-political systems in the PRC-a pattern of 
steady institutionalization with Chinese characteristics of media governance is emerging. 
The socio-political impact of the steady media institutionalization fosters a more relaxed 
space in both political and social domains. This has also challenged the dominant 
approaches, i. e., the 'Value-domination', the Nationalist, the Liberal model, and the 
Trans-cultural model, in the study of media politics in authoritarian states. After 
examining the changes in media institutions, policy responses, media structure, and 
media culture, the author conceptualizes these changes as institutional transformation, 
de-regulation, de-monopolization, and de-propagandization. This dissertation concludes 
that China's media governance has continuously progressed from the model of 
'leader-determined' model towards a 'consensus-building' model with an increase in 
media participants. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
When Mikhail Gorbachev first opened news media in the Soviet Union to dissenting 
ideas in the mid-1980s, he could not have predicted the ultimate impact of 'glasnost'. 
Indeed, the appearance of alternative information to communist propaganda messages 
helped dissolve one of the most powerful empires in the twentieth century. The world 
had expected the same story to take place in China when it promoted its open-door 
policies and economic reforms in 1979. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
still dominates within Chinese society, and China itself is displaying a picture that is 
quite different from that of the Soviet Union, where free criticism in the mass media has 
helped to 'bring an end to the old Soviet empire' (Bagdikian, 1992: 239). Thus, it is not 
easy to assess the influence of the democratic potential of foreign media and 
telecommunications investment, because it may be 'a myth' (Lee, 2003: 24). In order to 
assess such an influence, it may be necessary to find answers to the following questions: 
Is the Communist state sustainable, especially with it being more integrated with the 
global economy in the information age? Why did the CCP avoid demise when the 
increasing diversity of information carried by transnational media corporations (TNMCs) 
and other channels has been flooding into the Chinese media market? What influence 
does media globalization impose upon China's media governance? 
To answer these questions, the author has established several objectives so as to 
explore the changing nature of media governance in terms of media institutions, policy 
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response, market structure, and media culture. These objects are conceptualized as 
institutional transformation, de-regulation, de-monopolization, and de-propagandization. 
In-depth interviews conducted during late 2003 and 2004 with senior policyrnakers and 
practitioners in the media industry are also incorporated, so as to underpin the arguments. 
This dissertation concludes that the media's governance has advanced and continues 
toward institutionalization, and that the CCP's monopoly of media control has been 
gradually dismantled as the interplay between the TNMCs and Chinese media players 
has increased in the discourse of globalization. Indeed, the consequences of media 
globalization may go beyond the CCP's expectations. This chapter provides an overview 
of the research background, research questions, methodological issues and contributions 
to China studies. 
1. CHINAS MEDIA POLITICS SINCE THE 1980s 
The opening of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to transnational 
corporations is regarded as a fascinating development in the contemporary period of 
globalization (Shirk, 1996). Although the communist state exerts tight control, the 
Chinese media have dramatically changed, along with the restructuring of the economy 
and civil society since 1979, and more significantly since the calls from Deng Xiaoping 
for 'more opening, deeper reform' in 1992 (Chan, 1994a; Lynch, 1999; Hong, 1998; 
Zhao, 1998). The media have experienced a significant transformation, along with 
political, economic, social, and cultural changes. The 1980s saw a transformative debate 
on the functions and roles the media play. Some media experts and senior news editors 
considered that the media should not only serve the party, but also the ordinary people 
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(Yu Guoming, 2005: 4-8). Such an attitude shift led to a revolution in media writing 
styles. Formerly the party's mouthpiece, many media articles and programmes now turn 
to issues and formats, which may maximize readership and audiences. During the 1990s, 
more dramatic restructuring of news media took place. The weekend edition of the 
newspaper sector began to emphasize the philosophy of 'what the reader wants', rather 
than the 'what the reader must know'. It is the first time that the Chinese media have 
shown concern about the taste of audiences within its media structure and content. With 
the success of programme magazine formats such as 'Oriental Horizon' 
(Dongfangshikong), 'Focus' (Jiaodianfangtan), and 'News Investigation' 
(Xinwendiaocha), which have been produced by China Central Television (CCTV) since 
1993, reforms and restructuring have become a main theme within the Chinese news 
media. For the first time since 1949, the news media on the Chinese Mainland 
developed a function as a 'watchdog' over authorities (Sun Xupei, 2004: 5). The 
establishment of the Guangzhou Daily Group in 1996 became a landmark for media 
commercialization, or in Chinese parlance, 'media industrialization' (meiti chanyehua). 
This group symbolizes that the media are regarded as an industry. It is different from the 
Marxist 'super-structure', in which the media are completely attached to the communist 
party. Since then, the Chinese media have been transformed from being a tool of 
communist propaganda to a mixed agent of political stability, ideological control, 
economic growth, job creation, and information provision (Yu Guoming, 2002: 6-7). 
There is an assumption that the ongoing market-oriented, internationalized economy in 
China has put structural pressure on the media to follow suit. The Chinese domestic 
media corporations (DMCs) demand much more low-cost foreign programmes, and 
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transnational media corporations (TNMCs) ask for official market entry in order to gain 
a substantial market share. These internal and external factors have driven the media 
authorities to adopt a further type of media governance, namely accommodating new 
political, economic, social, and cultural situations. ' 
With the largest population and rapid economic growth, China represents a huge 
potential media market. Many TNMCs have tried to obtain access to this market. 
However, the communist government regards the media as an instrument for controlling 
public opinion, rather than as a platform for freedom of expression. Marxist-Leninist 
theory suggests that the media in socialist countries act as a propagandist, an agitator, 
and an organizer (Splichal and Lent, 1994: 46). Propaganda, through the heavy-handed 
manipulation of the media, has been just as essential as the army and police in upholding 
the CCP's mandate (Liu, 1990). Therefore, all Chinese media are state-owned. 
Privatization has been a forbidden zone. Foreign media are heavily regulated. 
The reality of TNMCs' entering China and the restrictions according to the CCP's 
philosophy are paradoxical and incompatible. This raises an interesting issue for 
academic discussion, but it is not covered in the existing literature. While there is much 
literature that focuses on the cultural consequences of globalization and TNMCs in host 
countries (Tomlinson, 1999; Reeves, 1993), little analysis has been carried out in terms 
of the development of media governance. The same is true for China. While TNMCs in 
China are not new, academics have seen a renewed interest, partly due to the collapse of 
communist countries throughout the world except in China, and the need to update 
political and economic communications in the light of rapid changes in the global media 
1 For example, in late 2001, China gained membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Simultaneously, 
official approval was announced for several TNMCs to directly broadcast in given areas in China. 
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markets. Much existing work focuses on media changes in China, but little of this work 
examines the impact of globalization and TNMCs on Chinese media governance. 
The importance of TNMCs in China and the significaricc of media governance have 
been neglected in recent social and political science, probably because of the roles of the 
media in communist countries. Media in these countries act as the mouthpiece of the 
Party (Splichal and Lent, 1994). With this orientation in mind, the existing literature in 
English on Chinese media politics mainly focuses on four themes. The first is a general 
introduction to China's mass media (Ilowkins, 1982; Chang, 1989). The second theme 
concentrates on the functions of the mass media manipulated by the Chinese 
government and CCP as a state or party monopoly to promote public campaigns 
(Strannahan, 1990; Bilship, 1989), national integration (Liu, 1975), education (Zhong, 
2002), and so on. The third is about the struggles for press freedom and media reform. It 
falls into two sub-therrics. One sub-thcme is that the open-door policy and economic 
reforms during the 1980s stimulated intense struggles for press freedom (Lee, 1990; 
Jernwo and Thurston, 1993; Chu 1994). The other is about rapid media 
commercialization without independence (Zhao, 1998; Zhao, 2000; Latham, 2001). The 
fourth theme is the profound influence of internal and external media on reforms in 
China (Lull, 1991; Chu and Ju, 1993; Chan, 1994a; Lynch, 2000; Chan, 1994b). Such 
works provide impressive understanding about the changing media structure in China 
and its far-reaching impact on every-day-life, but they seldom examine the 
transformation of media governance, which accommodates further economic reforms 
and dramatic social changes, as well as transnational media corporations. To a greater or 
lesser degree, these themes follow the 'value-domination' model in their study of media 
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politics, maintaining that the main features of a given media system depend on its 
political system. A media system is determined by the value of dominant groups in that 
society. With this rationale, China could not have any press freedom under the ruling 
CCP, which penetrates into every comer in Chinese society. 
If the CCP's iron fist control of information is cffective, or if external global 
forces such as the TNMCs have no influence on the authoritarian media governance, 
then there is no need for liberal students to examine the matter further. However, close 
scrutiny of China as well as other authoritarian regimes, such as Vietnam (Marr, 1998), 
suggests that the tight control of the media may be challenged when the economic 
reforms and opcn-door policy introduced a market logic into the party-controlled media 
system. In China, this created a fledgling journalism reform movement and fostered the 
emergence of discourse on media democratization in the mid-1980s (Lee, 1990: 1-18). In 
1992, market forces gained momentum after the CCP's unreserved embracing of a 
market economy at least as a long-term objective. As a result, the Chinese economy has 
kept growing on a fast track for the last two decades, and its per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) surpassed 3,800 US dollars in 1999. The change is so dramatic that there 
was an increasing demand for diversity of media content to meet the changing tastes of 
Chinese audiences (Li, 2001). These audiences began to switch off from those 
programmes that were full of propaganda and to seek more interesting things via 
different means, such as setting up illegal antennas or satellite dishes to receive 
cross-border channels and access to international information (Chan, 1994a: 72-80; 
Lynch, 1999: Chap. 1). 
Inevitably, transnational forces have placed heavy political and economic pressure 
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on the Chinese regime in the process of promoting market-oriented policies and 
embracing the global economy. For instance, China launched negotiations for joining 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) from the mid-1980s. Hence, the government has been easing its 
strict regulations on foreign media in an effort to attract more foreign direct investment 
(FDI), according to the WTO entry rules. Meanwhile, it has loosened the restrictions on 
market entry for transnational media corporations, too. Therefore, the transnational 
media corporations, especially the visual media, flooded into China and the media 
market diversified rapidly during the 1990s. When China officially became a WTO 
member in 2001, it was obliged to lift trade barriers, including on the media (Tong Bing, 
2003a). 
It is true that the CCP and the government originally took the initiative to set up 
economic reforms and open-up policies. However, since its economy deeply has become 
more integrated into the global economy in the past 20 years, China has increasingly had 
to follow international rules. Nevertheless, the government is not a weak passive actor. It 
may determine the extent to which foreign players can penetrate the Chinese media 
market with gate-keeping policies. But, when it finds its gains from globalization exceed 
its losses, the Chinese government may compromise with international partners. Both 
the regulatory responses by the media authorities to TNMCs in the marketplace and the 
further responses to restructuring Chinese media organizations resulted directly or 
indirectly from the governmental arrangements. 
In all, the dramatic changes in Chinese media structure were not just driven by 
internal market forces, through which the government has promoted policies of 
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modernization, decentralization and restructuring. External factors may provide a 
stronger impetus for change, such as the expansion of newspapers, television stations, 
radio and news websites, commercial financing, or the high quality of imported 
programmes, and transnational co-opcrations. While the processes of 
internationalization, commercialization, and pluralization have dominated the Chinese 
mass media in the past two decades (Hong, 1998; Zhao, 1998; Lynch, 1999), few studies 
have assessed the influence of globalization on media governance, and more empirically, 
few have concentrated on the role of transnational media corporations. 
The main purpose of this research is to provide a systematic study of the latest 
development of media governance in the largest transitional economy in the world. 
Specifically, it identifies the impact of transnational media corporations. In doing so, it 
is necessary to look at the relationships between transnational media corporations, 
domestic media and the media policy-makers, as well as the changes in media structure, 
conduct, and performance. Based on the above dimensions, this research has four 
primary objectives: 
1. to identify the roles of transnational media corporations in the ongoing changes of 
China's media governance; 
2. to explore the incentives for media governance changes stemming from the TNMCs 
and globalization; 
3. to examine the existing and proposed structures of media regulation, assessing the 
performance of media-policy making; and, 
4. to synthesize the above three objectives, and to identify values and institutional 
features that may be built into future media governance in China. 
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2. HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND DEFINITIONS 
In light of the research background and objectives, the basis hypothesis upon which 
this dissertation is premised is as follows: 
The CCP has a powerful mechanism to control the transnational Information 
now. Thus, globalization and the transnational media corporations (TNNICs) have 
little impact on its media governance. 
To test the hypothesis, this research opens up and examines the interactions 
between transnational media corporations, the state governors, and the market forces for 
media reforms in the course of Chinese transition. It investigates the following 
fundamental questions: Why did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) survive and 
prosper when an increasing diversity of information carried by transnational media 
corporations (TNMCs) and other channels has been flooding into the country? What 
influence does globalization impose upon China's media governance? What are the 
political implications of the interactions among the increasing media actors? 
After investigating the research questions, this study disagrees with the hypothesis 
based on 'value-domination' model. In the case of China, the features of its media 
system do not completely reflect its political system. In other words, the monopoly of 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the mass media has been gradually dismantled in 
the course of globalization. This study will conclude that globalization and TNMCs have 
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increasingly profound influence on China's media governance in terms of 
transformation of media institutions, deregulation and rc-rcgulation of media policy, 
&-monopolization of media structure, and de-propagandization of media culture. 
Some definitions of key terms are also needed. The term 'globalization' is very 
difficult to derine. This study adopts the definition of Anthony Giddens, which 'the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way 
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. ' 
Therefore, 'local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral 
extension of social connection across time and space. ' (Giddens, 1990: 64) This study 
defines media globalization as the growing information flow beyond borders through 
increasing volume and variety of cross-bordcr transactions in media goods and 
information services, free international media investment, and widespread diffusion of 
communication technology. 
'Governance' has no generally accepted definition. In this study, media governance 
is defined as the effective exercise of political authority and the good use of institutional 
resources to manage media issues, affairs, activities, and problems. In other words, it is 
the collective actions (the use of institutions, adjustment of authority structures and 
allocations of resources) to create an effective political framework in managing the mass 
media. 
'Media', or 'mass media', refers to those organised channels or means of public 
dissemination of news, fact, opinion, entertainment, and other information. They include 
television, radio, newspapers, news websites, magazines, cinema films, and books. 
A transnational media corporation (TNMC) indicates a media corporation that 
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operates in more than one country to provide information and entertainment. 2 
'China' only refers to Mainland China here and excludes Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao. 
The time-scale in this research is the period from 1992 to 2004, not only because 
there are a huge number of existing works involved in the process of media reform, but 
also because it is a significant period in allowing the Chinese mass media to take shape. 
The year 1992 was a turning point in Chinese economic reform: the late paramount 
leader Deng Xiaoping made an inspection tour of southern China and called for 'further 
opening' and 'deeper reform'. After that, Chinese economic reform progressed at a 
faster rate and on a wider scale towards internationalization and globalization. The 
reforms in the mass media also showed such a trend. It is evident that a new media 
system, especially in the television sector, has been developing dramatically in the past 
decade. The year 1992 is a cornerstone of China's media governance, as well as Chinese 
economic reform. 
3. MEASURING THE INFLUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION AND 
TNMCs 
This study sees the institutionalization of media governance as the most appropriate 
theoretical means of analysis. The model logically 'opposite' to the iron-fisted model of 
media governance is the liberal model, in which interest groups freely create and 
circulate information under well-structured and institutionalized media governance. 
1 David Demers provides the term 'global mediurn'to analyze TNMCs. lie mainly focuses on the operation scope of 
media corporations, rather than their implications on media governance of the countries. See David Demers, Global 
Aledia, Aknace orAkssiah? (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2001). 
Chapter One Introduction 
Institutionalization facilitates disruptive change, rather than 'disintegrative change' 
(Brzczinski, 1998: 4-5). The influences of globalization and transnational media 
corporations on the Chinese mass media are analyzed along three dimensions: economy, 
politics and culture. This structure of analysis is rooted in the three-dimensional 
character of the Chinese news media as a media industry, a party organ and a culture 
transmitter. As Chris Barker suggests, understanding media governance 'requires a 
multi-dimcnsional approach which would seek to understand the connection between the 
economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of society without reducing social 
phenomena to any one dimcnsion. '(1997: 25) Concerning the complex intertwined 
relations between international and national forces, both of which are affecting media 
governance, an analysis from the point of view of institutional arrangements may 
provide a precise picture. 
Before economic reform, Chinese people were overwhelmed by official 
information and interpretations of reality in the media, in the workplace and even at 
home (Lynch, 1999: 3). After the opcn-door policies and economic reform, particularly 
after 1992, the control of the flow of communication was weakened by increasing 
interaction across borders through economic, political, social, and cultural activities. Ile 
media paid more attention to the tastes of their audience and to providing more 
information and entertainment. This transformation had official acquiescence because it 
could provide more of a marketplace of ideas, believed to be useful channels for 
economic reform so as to reduce the poverty gap and to rcalise modernization. 
Information from films, TV programmes, music, books and magazines provided by the 
TNMCs is changing the way the Chinese see the world. Additionally, technological 
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advances enable people to acquire different information (Pool, 1990). 
Normally, there are two main ways to assess the influence of globalization and the 
TNMCs. One is to examine the audience effect, in which we can understand the extent 
to which the programmes provided by TNMCs impinge on an audience's beliefs, values, 
behaviour, and so on. The other is the regulation response, in which we can gain 
knowledge of the degree to which global pressures affect the regulatory impetus, task, 
process and outcome. In this study, I focus on the regulatory responses by China's media 
authorities to manage TNMCs in the marketplace and the further responses to 
restructuring Chinese media organizations. These responses, through regulatory changes, 
can be classified and examined from four points of view: institutional adjustment, 
market entry, media structure, and operation norms. These views are examined 
respectively in Chapter Three, Four, Five and Six. 
The rationale for this research stems from two academic perspectives. One is the 
liberal perspective, which examines how and to what extent the free flow of information 
can stimulate, enhance and consolidate democracy. The other is institutionalism, which 
scrutinizes media structure, conduct and performance in order to evaluate transaction 
costs, participation, predictability, stability and transparency in the process of media 
governance. In this study, I combine the strengths of the two perspectives in order to 
examine the influences of globalization and TNMCs on China's media governance. 
It is worth pointing out that any examination of the influences of globalization and 
TNMCs is difficult and less meaningful when using quantitative measures, since the 
relevant data provided in China is inappropriate (I will discuss the data issue in the 
following section). A better option is that of qualitative measurement, or indeed, a 
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combination of the two. In this study, I emphasize qualitative research as a means of 
identifying the relationships between TNMCs and the other actors involved. I 
distinguish between the influences of the TNMCs on China's media governance as 
'active' and 'counteractive'. The 'active' effect is a direct result of the interventions of 
international programs, broadcasting, and capital in the Chinese media market. This 
could generate short-term and quantitative changes. Having more potential, the 
'counteractive' effect is the second-stage effect. It represents the way that the Chinese 
mass media adjusts its operation models to face global pressure and to work in a global 
environment. It drives the qualitative change of the Chinese mass media and the model 
of media governance. I firstly ascertain the tasks of TNMCs in shaping regulations in 
the Chinese media market, the motivations of the authorities in reshaping regulations, 
the bargains between TNMCs and the regulators, and the outcomes and adjustment of 
media policy decision-making. Moreover, I will also scrutinize the regulatory changes 
concerning the domestic media, which indirectly respond to the TNMCs. In other words, 
I seek to examine the structure of network relations, the process of consensus building 
and the outcome ofjoint problem solving of media governance in the 1990s. 
Investigations are made into Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou in three processes 
of media governance: deregulation and re-regulation of market entry; de-monopolization 
of the media market; and, de-propagandazation of media culture, respectively. They may 
provide rich implications for further discussion on Chinese media politics. 
De-regulation and re-regulation mean the tendency to lift restrictions on mass 
media in terms of the structure of ownership, production, distribution and promotion. 
Influenced by transnational forces, Chinese authorities have loosened many regulations 
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regarding mass media, according to international trade agreements and the negotiations 
between TNMCs and China's media regulators. This is discussed in Chapter Four. 
De-monopolization of media market, partly resulting from de-regulation and 
commercialization, is the tendency of media market structure to become multi-tiered, 
multi-channelled, rather than a state-owned monopoly. It places greater emphasis on 
market position and profitability, even among state and public service broadcasting and 
telecommunications firms; it also puts much weight on audience size, advertising 
revenue and producing programming with international appeal and adaptability to other 
media platforms. As the authorities have reduced and even stopped financial subsidies, 
Chinese media have to seek survival in the market. For more efficient operations, 
domestic media struggle for more autonomy in terms of operational scale and scope, 
resource locations, and even share structure. The TNMCs bargain with regulators to 
build up their own platforms of production, promotion, and distribution. As a result, 
China's media structure is transformed from a party-monopoly into a dualistic system, in 
which state-owned and private-owned media, national and international media compete 
with each other in the emerging market place. It is discussed in Chapter Five. 
De-propagandization of media culture, insofar as it is related to deregulation and 
de-monopolization, is presented in Chapter Six. It refers to the transformation of 
Chinese journalism from mono-Marxist journalism to a mix of Zola-journalism (Gross, 
2002: 120-121), paid journalism, escapism, hypnotism, and populism. The change in 
media culture represents an increasing diversity of media content, which now focuses on 
amusement, entertainment, and information, rather than on pure politics, ideology, and 
controversial issues. The media play a critical role in providing entertainment because of 
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encouragement not only by the government, but also by the market. This may lead to 
'dumbling down' of society, making citizens less sophisticated in the ways that they 
think about politics. 
As the authorities have changed their rules on the TNMCs since the 1990s, three 
policy logics-party logic, culture logic, and market logic - are involved in the process 
of media governance. These logics represent different interest groups, but they may 
share common ground in some particular cases. Party logic still stands in the most 
dominant position. The next is culture logic. Media logic has to struggle for more effort 
by policymakers. 
Party logic refers to 'the structural and cultural assets that govern the 
communications enacted by the parties' (Mazzoleni, 1987: 81). Mao Zedong made the 
role of media unequivocally clear in 1942 (1983: 96-98). He demanded that 'a comrade 
thoroughly conversant with the Party's correct lines should read the galley proof to 
amend its incorrect views before publication' (Mao Zedong, 1983: 155). Newspapers and 
news agencies should be tightened by the Party committees' supervision. As Yuezhi 
Zhao points out, the party's purpose is 'to educate the people, to win mass support for 
and active participation in carrying out the policies' (Zhao, 1998: 24). 
Cultural logic refers to the concerns for the protection of cultural identity through 
media governance. It is always linked to nationalism, and the notion that nations should 
be sovereign in their own territory (Sparks, 1994: 6-7). Nationalism is likely to 
reconsider the idea of cultural harmonization resulting from the extensive penetration by 
Western media content in the form of advertising, film, and television programming. 
Like many other developing countries, China believes that a small group of Western 
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countries, mainly the USA, not only control the international media trade but also use it 
to transmit their particular cultural and economic values such as individualism and 
consumerism to developing countries. This logically leads to so-called cultural 
protection policy. 
Media logic is a set of values and formats which media practitioners and 
organizations demand in order to promote a particular kind of presentation (Mazzoleni, 
1987). It requires the media to provide a forum in which ideas can generally be argued, 
and serves as a basic mechanism for providing a commentary on and criticism of 
government performance. The first step towards media logic in China is that of media 
reform, in which the media industry moves from a planned economy to a market 
economy. The significant shift is the transformation of the media's role from 
'propaganda instruments' to 'an industry', from 'leading the masses' to 'serving the 
consumers', and from 'tools' to 'service providers' (Zhao, 1998: 47-5 1). Therefore, the 
media industry has shown an encouraging picture, with an increasing number of media 
outlets and a dramatic change of media content, which is 'less hollow and emotional and 
more realistic and pragmatic' (Hong, 1998: 40). 
Globalization and economic reforms are the main forces forming the current mix 
of party, culture, and media logic in the Chinese media system. This logic is affected by 
external factors and internal factors. External factors are the TNMCs, international trade 
bodies, or international political and social unions like the WTO and the UN. Internal 
factors include the CCP, the government and domestic media. In the economic process, 
there are three types of actors: consumers, firms and governments. Likewise, these 
actors act within a media economy and play important roles as well (Doyle, 2002a: 4). 
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To put it briefly, I class them into three kinds of actors: regulators, the Chinese domestic 
media, and TNMCs. These actors integrate together during policy decision-making and 
the process of media governance. Regulators refer to domestic policy-makers, including 
the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the Ministry of Public Security (MoPS), the 
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), and so on. They stand at 
dominant and decisive positions, collecting opinions and concerns from the domestic 
media and TNMCs, and thereby making final decisions as to whether to practise 
censorship. In some cases, regulators arbitrate in conflicts between the domestic and 
TNMCs. Among the regulators, the government is concerned with regulatory, 
technological, and administrative affairs, and the Party decides on programming policies, 
content, and reporting themes (Interviewees I and 2; Hong, 1998: 48). The domestic 
media struggle against regulators for more freedom and independence on the one hand, 
and ally with the regulators to prevent TNMCs from penetrating into their markets on 
the other. Naturally, some of them ally with TNMCs and call for more freedom and 
autonomy in terms of media cooperation and market entry. In contrast, the TNMCs are 
in a weak position. They still struggle for their right of market entry and cooperate with 
domestic media. 
4. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY 
The main research strategy used in this thesis is the case study approach. More is 
known about those capitalist governments that have adjusted their media governance, 
following global changes, than their communist counterparts. There are many theories 
available to be tested under the capitalist system (Granham, 1990: 161-2; McQuail el. al., 
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1992; McQuail, 1998), but few theories are available that may be empirically tested 
under the communist system. In China, a country that promotes open-door policies 
whilst continuing to face economic and political dilemmas, improved living standards 
have provoked greater political awareness. In particular, the emergence of middle-class 
and private enterprises, while accounting for a small proportion of the total population, 
is beginning to play an increasingly important role in China's political and social arena. 
Therefore, this study may help to bridge the gap between the capitalist system and its 
communist counterpart. 
The strength of the case study approach is that 'it allows the researchers to use a 
variety of sources, a variety of types of data and a variety of research methods as part of 
the investigations. '(Denscombe, 1998: 31) It enables the researcher to deal with the 
complexity of social situations, relationship and process in a way that is denied to the 
survey approach. It also allows for the use of a variety of methods and multiple sources 
of data in order to capture the complex reality under scrutiny (Denscombe, 1998: 30-41). 
To examine media transition, in-depth fieldwork, focusing on comparative research 
across time from 1992, has been carried out. Although conducting fieldwork research in 
mainland China is broadly permissible these days, it is still difficult for international 
researchers to conduct their fieldwork in politically sensitive areas such as mass media, 
political communication and policy-making. The main reason is, no doubt, that the 
people involved do not wish to be interviewed because of their high political status and 
risk of informational disclosure. Some researchers complain that 'the restricted nature of 
the dissemination of information in the People's Republic of China has caused problems 
for the analysis of its political decision-making. '(Dreyer, 1996: 7) Fortunately, my 
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experience in the headquarters of Xinhua News Agency (XNA) has enabled me to gain 
many insights into the Chinese media. My background has also enabled me to take 
advantage of interviews, which provided a wide range of first-hand data. Based on first 
hand observation, interviews with officials in major media and institutes, fieldwork may 
contribute to a historical and comparative analysis of government and party documents, 
of the editorials of XNA and People ý Daily, and of media self-censorship. This should 
add to the originality of the study. 
Concerning the rationale discussed above, the elite interview is one of the crucial 
methods in this study. Semi-structured elite interviews may 'incorporate elements of 
both quantifiable, fixed-choice responding and the facility to explore, and probe in more 
depth, certain areas of interest. '(Brewerton and Milward, 2001: 70) During the research, 
a number of interviews have been conducted via E-mail, telephone and face-to-face 
from July 2003 to late 2004. All respondents were promised that their names and other 
identifying descriptors would be kept confidential. The interviewees drew upon a range 
of different experiences related to the media sphere in China. 55 in-depth interviews 
were conducted to examine central issues in Chinese media governance (see Appendix 
1). 
There are three kinds of interviewees that could be selected. They were 
media-policy-makers (11), communication industry representatives (41), and media 
researchers (3). The interviewees of media-policy-makers included those at country 
level (9) and those at province level (2). Questions to these were mainly related to 
regulatory changes since the 1990s. The major interviewees were drawn from media 
practitioners including those of TNMCs (4) and the Chinese domestic media (37). For 
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those from TNMCs, enquiries focussed on the presence of TNMCs in China, negotiation 
with Chinese media regulators and strategies within the Chinese market. For those from 
the Chinese media, enquiries related to the transformation of media operations, 
management and culture when they faced competition from TNMCs. The third category 
of interviewee, namely media researchers, divided into two groups: those who acted as 
researchers in media institutions (2), and those who worked in academic institutions (1). 
One of the purposes of selecting them was to enquire as to the process of 
media-policy-making. Another was to assess the extent to which regulators considered 
the influence of globalization and TNMCs on Chinese media governance. Considering 
the sensitivity of this topic in China, most interviews were carried out in informal spaces, 
such as tea houses, coffee bars, restaurants, hotels and even within the home. Most of 
them were not recorded. Therefore, after finished the interview, I wrote down the 
information related to this theme as soon as possible. 
Documentary research was also conducted involving the collection of relevant 
literature on the topic, including Chinese News Year books (Zhongguo xinwen nianbao) 
from various years, books and journal articles, newspaper articles, brochures and 
information bulletins from regulation organizations. The Internet web sites of media 
policy organizations and transnational media corporations and domestic media were an 
additional source of information. For example, the continuous changes in media 
governance, driven by TNMCs, are reflected by the official documents of the 
administration, such as the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the State 
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), the Ministry of Culture 
(MoC), the State Administration of Press and Publications (SAPP), and the Ministry of 
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Telecommunications (MoT). In addition, the annuals of some key domestic media 
players, such as the Xinhua News Agency (XNA), the China Centre Television (CCTV), 
Renminribao (People's Daily), and so on, have been collected. 
In terms of data for this study, although the PRC began to import media 
production since it was established in 1949, quantitative official data that could be used 
to address the research question at both national and regional levels are available only 
from the mid-1990s onwards. Given this relatively short period, a chronological analysis 
of annual data is clearly inappropriate. Since international imports are a dynamic 
process, and specifically in the case of China, where a huge number of items are 
imported underground by different companies, the use of panel data is likely to be the 
most appropriate way for a systematic and efficient analysis of the national and regional 
distribution and promotion, TNMC trade linkages and the impact of TNMCs. In addition, 
panel data from such academic organizations as the Institute of Communication at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) and the Centre of International 
Communication at Qinghua University might possess some advantages for academic 
research partly because of the unreliability of official data. 
5. OUTLINES OF CONTENT 
This study argues that there is a substantial impact of globalization and TNMCs 
upon media governance. The traditional model of media governance has gradually been 
dismantled and transformed from a 'leader-determined' model to a 'consensus-building' 
model. This model has become increasingly institutional ised with the increase of 
governance participants. 
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In Chapter Two, I review the existing literature related to media globalization and 
media governance in China. There is much work about those capitalist governments that 
have adjusted their media governance following global changes, but there is little on the 
Chinese communist governments. Therefore, there are many theories available to be 
tested under the capitalist system (Granham, 1990: 161-2; McQuail et. al., 1992; McQuail, 
1998), but few theories are available that may be empirically tested under the 
communist system. This study seeks to explore the importance of TNMCs in China and 
the significance of media governance in China's media politics. 
Chapter Three investigates the media institutional transfon-nation since 1992. It 
provides profound background for further understanding of the Chinese communication 
system. 
The main body displays investigations which are considered in three dimensions 
of media governance. Chapter Four explores the deregulation and re-regulation of 
market entry when increasing TNMCs have entered Chinese media market. Chapter 
Five investigates the de-monopolization of media structure, that is how the monopoly of 
the party-controlled system has been dismantled under globalization. Chapter Six 
explores the de-propagandazation of media culture. The investigations could provide 
rich original material for further discussion about Chinese media politics. 
In the conclusion chapter, I employ the term 'dismantlement ', which is one of the 
original contributions in this study, to summarize the media politics in China during the 
period from 1992 to 2004. It also provides some suggestions for further studies. 
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6. CONTRIBUTION 
So far, this chapter has presented the research background, research objectives, 
research questions, and research methods. This dissertation aims to provide five main 
contributions to the academic literature on the subject. 
Firstly, it provides original, systematic research regarding Chinese media 
governance. Although China exerts tight control over its mass media, which play a 
significant role in the social control of the CCP, the country has, since the 1980s, begun 
to ease its control over non-political fields such as finance, fashion, and technology. This 
change has been rapid, if uneven, and its process of governance needs to be examined. 
There has been extensive empirical literature on the relative importance of various 
changes in the media in China. However, little systematic work has been conducted with 
regard to media governance. Thus, this research is an attempt to fill this gap in studies of 
political communication, so as to make a contribution to the understanding of 
policy-making within China. 
Secondly, this research seeks to reverse, or at least to enrich the 'value-domination' 
model within the study of media politics. Traditional academic literature maintains that 
the feature of a given media system depends on its political system. A media system is 
determined by the value of dominant groups within that society. This study provides a 
significant correction to the 'value-domination' model, illustrating that although China 
is still a communist country, its media system does not completely represent the ruling 
party in the course of globalization. The argument that a single, dominant value system 
determines all of the important features of a media system and a society is clearly 
inadequate in interpreting and dealing with a transformative change of the kind that this 
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study has examined. 
Thirdly, this study provides significant evidence as to the main hypotheses 
proposed in the literature to analyze the political, economical, and cultural determinants 
of transnational media corporations (TNMCs) in China from a macro perspective. Using 
original data, this study identifies the role of TNMCs in undermining the dominance of 
the CCP within the Chinese media market. In cooperating with provincial and local 
media channels, TNMCs penetrate into most of the provinces of China. The monopoly 
of Party-media (for instance, CCTV in the television sector, the Xinhua Book Store in 
publication distribution, the Xinhua News Agency in news releases) has been gradually 
dismantled. Therefore, China's media structure has been transformed from a 
party-monopoly to a dualistic system. 
Fourthly, the present study is a rich empirical study of the media market 
competition and its consequence in China. It shows that TNMCs and domestic media are 
the two important means of pluralization of information, and they could both have a 
positive impact on policy-makers. The proliferation of media outlets since the 1990s has 
forced editors to become 'marketeers'. In order to survive in the marketplace, China's 
state-owned media, traditionally collaborating with non-commercial interests through 
the support of governmental funding, are now beginning to find new ways of enriching 
their operations outside the mainstream governmental sectors. The alliance with 
commercial interests is no longer a taboo, but a necessity, and also a way of dealing with 
cost-saving pressures. The reforrns have had unintended consequences that have further 
undermined the Party's political monopoly. 
Fifthly, and related to the previous contributions, this study provides rich data 
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concerning the 'dumbling down' of Chinese media culture. The implications of 
entertainment have been significantly ignored in the literature on media politics in 
China. The presence of TNMCs in China has generated increasing entertainment and a 
sense of pluralism within journalism. The de-propogandalization of media culture has 
dismantled the monopoly of Marxist media culture. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURF, REVIEW: WHY GLOBALIZATION MATTERS IN 
CHINA'S MEDIA GOVERNANCE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will review the literature related to globalization and media governance 
in China. It is an attempt to identify a research gap for this study. In general, there is a 
large amount of literature on China's media, media globalization, and media politics. 
However, there is relatively little on transnational media corporations (TNMCs) in China 
and their influence on media governance. In particular, there are several ways of 
exploring China's media politics, for instance, from the point of view of liberal 
democracy, media imperialism and nationalism, as well as transnational and transcultural 
political -economic perspectives. However, few studies tackle this theme from the point of 
view of institutionalization. The purpose of this study is to fill this academic gap. 
The importance of TNMCs is self-evident. The total revenue from China's 
national broadcasting industry in 1999 was 36 billion Yuan (Zhou Wei, 2002: 33), that is, 
nearly 4.5 billion US dollars. This represents only one ninth of the revenue of AOL Time 
Warner in 2000 (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 137), which generates businesses in movies, 
publishing, music, cable TV, and the Internet throughout the world. As can be seen, the 
annual revenue of a single TNMC can be much larger than that of a country's media 
market or even the gross domestic product (GDP) of an individual nation-state. The 
economic power of TNMCs adds weight to our consideration of the significance of media 
27 
ChapterTwo Literature Review: Why Globalization Matters in China's Media Governance 
globalization. In the Chinese context, the importance of TNMCs is twofold. On the one 
hand, China officially allows TNMCs to enter the marketplace in a limited fashion. On 
the other hand, it tries to control their influence on Chinese society. This study argues that 
such complex media governance can be interpreted from the perspective of 
institutionalization. This may be understood either in terrns of the older concept of 
'ideological hegemony' (Gramsci, 197 1: notebooks 24 and 26) or in the more fashionable 
terms of 'soft power' (Nye, 1990: 153-172; Keohane and Nye, 2001: Chap. 1). The 
institutionalization of media governance in China can also be comprehended either in 
terms of media transformation from an authoritarian model into a liberal one (Siebert, el 
aL, 1963), or in the democratic sense of the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and 
coherence of state organizations (Huntington, 1968: 12-24). 
Unlike the literature on Chinese media politics, the approach to institutionalization 
employed by this research may give rise to a new way of understanding globalization and 
media governance in the People's Republic of China. It refers to the acceptance of a 
constitutional process, citizenship ideals and the rule of law (Hu Angang, 2004). In the 
media sector, the policy of allowing 'a hundred schools of thought to contend'within the 
Party's orbit has little realistic impact on the formulation of cultural and media policy 
(Zhao, 1998; Lynch, 1999). It is bargaining between different parties that imposes 
profound structural influence on media governance. Such a process indicates a 
combination of institutional ised social practices and increasing entrepreneurial ism 
(Keane, 2001: 783-98). Broadly speaking, institutionalization may be the most realistic 
concept to explain the complex resistance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to 
pluralization and democratization, which were assumed consequences of China's 
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integration to media globalization. As Andrew J. Nathan suggests, the survival of the 
CCP resides in four aspects of institutionalization: 'the increase of norm-bound nature of 
its succession politics', 'the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional 
considerations in the promotion of political elites', the increase of special institutions 
within the regime, and the increase of institutions for political participation (Nathan, 2003: 
5-6). Viewing China's modernization as a process of institutional changes approaching 
modernity, Fei-Ling Wang contends that the direction of Chinese reforms in the past two 
decades is 'a state-led modernization: to introduce and "utilize" the market 
institution. '(Wang, 1998: xiii) The validity and revision of these approaches are 
considered with reference to China's media politics. 
This literature review is divided into three parts. Firstly, it reviews media 
globalization and its impact on global media governance. Here, it will be seen that little 
English literature actually focuses on the influence of globalization upon media 
governance. Secondly, this chapter discusses three frameworks in the literature that are 
relevant to the impact of globalization upon China's media governance, including liberal 
democracy, media imperialism and nationalism, and transnational and transcultural 
political-economic perspective, reviewing their strengths and weaknesses in discussing 
the theme of media globalization and Chinese media politics. Thirdly, it addresses an 
evaluation of these approaches, before outlining my own approach, namely the 
institutional foundation perspective, in terms of Chinese political and social 
characteristics. With little literature concerning China's media governance, the 
institutionalization perspective may provide a new approach to examining the 
transformation of media politics since 1990s in the course of globalization. 
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2 MEDIA GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 
From the 1990s onwards, academics have applied the concept of governance, in 
order to recognise the fact that not one, but many centres of power link together a whole 
variety of state actors. These actors could be at the local, regional, national, or 
supranational level, and cover all facets within the discipline-comparative, economic, 
societal and regional politics, public administration, and democracy (Pierre, 2000). James 
N. Rosenau provides a succinct and insightful definition as follows: 'governance is order 
plus intentional ity. '(Rosenau, 1991: 5) Focusing on the interactions between the actors 
involved, Jon Pierre defines governance as 'sustaining co-ordination and coherence 
among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as political 
actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational 
organ ization. '(Poerre, 2000: 3-4) In this sense, governance is seen as a process of 
activities by multiple actors, including government, institutional players, and individuals. 
This process contributes to the aggregation of interests and demands, and to the 
coordination of different actors and their activities. In this movement of governance, 
'modes of coordinating collective action and of integrating individuals and groups into 
this collective action are changing' (Pinson, 2002: 478). Thus, governance may be 
examined in three ways, including a new process of governing, a changed condition of 
ordered regulation, and a new method by which society is governed (Finder, cited by 
Rhodes, 2000: 55). Good governance refers to 'creating an effective political framework 
conducive to private economic action-stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state 
administration adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform, and a strong 
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civil society independent of the state. '(Hirst, 2000: 14) 
From the 1990s onwards, a significant development in research into governance 
has been fuelled by economic globalization and the growing importance of trarisnational 
political institutions, such as the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as transnational corporations like General 
Electric (GE), Ford, AOL Time-Warner, and so on. The rapid growth of interconnections 
between these organizations has made 'globalization' a buzzword for intellectuals, 
businessmen, politicians, media and other circles. According to the literature on 
governance, the processes of globalization in terms of culture, politics and the economy 
challenge the conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty. Some authors argue that states 
are not the only sources of legitimacy, accountability, and law. International factors are 
increasingly autonomous and effective (Hirst, 2000: 132-33). Globalization has been a 
key theme attached to the 'hollowing-out of the state' (Rhodes, 1997). Others oppose the 
view of Rhodes, arguing that the degree of economic integration in global markets has 
often been overestimated (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In many fields, the national 
government remains 'the dominant factor in determining policy. '(Richards and Smith, 
2002: 153) Governance has been concerned with both exogenous and endogenous 
changes in the policy-making arena. These changes have affected the resources, context 
and structure of the arena in which the core executive operates. The new governance 
under globalization does not mean the end or decline of the state, but it means 'the 
transformation and adaptation of the state to the society it is currently embedded 
in'(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 68). In other words, the state is still crucial as a goal-setting 
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structure if not always as an implementing structure. 
The debate about the impact of globalization produces an insightful understanding 
of governance. Some authors have mentioned that globalization has given rise to some 
particular issues such as independence of policy-making in the developing countries. 
Political pressure exerted by developed countries has made developing countries open up 
their economies during the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the United States used Section 
301 of the Trade Act to press heavily for the liberalization of foreign investment 
regulations (Milner and Keohane, 1996: 24). The gap between the rich countries and the 
poor ones is widening. It prompts us to explore why globalization does not imply 'either 
homogenisation or equality' (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 230; Thussu, 2002). Globalization 
creates costs and constraints. Economic integration among individual countries requires 
adjustment, though it is often painful (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). Individuals and 
groups struggle for their loss and gains by attempting to push globalization on their 
favoured track (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 235). This assumption needs empirical data to 
make it more convincing. 
In the media sector, governance is driven by 'a diversity of competing economic, 
social, political, and cultural goals' (Siochru and Girard, 2002: ix), because the mass 
media play a special, significant role related to economics, human rights and social issues. 
In western countries, media governance is mainly linked with the concentration of media 
ownership. Its aim is to prevent excessive industrial control and to ensure a plurality and 
diversity of media sources for social, cultural and political development. Thus, regulation 
is one of the critical components of media governance. In general, there are two kinds of 
rationale for media regulation: industrial and social regulation. Although there are unique 
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characteristics in the media sector, media industrial regulation can be justified as 
necessary to ensure fair competition and to combat oligopoly and unfair trading practices. 
Critical aspects of media industrial regulation include protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs), concentration of media ownership, and control of gateways between layers 
of content production, content compilation and management, broadcast management, 
infrastructure provision, and user equipment production and distribution to final 
consumers. The importance of the mass media in politics and culture makes the economic 
regulation of the industry more complex. For most of the countries in the world, social 
regulation of the media industry aims at ensuring media diversity and plurality to sustain 
freedom of the press and universal accessibility. Apart from catering to different audience 
interests, media diversity requires that media content should reflect different views, 
including dissenting opinions, and remain impartial and refrain from standing for a 
specific sectional interest. Furthermore, media plurality should offer people different 
types of media, different avenues for media participation, and different ranges and depth 
of content (Yu Guoming, 2004a: chap. 2-3). 
In the process of media governance, there are three types of actors as mentioned in 
the normative tradition: consumers, firms, and governments (Dolye, 2002b: 4). 
Identifying these actors, Vincent Mosco and Vanda Rideout summarise three basic 
models of state and media policy in developed capitalist countries (Mosco and Rideout, 
1997). These are pluralist, managerial and class power respectively. All the models regard 
the state as having a critical role. The pluralist model, developed from the view that 
power is situational, maintains that media practitioners should be regulated to meet broad 
public interest goals, in order to reflect the democratic principles of fairness and equity. 
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The managerial model focuses on the influence of bureaucratic rationalization, arguing 
that there is a causal relationship between the quantity of media services and qualitative 
changes in the structure of media industries. The class power model contends that media 
policy should overcome class divisions. Although their analysis is limited to the 
political economy of communication, Mosco and Rideout outline a roadmap on media 
policy between the state and the major participants in North America. To some degree, 
they introduce balance into the discussion of media policy research by remedying the 
tendency in the literature to respond primarily to the demands of industries affected by 
media policy and of the government responsible for setting media policy and regulation. 
In employing the case of China, this study will examine the activities of consumers, 
media firms and the Chinese government in the course of globalization. 
As global forces have increased, models of media governance need to be adapted 
from the national level to the international one. The state is still important, but 
international forces receive much more attention. Marshall McLuhan's 'global village' 
has been partly realized: advanced communication technologies have made information 
flow beyond borders at a speed and volume never seen in history. The transformation of 
media corporations from national to international plays a critical role in shaping the 
on-going globalization (Herman and McChesney, 1997). With the huge number of 
audiences that it reaches around the world, the recent growth of satellite television 
provides a good example to demonstrate the scale and scope of media globalization. In 
Asia, News Corp. 's Star TV reached 11.1 million households within 2 years of its 
inauguration in the early 1990s. In Latin America, there were one million satellite 
television viewers by the end of 1997. CNN alone penetrated over 150 nations and 
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territories in the early 1990s (Wang, 1997: 3 10). Global television channels, such as CNN, 
MTV, HBO, ESPN, TNT, Nickelodeon, the Cartoon Channel, Discovery, Disney, and so 
on, began to expand their existing channels from USA to Europe, Latin America, and 
Asia (Straubharr, 1997). Therefore, media governance at the national level gives way to 
'international structures of governance emphasizing trade and commercial considerations 
above all else' (Siochru and Girard, 2002: ix). Seeing interactions among state, 
individual, and non-government organizations, David Hesmondhalgh identifies four 
waves of governing changes in the past two decades, all involved in deregulation, 
marketization, and privatization. 
9 The first policy changes initially took place in the USA from the 1980s onwards; 
The second wave appeared from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s in other advanced 
industrial countries, such as Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan; 
The third wave arrived in countries which experienced social and political transition 
after 1989, such as the Soviet Union and China where strong authoritarian traditions 
of state control and ownership were being replaced or modified by policies of 
marketization and even 'liberalization'; 
9 The fourth wave influenced all regions and polities with concern for the convergence 
of cultural industries. (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 115) 
Media governance in China, together with that of other transitional states, has 
been challenged by resistance to globalization in media policy (Yang Boxu, 2003: 29-38). 
In Asia, there are four major types of policy response to satellite television: virtual 
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suppression in Malaysia and Singapore, where satellite television was banned; regulated 
openness in Hong Kong and the Philippines, where direct reception of satellite television 
programmes was allowed, but the authorities exerted control over programme 
redistribution over cable networks; limited openness in India and Taiwan, where direct 
reception was illegal; and unintended in China, where the ban on satellite dishes was 
ineffective (Chan, 1994b: 112-130). Overall, John Lent suggests, 
'Mass media in Asia have changed drastically since the late 1980s, owning in part 
to already cited tendencies toward more openness on the part of governments but also of 
the universal push toward globalization and its attendant side effects of privatization and 
deregulation. '(1 998: 153) 
The cases from Asia demonstrate that, to a great extent, global pressure has 
increasingly significant influence on individual countries in media policy-making. They 
may respond to global changes, either in an active manner or in a passive one. Facing the 
challenge of deregulation and the increasing popularity of TNMCs, media policy makers 
4were left with little choice but to adopt a more liberalized policy strategy. '(Wang, 1997: 
311) In other words, the domestic media regulatory systems have to be concerned with 
the direct pressures on politicians and the political process from media giants, who 
accumulate the excessive market power of individual firms (Humphreys, 1999: 2748). 
The pressures that come from global institutions have brought about neo-liberal policy 
changes throughout Latin America and Africa (Milner and Keohane, 1996: 255-6). For 
instance, the WTO, an engine of free trade, plays an important role in reshaping 
governance in terms of administrative transparency and predictability. Some developing 
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countries, such as Asian countries like reforming China, have to move from a 'control 
mode' to a 'developing mode', and even accept media liberalization. In the Chinese 
context, at least four phrases are used to describe the transition and transformation of 
media politics, which are 'from party's mouthpiece and tone to party's commercial unit 
of public opinion' (He, 2000: 112-151), 'from directed propaganda institution to 
state-owned information industry' (Chen Huailin, 2002: 97), 'from ideology media to 
industrial media' (Huang Shengmin, 1999: 5), and 'from political domain to political 
public sphere' (Qian Wei, 2002: 175). Meanwhile, some scholars contend that media 
governance in China has never changed because 'the Party has left its opponents at the 
margins of the Chinese information world' (Keller, 2003: 133). All these arguments have 
their merits in helping us to understand Chinese media politics, but they do not regard 
mass media as important political institutions in politics. They also neglect the functions 
of different actors at international, national and local levels. Regarding media as critical 
political actors, this study attempts to fill the gap in studying China's media politics. 
Media globalization leads individual states to integrate with each other, and to 
reconsider their media governance at an international level, rather than only at a national 
level (McQuail, 1998; Siochru and Girard, 2002). In the Chinese context, as some 
scholars suggest, the forces driving media transformation are more influenced by 'global 
events, political processes, and multilateral trade agreements than at any time in the 
past. '(Keane and Donald, 2002: 200) Thus, an increase of the variables in media 
governance analysis is necessary, in terms of both national and international aspects. With 
the global trends toward commercialization, liberalization, privatization, and 
internationalization, there are more concerns about the challenge to national sovereignty 
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and the increased power of TNMCs from the renegotiation of trade agreements and the 
implementation of new ones, such as GATT, the WTO, and the EU. For instance, the 
changed nature of European broadcasting raised many issues (Burgelamn, 1997). The 
accumulation of excessive market power by individual firms has been underlined. 
Together with the electronics and advertising industries, publishers of the press, cable 
television lobbyists, independent producers, broadcasting facilities companies, and 
financial investors share a common aim of breaking up the public media monopoly and 
establishing a regulatory framework that would be favourable to commercial enterprise 
(Humphreys, 1996). With organizational networks in many networks, these transnational 
corporations keep operational control to exploit their international business activities and 
connections (McQuail, et aL 1992: 22; Hutchison, 1999: 27-48). TNMCs, particularly the 
ones involved in telecommunications, have altered the traditional relationship between 
state actors and the industry (Youngs, 1996: 64-65). The shift of power partly from 
traditional government to commercial units is probably less visible, but it has much 
potentiality. Therefore, as media globalization raised issues in the international media 
market in the 1990s, this study attempts to examine whether cross-border media 
performance could respect the sovereignty of nation-states. 
3 LIBERAL BROKER PERSPECTIVF, 
In the previous section, the weight of media globalization and TNMCs has been 
discussed, this section will review the liberal perspective on media globalization and 
TNMCs in the context of Chinese media politics. In the literature, the liberal perspective 
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regards TNMCs, along with globalization, as brokers to break the Chinese authoritarian 
regime. It argues that freer flows of information and increasing integration in global 
communication systems have produced a profound impact on reforming China and its 
media governance (Lull, 1991; Chan, 1994a; Lynch, 1999; Lynch, 2000). These flows 
would provide alternative information completely different from official messages, 
weakening the Party's control, and facilitating pluralization of communication. The gap 
between Party line and reality is widening because many Chinese are able to access 
different information, 'eroding the legitimacy of CCP rule' (Clemans, 1999: 4). These 
so-called 'spiritually polluting' communications, acting as invisible weapons, have 
significantly undermined the capacity of the state's media governance to create a 
tsocialist spiritual civilization' (Lynch, 2000). The cases of East Europe have 
demonstrated that the TNMCs have significant influence in shaping the transitions of this 
region in the late 1980s (Bennett, 1998). Therefore, it assumes the same would take place 
in China's media governance. 
The liberals view TNMCs as significant institutions for a nation-state to gain mutual 
benefits from integration with media globalization. TNMCs are 'the missionaries of our 
age' (Herman and McChesney, 1997: 37). The liberal perspective regards 'the free flow of 
information' as an effective mechanism to promote political democracy, to maintain 
social stability, and to produce sustained economic growth. For its supporters, the 
primary goal of international communication was to promote democracy, freedom of 
expression and a market-orientated system (Clemans, 1999; Bennett, 1998; Nye, 2002). 
The heart of the free flow of information is the right of media corporations, particularly 
the TNMCs, to sell their commodities wherever and whatever they want (Hernman and 
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McChesney, 1997: 17). The liberals insist that via their platforms in advertising and 
marketing their goods and service in transnational markets, the TNMCs may promote the 
Western life-style and its values of capitalism and individualism (Thussu, 2000: 55-56). 
In the Chinese context, Sun Xupei argues that the country's global integration, 
especially its entry into the WTO, would push the news media on the track to throw off 
influence from the authoritarian regime (Sun Xupei, 2001; 2004). Tong Bing suggests that 
China's entry into the WTO has driven the Chinese government to improve its 
administrative transparency, in which the media authorities could adjust their industrial 
and social regulation to follow international codes (Tong, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). China's 
WTO membership and integration with the global free trade system would liberate 
Chinese traditional governance (Wang, 2000; 2002), and the WTO would unleash forces 
that may hasten the demise of the one-party state (Holbig, 2002: 2). Freedom of press and 
expression is predicated on economic freedom and private property (Zhang Aizhong, 
1999; Liu Junning, 2000; Liu Junning, 1998). 
All these arguments assume that the global forces may drive China to reduce 
political interference in the economy in the first stage, then, increase governmental 
transparency, establish institutions to implement the rule of law, and finally undermine 
the structural basis of authoritarian regime. Concerning their roles in conveying diverse 
information, the TNMCs may bring about many benefits to the developing countries in 
general. This is especially the case for China, in which media globalization and TNMCs 
may help promote its social development at least in the following three respects. 
First, media globalization and TNMCs may contribute to the advancement of a more 
democratic political order. In a democratic society, political power is institutionally 
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diffused. The allocation of power to specified agents is realized via the explicit choices of 
that society. Moreover, competition and participation is intrinsic to this deliberative 
process. In this process, the media must contribute to a more competitive or participatory 
political system on the one hand and to the institutional ised diffusion and fragmentation 
of political power conferred by the electorate upon a chosen group of representatives on 
the other (Rozumilowicz, 2002: 9-25). 
Second, media globalization and TNMCs may support marketized economic 
structures by providing more information on products and services and promote enhanced 
social understanding through universal access to information regarding social groups. 
TNMCs may contribute an organizational solution to inefficiencies and low productivity 
in the marketplace because they have the resources and capacity to produce higher quality, 
more content-diverse media products and services (Cai Wen, 2003). They could impose 
great pressure on the Chinese media to improve the efficiencies of reallocation of media 
resources. 
Third, media globalization and TNMCs may deliver educational, informational, and 
cultural content to worldwide areas through various platforms like press, radio, television, 
satellite broadcasting, and Internet. Within free media markets, TNMCs may diffuse 
managerial skills from media-developed countries to media-developing ones. The 
managerial revolution is 'the most underappreciated trend in the media industry today' 
(Demers, 2002: 153). In the context of China, free press and free media markets are 
significant for Chinese society in the course of transformation, modernization, 
pluralization, and democratization. It is the free market idea that helps create the 'CNN 
effect', which encapsulates the idea that live reporting via advanced communication 
41 
Chapter Two Literature Review: Why Globalization Matters in China's Media Governance 
technologies may provoke major responses by the domestic audiences and political elites 
to national and international events (Hoge, 1994: 136-44). If they were under a freer 
regulatory place, the media in China, including TNMCs and the Chinese domestic media, 
may become agents in the political process and social transition and function as 'a social 
institution and democracy' (Hong, 2002: 4). 
The liberal perspective assumes that if mass media are free of interference from 
government, business, or dominant social groups, they may play their role as watchdog 
better. Therefore, the media may maintain and support the competitive and participative 
elements for modem democratic societies (Rozumilowicz, 2002). Although ideological 
control persists, Chinese media governance has transformed into a model of media 
liberalization under authoritarianism (Chan and Qiu, 2002: 27-46). The messages 
transferred by TNMCs, particularly by its entertainment programmes, act as an agent for 
cultural and ideological changes in China, offering alternatives to uniform official 
ideologies, expectations, and lifestyles (Lull, 1991). The foreign and domestic television 
programmes have produced visions of liberation from the suffocating circumstances of 
everyday life. G. C. Chu and Y. A. Ju draw similar conclusions with substantial data from 
a 1,500-sample survey in the Shanghai area (Chu and Ju, 1993). Media globalization has 
become a new factor exerting significant pressure on political change (Ferdinand, 
1991: 310-311). Daniel Lynch situates China's information revolution in an appropriate 
historical context. He documented the steady erosion of control over communication 
channels and messages by the global force in China along with the party's futile efforts to 
reassert' such control (Lynch, 1999,2002). He conceptualizes this in the term 
'public-sphere praetorianism', which means 'a condition in which neither the state nor 
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any other organized political force can impose order and purpose upon the initiation and 
circulation of society's communication messages-the building blocks of the "symbolic 
environment" from which people derive their worldview, values, and action strategies' 
(Lynch, 1999: 2). 
The liberal approaches toward globalization and TNMCs share an argument that 
there is a causal linkage between a free media market and pluralization and democracy. A 
free press is regarded as a midwife of democratization and modernity. Accordingly, some 
of its essential components are freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
freedom of assembly (Thompson, 1995). It is completely impossible to develop a 
democratic government without the support of free and independent media. The 
significance of penetration of TNMCs and international information is not only just a big 
phenomenon, but more importantly, a global one (Serift, 2000). To various degrees, 
TNMCs, who own the advanced communication technologies, became a powerful 
democratic instrument in the liberal wave of the 1990s. They supported the democratic 
campaigns like that of ETAN (East Timor Action Network) over human rights abuses in 
East Timor in the 1990s; they enhanced the interaction between Chinese student exiles 
from the Tiananmen Square Incident since the spring of 1989; they also helped students 
and citizens in protests against attempts by the socialist regime to hijack the local 
elections in Belgrade in 1996 (Walch, 1999). As western media penetrated into the East 
European media (Sparks, 1992), freer flows of information produced 'a liberal path' 
during the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chan, 2002). In China, 
Joseph Man Chan conducted a comparative study on satellite broadcasting and an 
audience effect study on cross-border content between Hong Kong and Guangzhou, 
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arguing that the audience may change their beliefs, values, expectations, norms and life 
style after continuously viewing the TNMCs' programmes (Chan, 1997: 94-105). 
Although Chan pays much more attention to the process of the influences, rather than 
their result, his study is valuable in providing analysis of the influences of media 
globalization. Consequently, the TNMCs offer Chinese audiences more resources for 
constructing arguments and identities (McCormick and Liu, 2003: 139). They may 
empower the citizens to recreate the world in the image of a global village. From this 
visualized world, audiences know more about what is happening everywhere with news 
around the globe. The TNMCs feed the citizens with diversity of information, grounding 
a solid base for establishing mutual understanding and social consciousness. In this sense, 
although Habermas' version of the public sphere has some limitation because of its 
male-centrism, Euro-centrism, and bourgeois-centrism, it does provide supportive 
evidence for the free flow of information to promote democracy against opposition to the 
Chinese authoritarian regime (Lynch, 1999: Chap. 1). I will further discuss this issue in 
Chapter Six. 
Third, the liberal perspective values the contribution made by individual 
nation-states in pulling down their trade barriers on media products. It recommends that 
government should remove barriers such as high protective tariffs or product quotas on 
media products. It also suggests that media policies should be liberalized and deregulated 
so as to give way to 'free flow of information' (Thussu, 2000: 55-56). A key issue is that 
'transnational media firms and advertisers can be permitted to operate globally, with 
minimal governmental intervention. '(Herman and McChesney, 1997: 17) Government 
efforts to regulate the operations of TNMCs are strongly discouraged. Some authors 
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argue that government attempts to control TNMCs may do more harm than good (Warren, 
1980). A free society should enable audiences to know and choose what they want to read, 
watch, and listen to. Media practitioners should provide audiences with what they want. 
The government should defer to the media practitioners' ability to determine the wants of 
their audiences under the normal mechanisms of the marketplace. In the fully 
re-regulated marketplace, the highest bidder would make the best and most efficient use 
of resources. 
The strengths of the liberal perspective are discussed so far, but it does also have its 
weaknesses. Firstly, the positive argument advocating the 'liberal path' and 'free flow of 
information' ignores the domestic resistance from media governance by the CCP or other 
administrative institutions. Although there are some limitations in framing the issue of 
media governance (e. g. neglecting transnational satellite broadcasting), Junhao Hong 
warns that internal factors, such as governmental policies, are often more decisive in the 
internationalization process of the Chinese television than external factors, such as the 
advantages of foreign programming (Hong, 1998: 78-100). For instance, the local network 
has the right to censor and even block sensitive information during the transmission of 
Chinese-language satellite channels provided by Time Warner and News Corp. 's Star TV 
in southern China (Zeng Huaguo, 2004: 225). Therefore, to assess the influence of media 
globalization on China, it needs examining the paths where the domestic resistance has 
taken place. 
Second, the freer flow of information in China cannot follow Habermas's 
normative tradition that views civil society and the associated idea of public sphere 
activity as mechanisms that enable forms of public debate. Such mechanisms in turn 
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affect the formulation of policy. Daniel Lynch provides an important case to challenge the 
notion that freer flows of information inevitably produce a genuine 'civil society'. He 
demonstrates that at least in the Chinese case, the results are characterized by social 
fragmentation, chaos, and cacophony (Lynch, 1999: 5). There is another argument against 
the normative tradition. Michael Keane argues that it is true that citizens in liberal 
democracies seek to influence the formulation of policy by the force of ideas, by interest 
group activities and ultimately through the ballot box, but till now it has not taken place 
in China (Kean, 2001). Then, Chinese civil society might succeed as a descriptive device 
to indicate an increasing separation of government and society. But, the argument that 
social groups have significant influence on the cultural and media policy-making is 'a 
case of misplaced optimism about the nature of social change. '(Kean, 2001: 783) 
Third, it neglects the motivations behind the global expansion of TNMCs, thus takes 
for granted ideological conflicts between TNMCs and Chinese media politics. This study 
assumes that like other commercial entities, TNMCs are primarily geared towards 
maximizing profits and satisfying shareholders. For this purpose, TNMCs pursue 
economies of scale and scope, taking full advantage of market expansion. They seldom 
cover the relevant issues or content for the poor and other disadvantaged groups. Instead, 
they often expose injustice and wrong-doing in the most powerful elite groups in society, 
acting as 'not simply lap dogs of the rich and powerful. '(Demers, 2001: xxiii) Therefore, 
although there are unavoidable ideological differences between the Chinese government 
and the TNMCs, global capitalism and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' may also 
reach compromise. The TNMCs would not like to challenge the ideology of the state (Lee, 
2003: 24). The co-existence of ideological cross-promotion between capitalist and 
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Chinese socialist media, by contrast, may further embrace market ideology and 
consumerism. 
Fourth, the liberal perspective fails to give enough consideration to the linkage 
between freer information and social changes. It is true that the diversity of information 
would provide more opportunities for the citizens to be aware of their own rights. This 
evaluation has general support theoretically, but lacks empirical and systematic evidence 
in details, particularly in individual nation-states. The presence of information diversity 
does not subsequently lead to social pluralization and democracy. It needs more 
institutional arrangements either from the government or non-government organizations 
to act as an agent to bargain for citizens' rights in the policy-making and governing 
process. 
4. THE CHINESE NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
The Chinese nationalist perspective on globalization and media governance in 
China mainly concentrates on issues of cultural identity and security in the era of 
globalization when TNMCs appeared in China. The notion of nationalism is an ideology 
grounded upon the proposition that nations should be sovereign in their own states 
(Sparks, 1994: 5-6). The nationalists argue that Chinese media governance should not 
separate itself from culture and identity. It can be exemplified when the authorities decide 
on concrete issues such as the importation of cultural products and the presence of 
TNMCs. This perspective includes several varieties. 
From the 1980s, there has been a cultural resistance to the presence of TNMCs via 
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programme imports and direct satellite broadcasting in the Chinese media market. In 
focusing on the cultural implication of foreign media and the survival of 'Chinese 
culture', the cultural perspective consists of two aspects. On the one hand, the 
anti-TNMCs aspect employs the idea of cultural homogenization resulting from the 
extensive penetration by Western media content in the forms of advertising, film, and 
television programming and so on. Although Chinese authors seldom develop the 
framework of dependency theory and cultural imperialism, largely seen in Western 
writings (Schiller, 1969/1992; Wells, 1972; Varis, 1974), they view the presence of 
TNMCs as 'cultural invasion' and 'cultural imperialism' (Lu Di, 2002; Liu Kang, 2002). 
The existence of TNMCs since the 1980s has even been compared to the invaders in the 
'Opium War' one and a half centuries ago (Lu Di, 2002: 217-228). Such comparisons 
have some arguments in common with the essence of the neo-Marxist political 
communication framework. They agree with McChesney's eloquent argument that 'the 
rise of a global commercial media system is closely linked to the rise of a significantly 
more integrated "neoliberal" global capitalist economic system. '(McChesney, 1999: 78) 
For instance, Li Bin argues that the presence of TNMCs is more than an economic matter 
and there are clear implications for media content, politics, and culture (2002: 1-30). His 
view is that along with the support of their home governments, TNMCs, mostly 
headquartered in the developed capitalist countries, exercise control over the developing 
countries by setting the terms for global trade-dominating markets, capital investment, 
technology, resources, production, and labour. By selling the Western lifestyle, the 
TNMCs create a desire on the part of consumers to emulate Western culture (Lu Di, 2002: 
217-228). Consequently, developing countries such as China have to increase the 
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importing of Western commodities, as well as the dependency on developed countries 
(Varis, 1974: 102-109; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Salinas and Paldan, 1979: 82-97; 
Oliveira, 1991: 200-201; Wells, 1972). In this sense, the anti-TNMC perspective shares 
with western scholars the notion of cultural imperialism. For ideological as well as 
economic objectives, the cultural and media imperialism thesis contends that western 
governments impose pressures on foreign governments and international institutions to 
disseminate western media products and promote their way of life. Herbert Schiller 
argues that the global power structures in international communication industries and the 
links between transnational business and the dominant states determine the hegemony of 
US-based TNMCs in the global media market (Schiller, 1969/1992). Like Schiller, Oliver 
Boyd-Darrett identifies 'media imperialism' so as to examine information and media 
inequalities between nations/states and the reflection of broader issues of dependency, 
and to analyze the hegemonic power of US-dominated international media. TNMCs 
become a path which 'encompasses business norms and political and cultural values, as 
well as consumption of US consumer goods. '(Boyd-Darrett, cited by Hoskins, et al, 1997: 
46) Similarly, the Chinese anti-TNMCs perspective argues that the capitalist system is so 
strong that all Chinese walls would be battered down. The Chinese media are too weak to 
compete with the TNMCs. They suggest that China should adjust its policies in order to 
protect its domestic media industry and to limit TNMCs in the Chinese media market (Lu 
Di, 2002: 217-228). 
On the other hand, the pro-TNMC aspect is optimistic about media globalization and 
cultural integration. Leaving aside the notion of 'cultural imperialism', this perspective 
accepts the marketised and commercial logic in cultural and media industries. It argues 
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that the creativity and marketing skills learnt from TNMCs may generate more 
opportunities for the Chinese media in the marketplace (Yu Min, 2001; Shao and Yan, 
2003). The success of feature films Mobile (shouji), Hero (yingsong), Flying Daggers 
(shimian maifu) strongly support the argument that integrating in the global marketplace 
may strengthen Chinese media industries. In turn, Chinese culture may occupy more 
places globally (Chan Taowen, 2002: 89-107; Yin Hong, 2003: 189-200; Yin Hong, 2001: 
15-19; Yin Xiaorong, 2004: 38-42). This perspective assumes that the customer would 
benefit from a competitive media market. As a developing country, China may learn a lot 
from TNMCs in terms of content quality, branding strategy, distribution, production 
creativeness, and so on. Therefore, the priority of Chinese media industries is to break the 
regional monopoly, remove industrial protection, and concentrate media strength among 
different institutions and platforms. In order to establish cross-media, cross-regional, 
cross-industrial media conglomerates, the regulatory bodies should allow the domestic 
mass media to compete, merge and consolidate with each other in the marketplace (Tang 
and Peng, 2001: 50-56). 
From an industry perspective, the TNMCs stimulate a sense of the 'Chinese 
media under siege' (Tong Bing, 2003: 23; Dai Yuanguang, 2003; Zhang Fengzhi, 2001). 
This analysis concentrates on the conflicts between TNMCs and the Chinese media. 
Regarded as a strong intruder, a TNMC is described as a 'wolf', which seeks profitable 
markets and defeats the Chinese media. Subsequently, it focuses on such paradigms as 
the connections between the Chinese national media and the international counterparts, 
the effective acceptance of international capital, management, production and marketing 
skills within the Chinese media industry, and increasing promotion of Chinese media in 
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the global media marketplace. Moreover, the presence of TNMCs has also preceded other 
reforms such as 'Keep the Big and Let Go the Small' (zhuadafangxiao) in late 1997. The 
government allows small and medium-size state-owned enterprises to change ownership, 
effectively approving large-scale privatization. With this transformation, privatization is 
necessary, so that Chinese 'national industry' (minzu chanye) can be revitalised and 
strengthened to meet global competition. To some degree, this perspective has gone 
beyond the media economy and shaped ideological transformation. It has replaced the 
previous socialist perspective and 'so far has shielded the Chinese leadership from 
accusations that it has sold out socialism. ' (Gallagher, 2002: 361) Responding to this 
emphasis, the policy preference is - to re-concentrate, consolidate and capitalize the 
Chinese media against foreign intruders. 
In short, these arguments are based on assumptions that the worldwide operations of 
the TNMCs may undermine Chinese political ideology, economic development, or 
cultural traditions. However, we should be more concerned about the motivations of 
TNMCs in the Chinese media market. First, TNMCs are profit-oriented. Their huge 
market power enables TNMCs to crush competition and control the targeting markets. 
They are less responsive to the social and moral concerns of the community. Second, 
TNMCs practice systematic discrimination against the poor (as well as poor countries), 
women, minorities, and so on (McChesney, 1999: chap. 1). Such discrimination implies 
that the poor cannot access as much information as the rich. Third, TNMCs may 
undermine indigenous cultures, especially those not founded on capitalism, and prompt 
media imperialism, mainly US cultural imperialism (Yang Ruiming, 2003). Accordingly, 
government intervention against the TNMCs may legitimately be justified through the 
51 
ChapterTwo Literature Review: Why Globalization Matters in China's Media Governance 
external benefits rationale of the mass media, and this intervention may protect 
indigenous cultures when citizens are exposed to indigenous programming (Hoskins et al, 
1997: 85; McGuigan, 2004). 
The nationalist perspective has its strengths. First, it provides a clear picture of the 
institutional influences of TNMCs. Since the relevant system of power is the post-Second 
World War Pax Americana - the world capitalist system dominated both politically and 
economically by the United States (Cox, 1987), this perspective argues that TNMCs play 
a 'hegemonic' role in media globalization. That is to say, they contribute to the 
maintenance of consent for a system of power. Gramscian 'hegemony', unlike the ideas 
of Lenin, suggests that the dominant class in society gains its position by consent as well 
as coercion (Gramsci, 1972: notebooks 24 and 26). Robert Cox's ideas, which extend and 
develop Gramscian hegemony, assume that inter-nation relations are inherently 
conflictual. They may associate a stable world order with the hegemonic dominance of 
one or more nation-states (Cox, 1987). With the position of hegemony, the dominant 
social group such as TNMCs in a society has the capacity to exercise intellectual and 
moral supremacy over society at large and to build a new system of social alliances to 
support its tasks. The concept could go beyond both the liberal idea of consent as 
'consensus' and the historical materialism notion of consent as 'false consciousness'. 
Transnational media competition, therefore, becomes a battlefield between nation-states. 
If so, the cultural and media industries may be regarded as vehicles to show Chinese 
national economic and cultural strengths on the domestic and global playgrounds. 
Second, this perspective directly indicates several policy implications. It argues 
that China should assert its right to restrict trade in the cultural area by quotas, taxes, or 
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tariffs in order to protect and promote its own creativeness within its media industries. 
When it comes to international trade agreements, there should be a 'cultural exception' 
within the larger trade regime, as Canada achieved under the FTA and NAFTA (Colin et 
al, 1997). If possible, China may delink from the worldwide media market (Amin, 1990; 
1997). In order to avoid dependency on other countries, a policy choice of Chinese media 
regulators could bar media trade or exchange with other countries on the one hand and 
promote self-reliance on the other. 
Third, this perspective regards a range of media practitioners as active agents 
against TNMCs. These practitioners include policy-makers, domestic media units, and 
local government. Therefore, it clearly indicates the actors for research on China's media 
governance. 
The nationalist framework is a systematic but only moderately plausible way of 
examining media globalization and its impact on China's media governance. The 
literature in this field shares some common weaknesses, which will be filled in this 
research. 
Methodologically, most of their publications rely on selective anecdotes to draw 
conclusions. They seldom follow any social science or humanistic approaches to 
collecting systematic data for substantiation. For instance, the School of Journalism and 
Communication in Qinghua University polled a group of New Left authors, including Li 
Xiguang, Yin Hong, Lu Di, and so on. Most of their publications lack clarification about 
data collection and references (for instance, Yin Hong, 2001; 2003; Lu Di, 2002; Li 
Xiguang, 2002). They did not display any methodological rigour. Based on blurred and 
implausible data, therefore, their arguments are inevitably unconvincing. 
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Theoretically, they equate the penetration of TNMCs in China with cultural 
homogenization and the erosion of native culture, presupposing a problematic dichotomy 
between the international and the national. Some of them employ a static analytical 
framework to analyse external forces like TNMCs, regarding a nation-state as the only 
decisive role in the cultural and media domain. However, the view of the nation as one 
cultural entity is changing. Few nations are ethnically homogeneous. Instead, many of 
them, for instance, China, have multiple cultural unities. While analysing the state's role 
in this issue, they ironically ignore the power of national gate-keeping policies. In 
practice, the media authorities could play an important role in determining the extent to 
which foreign players could penetrate a given market (Chadha and Kavoori, 2002). The 
regional study by John A. Lent in the Commonwealth Caribbean undermines the link 
between dependency theory and media imperialism (Lent, 1971). Chadha and Kavoori 
argue that the national gate-keeping policies such as Six-Nos in China and strict 
regulations in India and Indonesia have a strong effect in protecting their national media 
industries (Chadha and Kavoori, 2002). Moreover, the nationalist perspective simply 
regards the presence of TNMCs as a causal consequence of social change. Evidence 
demonstrates that local shows are much more popular than imports because of the 
'cultural discount' (Hoskins, et al., 1988; 1996; 1997). Such audience preference also 
appears in Asia (Chadha and Kavoori, 2002). In brief, the Chinese nationalist perspective 
has taken the nation out of context, abstracting it from the concrete social and historical 
conditions, which are the political struggle and commitments of the Chinese political 
climate in the 1990s. 
Analytically, the writings of a few nationalist publications are subjective and full of 
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'hatred, xenophobia and nationalistic jingoism' (Huang and Lee, 2003: 52). These writings 
contain some exaggeration, factual errors and misleading information. Take Li Xiguang 
and Liu Kang for example. The former is a professor at Qinghua University in China and 
the latter is a researcher in the USA. Their popular publication, Behind the Demonisation 
of China (Yaomohua zhongguo de heihou, 1996), is written in a combination of 
semi-academic and journalistic prose. Some scholars criticize the 'demonisation' volume 
as having been translated into English 'not for its academic value but as a barometer of 
the depth of anti-American feeling. '(Huang and Lee, 2003: 49) 
5 THE TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSCULTURAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
The perspective of transnational and transcultural political economy argues that 
along with market logic, since the late 1970s, the Chinese media system has apparently 
been reorganised for the sake of integrating into a global communication systems (Zhao, 
2003: 61). In this sense, Chinese media transformation, and even Chinese reform, is part 
of a global expansion of media capitalism. For China, globalization 'has constituted new 
global structures and systems in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. '(Liu, 
2004: 5) Media flows are regional as much as global. Consequently, it challenges the 
essentialism of Chinese media politics and of audience choices. 
Based on Marx's 'base-superstructure' framework, this perspective argues that 
with the fading of communist characteristics, the Chinese communication system has 
become an integral part of the global capitalist communication system. TNMCs, with 
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their substantial capital accumulation, actually integrate themselves with the state capital 
of the Chinese Communist Party, for the sake of expanding the market and pursuing 
profit (Zhao, 2003). The shift of Party sentiment toward sensitive cultural industries in 
the early 2000s is an institutional attempt to stimulate a new site of economic growth and 
to consolidate the Party's mouthpiece. There are no obvious differences between the 
TNMCs and the Chinese media authorities. Both of them attempt to enhance a cohesive 
hegemonic dominance. Therefore, the Chinese capitalist media system determines that it 
could not provide the diversity of information that the citizens want. 
This perspective puts the global neo-liberal logic of commercialization, liberation, 
and privatization into a concrete historical context. Therefore, it becomes easier to clarify 
the special roles that the TNMCs play in China's social transformation (Meng Jian, 2003: 
223-232; Yang Ruiming, 2003). Junhao Hong provides profound research on programmes 
imported onto Chinese television (1998). With a set of systematic and historic data about 
the import of TV programmes since the foundation of the PRC, particularly since the 
1980s, Hong suggests that the internationalization of television in China has resulted 
from both external and internal factors. He maintains that the newly adopted policies 
have decisively contributed to media changes towards openness. There are a number of 
contradictions and dilemmas in Chinese media and cultural reform and openness (Zhang 
Xiaoming, 2003). The most explicit of these is the unchanged media nature amidst 
rapidly changing domestic and international environments. 
Within this perspective of transnational and transcultural political economy, some 
authors like Yuezhi Zhao regard the class struggle as a strong element pushing media 
transformation. According to Zhao, ideological struggles between reformists and leftists 
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have taken place several times since the 1980s. The resurgence of nationalist and 
anti-imperialist sentiments has prompted waves of anti-spiritual pollution, anti-bourgeois 
liberalization, and anti-'peaceful evolution'. This tension also existed in the vertical and 
horizontal restructurings of media bureaucratic integration. With such conflicts in mind, 
domestic forces have steered in the direction of media transformation. Moreover, Yuezhi 
Zhao views the co-existence of capitalist TNMCs and the socialist party mouthpiece as an 
integration between the global capitalist system and the Chinese communist capitalist 
system. Therefore, the re-organization of the Chinese media industries and the presence 
of TNMCs in China has not automatically led to free expression. Dominant media outlets 
cater for the urban-based middle class, transnational businessmen, and domestic political 
and economic elites and they marginalize the rural population, the urban worker, and the 
unemployed. (Zhao, 2003a: 53-74; 2003b: 32-56). On the one hand, the media authorities 
may adjust institutional arrangements to mediate the distribution of media production. On 
the other hand, TNMCs may compromise with the authoritarian government by providing 
self-censored content bearing their brands. Thus, 'mass provision of communications 
infrastructure is not necessarily a catalyst for democratic evolution. '(Atkins, 2003: 484) 
This perspective has its strengths in analysing China's media governance in the 
course of globalization. Firstly, it provides a systematic historical understanding of 
Chinese media governance by inter-disciplinary analysis. With historical analysis, Hong 
provides a holistic picture of Chinese media policy, including the general political 
guidance of the CCP, the concrete regulation of the government, and the self-defined 
specific policies of the media institutions (Hong, 1998: 8). Acknowledging the structure of 
mass media and political communication systems, literature on the transnational and 
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transcultural political economic perspective helps us understand the profound changes 
that happened in Chinese economic and political reforms. Secondly, it clarifies the 
structural process of media policy-making by examining the factors relevant to the new 
economic, political, and social circumstances, though it fails to examine the interactions 
among the regulators, domestic media and foreign media. It assesses the weight of power 
holders - the media authorities and the TNMCs - and makes it easy to evaluate the roles 
they play during the process of media governance (Zhao, 2003a). Third, this approach 
contains a state-centrist inclination. It puts the state in the centre of media politics. 
Although it regards the major causes for globalization of mass media as external factors 
and views national policies and regulations as internal factors, it argues that internal 
factors are more important than external ones. As it tries to pay equal attention to both 
factors, it concentrates on changes in policies, motivations for policy change, and the 
implications and consequences of these changes in domestic terms. In other words, in a 
centralized communication system like China, decisive factors at the national level are 
internal ones (Hong, 1998: 136; Chan, 1994a: 84). The clearly identified factors have 
affected the regulatory principles and media polices underpinning the broad, rich media 
canvas in China. 
Although the transnational and transcultural political economic perspective has 
some strengths, it also has weaknesses. 
Firstly, under its framework, there is no established connection between media 
importation and changing media structures. In other words, the relationship between the 
input of the politics and its output has not been convincingly identified. Some scholars 
provide descriptive statistical analysis of the imported television dramas, series, serials 
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and teleplays (Hong, 1998). However, the analysis only has a small amount of meaning in 
terms of understanding changes in television import. It does not help to demonstrate the 
quality of media changes. 
Secondly, from a methodological point of view, the argument that the combination 
between the global and Chinese party capitalism cannot result in liberal change only 
seems to be valid for China. Or rather, it is unconvincing because it lacks corroborative 
evidence, such as comparison, content analysis, or media effect studies, and so on. If 
there is no adequate observation of the relationship between media programmes and their 
employers and audiences, the conclusions may only be plausible. It is true that 
information-sensitive states like China have developed strategies to mediate the 
distribution of mass media. This is done through the government's partnership with 
compliant local entrepreneurs and TNMCs, which may also benefit from controversial 
customer relationships. A number of the Party's ideological concepts may be 
reconstructed, and a few news Policies may be erected and implemented. However, they 
neglect the indirect implications of the 'uncontroversial media products', which are 
acceptable for the party, for media institutional norms and their audiences. For instance, 
although the entertainment programmes, the import of media formats and the diversity of 
information are related to soft content, they have the potential to influence the Chinese 
media sphere if we put them into a larger historical context. In any study of media politics, 
the most important thing is to identify the implications of imported media programmes 
for the regulators, programmes providers, domestic media, and media audiences, not just 
the presence of TNMCs and their programmes. In other words, the responses by media 
practitioners and the reflection from media policies should be examined if we wish to 
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understand media politics. 
Thirdly, the unconvincing argument that TNMCs do not create any liberal 
awareness is mainly based on the assumption that media ownership would determine 
media content. It is true that the owners of mass media may impose heavy pressure to 
influence the editorials of their media outlets. However, the separation between media 
ownership holders and professional managerial boards weakens this direct causality 
(Gershon, 1997). There is little evidence to disprove the argument that the authoritarian 
governments have less capacity to control the information flow. 
Overall, the transnational and transcultural political economic perspective tends to 
oversimplify the complicated process of the transformation and globalization of the 
Chinese mass media. Of course, policy back-flips and ambiguous guidelines can be 
explicitly interpreted by the transitional nature of society, from plan to market economy, 
from national to transnational community, and from isolated culture to transculture. 
Broadly, this perspective seems to be stretched to explain everything. For instance, 
'irregularities' in policy paralysis, crackdown on content, neglect of copyright law and 
widespread competition within media regulatory bureaux may be attributed to the 
unsteadiness of the bridge that spans the 'trans-' chasm (Donald and Keans, 2002: 12). 
However, this perspective would not explain the contradiction and paradox of China's 
media politics. To fill this gap, there is a need to explore the institutional arrangements of 
media governance, focusing on interactions among the regulators, domestic media and 
foreign media. 
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6 AN ALTERNATIVE: THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Hitherto, the current literature on TNMCs and media globalization in China has been 
discussed and has been seen to provide various theoretical frameworks for examining 
China's media governance under globalization. However, none of these approaches 
seems to offer a completely satisfactory analytical framework to assess the impact of 
globlization and the importance of TNMCs in China. This research attempts to fill several 
gaps in the literature which have been discussed in previous sections. These attempts will 
become clearer in the course of the remaining chapters, in which different aspects of the 
interactions between different media actors will be discussed in more detail. To 
summarise, each of the approaches discussed so far is partial, in that it emphasizes, at one 
level of analysis, that TNMCs are either good or bad for host countries except for 
media-rich countries led by the U. S. None of these approaches is able to successfully 
integrate the spheres of media performance and social changes in China. Secondly, these 
approaches fail to integrate the analysis of TNMCs as institutions within a broader 
analysis of China's media politics. Thirdly, their tendency is to reduce the contradictory 
reality to one or other side of a false dichotomy. TNMCs are regarded as either 
competitive or monopolistic. In China, they either contribute to social development, or 
increase dependence. TNMC-state relations are either harmonious or contradictory, and 
the developing countries are either 'nationalist' or 'comprador'. Fourthly, both of these 
approaches regard the audience as passive receivers and the nation-states as weakened by 
the process of integration with globalization. Employing a new approach, this study 
attempts to absorb the strengths of these approaches and overcome their weaknesses, 
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which have been discussed in the previous sections. 
As an alternative, inspired by Hancher and Moran's notion of 'regulatory place' 
(Hancher and Moran, 1998: 148-71), this study applies an institutional foundation 
framework to this research, It reflects various levels of Chinese legal culture, which 
determine the outcomes of cultural and media policy. As Hancher and Moran argue, 'the 
purpose and character of economic regulation is in part a function of the nature of the 
surrounding legal culture. ' (Hancher and Moran, 1998: 149) The cultural and media policy 
is influenced by institutional ised factions within China's bureaucracy, which often relate 
to bureaucratic and private interests. The term 'institution', according to Douglass North, 
is employed to refer to the 'rules of the game' in society, including current law and 
jurisprudence, accepted habits, and formal and informal codes of conduct (North, 1990). 
One of the purposes of an institution is to contribute a solution to the incentive problem. 
Rational individual actors could behave in ways that minimize losses or maximize profits. 
If there is no institution, individuals may have little incentive to cooperate with each other, 
and they may at times face a prisoner's dilemma. The guidance is provided by institutions 
for actors to coordinate help to reduce uncertainty and create order in human interactions. 
Rules are of primary importance for institutions to function effectively (Coase, 1937: 
386-405). Rules should have three characteristics to ensure an institution works well. 
Firstly, a rule must be recognizable, clear, general, and non-contingent. In other words, 
rules must be unambiguous in 'specifying the costs and benefits of choice made by all 
members of the relevant group in all relevant situations' (Wang, 2002: 137). Secondly, 
rules must be obeyed by all parties. Thirdly, rules must be enforced in order to ensure 
compliance. The enforcement power is critical in any institutional design. If these three 
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basic characteristics cannot be monitored, it may lead to opportunism. Following this, 
actors in defective institutions may enjoy discretionary power to make their own choices. 
The institutionalization of media governance builds up solid ground for observing 
media transformation in transitional countries. By analyzing the performance of mass 
media in the former Soviet Union, Katrin Voltmer suggests that as the function of mass 
media shifted from 'a collective propagandist and collective agitator' and 'a collective 
organizer' in the revolutionary process to 'a provider of information' after the collapse of 
Communism, media transformation from the 'totalitarian' to the 'libertarian' model 
requires an institutional reorganization of the mass media, as well as an adoption of new 
journalistic practices in political reporting (Voltmer, 2002: 469-501). A similar theme is set 
out by Colin Sparks as he examines four post-communist countries, Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia. He notes that 'those theories which best explain change in 
the media systems of formerly communist countries are those which stress the elements 
of social continuity in the ruling class and its institutions. '(Sparks, 1997: 114) Fearing 
potential loss of political power, the CCP leadership has manifestly expressed hostility 
toward the concept of press freedom. The ruling CCP may also seek to block broader 
social ideas from market entry, though doing so is very difficult. Domestic institutions 
also have their responses to change. The design of these reforms may make the 
authoritarian system work more effectively in new circumstances under globalization. 
With the institutional foundation framework, it may be easier to comprehend the 
directions of media policy-making towards TNMCs by investigating the Chinese 
regulatory players, the regulatory institutions, and their connections with bureaucratic and 
private interests. The Chinese legal system is transformed from a 'command and control' 
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mode to a self-regulation mode, which is 'a combination of cultural factors and legal 
factors determining the efficacy of regulation' (Keane, 2002: 179). 
This institutional perspective is also rooted in the methods applied to studying 
governance. Rhodes (1997: 64) suggests that with its focus on rules, procedures and the 
formal organization of government, the study of political institutions 'is central to the 
identity of the discipline of political science. ' The classic institutional method is 
descriptive-inductive; formal-legal; and, historical comparative. The 
descriptive-inductive approach employs historical techniques and explores specific events, 
eras, people and institutions, because political institutions grow by slow accretions and 
exist without conscious design. Induction implies the belief drawn from repeated 
observations. The great virtue of institutions is that they are concrete and they can 'be 
pointed to, observed, touched... be examined for their operations... what could be more 
logical, more natural, than to turn to the concreteness of institutions, the facts of their 
existence, the character of their actions and the exercise of their power. '(Landau, cited by 
Rhodes, 1997: 65) 
In the context of China's politics, Shiping Zheng (1997) provides a pioneering study 
on the institutional dilemma between the CCP and the state, exploring the institutional 
challenges China faces. Applying an institutional approach to Chinese state-building, 
Zheng recognises the significance of distinguishing Party from state. It is undoubtedly 
different from the pervasive party-state conception, which is influenced by the 
'totalitarian' model (Huntington, 1968: 5,91). He argues, 'the state is a set of sovereign, 
differentiated, and autonomous institutions and those officials who run these 
institutions. '(Zheng, 1997: 14) The different organizational logics, tasks, and attempts at 
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institution building inevitably generate contradictions and tensions between Party and 
state. Because the CCP has contributed little to institutional development in China, 'the 
Chinese state institutions can hardly function independently of the Party 
organ ization. '(Zheng, 1997: 5) This is applicable to the study of China's media 
governance. What Shiping Zheng fails to answer is why the CCP can still continue to 
exist in its dominant position when China has promoted economic reforms and open-door 
policies since 1979. 
With the historical-empirical approach, Hu Angang argues, the CCP consolidated 
its power with an institutional ised process. The Eighth Conference of CCP's Central 
Committee in 1956 produced a framework for the CCP's institutionalization on 
leadership succession (Deng Xiaoping, 1994: 212-256), but its implementation was 
delayed by the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping reset a reform-agenda 
on the institutionalization of the leadership succession (Deng Xiaoping, 1994: 212-256). 
From 1989 to 2002, China successfully passed on leadership succession from Deng 
Xiaopong, the second leadership generation, to Jiang Zemin, the third leadership 
generation, and Hu Jintao, the fourth. From the Sixteenth National Conference of the CCP, 
China's leadership succession becomes institutionalization (zhiduhua), normalization 
(guifanhua), and procedural ization (chengxuhua). Hu Angang categorises three 
characteristics of these evolutions. Firstly, the retirement age and the executive period 
have been strictly set. Secondly, the new leadership generation has become younger, 
ending 'old-man politics'. Thirdly, the educational background has become more diverse 
and 3 out of 24 CCP's Politburo members have been educated overseas (Hu Angang, 
2004: 69). Though it is not a large number, it has never happened in the history of the CCP. 
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As Hu argues, the stability of China's politics depends on the stability of CCP's 
leadership. If the succession of CCP leadership is transparent, rational and predictable, 
the Chinese social order could be stable. To maintain this stability, the most important 
thing for Chinese leaders is to create some new institutions. The transformative role from 
a revolutionary party to an executive party offers the CCP the capacity to dominate in 
China. The maintenance of sustaining economic development also provides strong 
support for CCP dominance. The purpose of economic reform is to build an institutional 
capacity for new economic openings (Zhu, 2003: 142-160). In a word, the CCP's capacity 
in ruling China may result from its institutionalization, normalization and 
procedural ization (Zhu, 2003: 79; Lin, 2004: 255-275). 
During the process of institution building, the institutionalization of information flow 
is one of the key tasks of the state. The core values of the state could not emerge without 
a common consensus, and there is a need to promote the state as an entity among the 
populace. The increase in the average level of education corresponded to a greater level 
of awareness of political and social responsibility among citizens, which manifested itself 
in a greater desire to participate in social and political activities, and to express their own 
will and opinions. It became apparent that the government should, in response to this, 
build up some institutionalised channels to satisfy citizens' demands. Otherwise, this 
might result in disaffection with the existing political institutions leading citizens to 
express their frustration by violent means (Zhao Zhengyu, 2003: 21-28; Hu Angang, 
2003: 11). 
Although there are certain differences between Zheng and Hu, they have one 
standpoint in common, which is that they both assert the institutional transformation that 
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is taking place, in China today, is mainly driven by internal forces already apparent 
within China. However, after twenty years of open-door policies, it may be that there are 
external forces which also have an influence on China's reforms. One of the main 
research targets of this study is to investigate this further and to find out more about the 
role that external factors play in political and social reform, which takes place in the 
minds of people in contemporary Mainland Chinese society. 
In the media sector, due to complicated correlations with institutions, to 
understand Chinese culture and media industry, one should explore its governing 
structure and system (Hu Huiling, 2003: 21-39). If China's media develop their role of 
watchdog, the state must provide institutionalized protection for the media practitioners 
(Tong Bing, 2003: 13-20; Zhao Zhengyu, 2003: 21-28). In China, media practitioners, 
including the TNMCs, have close connections with officials, bureaucrats and censors at 
the different levels of media bureaus. There are two regulatory systems in China. In the 
state system, under the State Council, there are the Ministry of Culture, Xinhua News 
Agency, and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), the State 
Administration of Press and Publication (SAPP), the State Information Office, and the 
Ministry of Information. The key representatives of these institutions consist of a 
Leadership Group attached to the State Council to resolve administrative issues, and 
another Group attached to the CCP's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) to monitor 
ideological issues. Each of these institutions has provincial and local branches. Parallel to 
the state system are the Party organizations, headed by the CPD of the Central Party 
Committee (CPC). The CPD has sections at all levels of administration, which all media 
must take into account. Overall, the Party's propaganda system is headed by the 
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information and cultural network, which is the most powerful decision-making body in 
China. The CCP propaganda departments at different levels deal with policy matters, in 
accordance with the Party Principle. They require that all news media must adhere 
ideologically to the party line, propagate the party message, and comply with its policies. 
This is quite unlike Western democratic countries, in which policy is formulated as 
precise and specific rules and legal regulations, China's policy is produced in the form of 
documentation, such as written reports or leaders' oral speeches, which are often 
imprecise and vague, and may not be revealed to ordinary people. In such a regulatory 
regime, the regulatory institutions, together with their connections with the private 
interests, can determine the directions of media policy-making. In other words, the logic 
of the existing institutions is very important for understanding the outcomes of media 
policy-making. 
In general, the institutional characteristics provide a roadmap for interpreting the 
impact of globalization and TNMCs on China's media governance. 
At the international level, since the open-door reform policy in the late 1970s, 
China has joined most of the important international organizations, which play significant 
roles in on-going globalization. When China began embracing the global economy, 
particularly after it gained membership of the WTO, we could assume that it had to 
accept the rules of these global institutions and transnational organizations. Its 
governance, especially in the economic administrative aspects, adopted these rules 
dramatically in order to comply with the international standards. Such administrative 
institutional transformation will be discussed in Chapter Three. In terms of the 
institutional power, China's media governance may be adjusted in terms of regulations in 
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the context of market conduct, structure, and performance. It will be discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
At the national level, increasing numbers of institutions have been established for 
the sake of effective administration. Although the CCP is dominant in China's politics 
and other groups are subordinate, its media governance is increasingly driven by 
professional, rather than factional considerations, promoted by political elites. Besides 
the Department of Propaganda of the CCP, the Ministry of Telecommunications, the State 
Administration of Broadcasting, Film and Television and the State Administration of 
Press and Publishing, which are affiliated with State Council, have been established and 
empowered in terms of administration. It is true that the CCP has hegemonic power over 
Chinese social interest groups in media transformation. However, as the market-oriented 
economy grows, social interest groups gradually enhance their negotiating power. 
Chapter Three will further address this institutional issue. 
At a local level, there are institutional changes of media conduct, structure, and 
performance. Following considerable social changes which resulted from open-door 
policies and economic liberalization, an obvious tendency in media governance is the 
increase of differentiation and functional specialization of institutions. These academic 
and managerial institutions are empowered in the course of media deregulation and 
re-regulation, de-monopolization, and de-propagandization. Every aspect of this will be 
examined in greater detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
This literature review has sought to review why globalization and TNMCs matter in 
China's media governance. A research gap was located, in that after having reviewed 
several approaches to Chinese media politics, TNMCs were seen as power brokers 
engaged in China's media politics and economy. The Chinese government has been 
concerned about the liberal diversity viewpoint, as spread by the TNMCs. Meanwhile, it 
has been keen to harness the TNMCs' global networks, so as to diffuse the new voices of 
China around the world. The co-existence of the TNMCs and the Party's media control is 
complex. This study attempts to fill the academic gap with an approach to 
institutionalization. The presence of TNMCs undoubtedly provides much diversity of 
information, as distinct from the official agents. This seems to be a win-win game. It is 
good for the people and national political development, but it is also good for the 
continuity of the ruling CCP in terms of information control. This study will argue that 
along with other institutional elements, this institutional arrangement determines the 
presence of TNMCs in the Chinese media market. In return, the increasing participation 
of TNMCs in the Chinese media market has produced a significant impact on the process 
of media governance. The adjustment of institutional governing bodies, deregulation and 
re-regulation of media industries, de-monopolization of media structure and 
de-propagandization of media culture result, both directly and indirectly, from the 
TNMCs and media globalization. These results are further discussed in Chapters Three, 
Four, Five and Six respectively. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MEDIA INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION SINCE 1992 
I INTRODUCTION 
The impact of globalization and transnational media corporations (TNMCs) on 
China's media governance is profound. Following the great social changes, media 
governance has been driven toward differentiation and specialization of media 
institutions, deregulation and re-regulation of media policy, de-monopolization of media 
structure, and de-propagandization of media culture. The increase of bargaining within 
different parties, though still lacks stability, shows the model of media governance has 
transformed from a 'leader-determined 'model to a model which is more institutional ised 
and predictable. As a starting point, this chapter will examine the great institutional 
restructuring in the media sector. As Chapter Two has reviewed, there is little literature 
focusing on Chinese media institutions, the foundation of media governance. In this 
chapter, the restructuring and transformation of media institutions is regarded as one of 
the consequences of the complex process of globalization and the activities of TNMCs. 
The main argument is that the forces from globalization have increasingly challenged the 
model of media control in China, driving forward a big transformation of the structure 
and performance of media administrative organizations. This institutional transformation, 
like that in other developing transitional regimes, is driven by internal and external 
factors. The capacity and control of conventional models of media governance have been 
seriously challenged and dramatically changed. In the following chapters, 'capacity' 
indicates the ability of an administrative unit to achieve its objective efficiently. 'Control' 
71 
ChapterThree The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
refers to accountability to the regulatory authorities, most particularly to the CCP's 
Propaganda Department. 
Since its increasing integration into global society, China developed media 
reforms in media governance towards a more institutional ised and stable pattern. 
Before examining the new model of media governance, we need to understand the 
traditional ones because they are 'the backdrop against which attempts at reform must be 
viewed. ' (Peters, 1996: 2) In the Chinese context, a certain level of rationalization 
appeared in the 1980s, such as combating individualism, spiritual pollution and 
corruption, separating the party from the government, and promoting the role of 
legislators and intellectuals. Since the 1990s onwards, the once totalitarian party-state has 
retreated from many political, social and private spheres, allowing the economic and 
political foundations to support a possible political transition to an institutional ised 
framework. This happened after the successful leadership succession from Deng 
Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin in 1992, and then to Hu Jintao in 2003. It is the first time that 
the power of the ruling CCP passed from the revolutionary elders to a generation of 
younger technocrats without dramatic political fluctuation. It indicates that Chinese 
politics has become increasingly institutional ised in terms of power succession (Hu 
Angang, 2003,2004). Since 2003, the powers of the party and the government have been 
regulated by a new law named 'Administration Law', which aims to avoid the misuse and 
abuse of public power, and to increase administrative transparency. Additionally, the 
protection of private property was finally enacted in the latest constitutional amendment 
in 2004. However, no matter who gains power in China, they need to legitimize their 
position by proving the congruity of their policies with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. 
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During the 1990s, one important function theorists performed was to decorate the system 
introduced from Western society with the name of 'socialism' and 'Marxism', so that it 
could be accepted and used by the authorities. The transformation of media governance 
institutions was also marked with 'Chinese characteristics' (Hu Huilin, 2003), which in 
fact contained the basis of Western concepts in the process of media institution 
rebuilding. 
As a starting point, this chapter outlines the media administration framework 
within a comparative context. Then, it moves to four significant challenges to the 
conventional media governance model: commercialization, globalization, 
decentralization, and advanced technologies, respectively. All are directly and indirectly 
relevant to globalization and TNMCs. Thirdly, it compares the media guidelines of media 
governance under the CCP in a different historical context, to address the success and the 
failure of the CCP. Finally, it moves to interpret the transformation of media governing 
institutions during the period from 1992 to 2004. 
2 MEDIA ADMINISTRATION IN CHINA 
2.1 The Framework of Media Governance 
Although the appearance of paper in China can be traced back thousands of years 
and it produced the first 'newspaper' in the world (Fang Hanqi, 1992: 63-64), modern 
Chinese media have been profoundly affected by foreign forces. The colonial media and 
the ideas of media professionalism cultivated the earliest modem Chinese media system 
and journalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After the CCP took power in 
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1949, the system governing the country's media was based on the Soviet model, in which 
the media were controlled by the party. When China promoted open-door policies, its 
media system also experienced a transformation. This was especially the case after 1992, 
as the media sector inevitably encountered some new challenges, such as the demands for 
divergent information from society and the pressures posed by foreign actors. 
Essentially, media governance in China, like other administrations, is handicapped 
by 'Chinese characteristics', which implies that the country must have the following 
aspects: one-party rule; centralized power over the economy and society; and, a 
bureaucratic hierarchy. With these characteristics, China's media governance coincided 
with more flexibility of the central government in governing actions in different bureaus 
and provinces. In general, the party and the government delineate five basic 
administrative layers as the bedrock of the bureaucratic system, which are: the national 
(quanguo), or the Centre (zhongyang); provinces (sheng); counties (xian); cities (shi); 
and work unit (danwei). The party is the principal source of authority and the government 
is the agent. The government structures, in theory, have been subordinated to the ultimate 
authority of their party counterparts (Yang Fengchun, 2002; Lieberthal, 1995: 158-159). 
The ruling CCP appoints the top executive members of the power elite to major 
functional areas, each of which is referred to as a 'gateway' (kou) inside the party. The 
four broadest gateways are those for party affairs (dangwu), government work (zhengwu), 
state security (guojia anquan), and foreign affairs (wayiao shiwu) (Lieberthal, 1995: 
192). The party affairs gateway is typically the most important and powerful one, headed 
by the pre-eminent person among the executive members of the power elites such as Mao 
Zedong. The second gateway, which is responsible for government work, primarily 
74 
ChapterThrcc The Media Institutional Transfomation Since 1992 
focuses on economic development. The state security gateway encompasses the military, 
the public security, and the state security (counter-espionage) apparatuses. Within this 
framework of gateways, there is a system of political organization operation, divided 
throughout society into functional spheres. There are seven systems (xitong). They are: 1) 
the military system; 2) the political and legal system; 3) the administrative system, 4) the 
propaganda system; 5) the unification system; 6) the mass organization system; 7) the 
organization and personnel system (Yang Fengchun, 2002; Yan Huai, 1995). Each of 
these systems is always headed by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. 
The propaganda system is in charge of news media. It consists of two intertwined 
subordinate systems. At the state level, media institutions comprise several distinct 
organizations. Under the State Council there are the Ministry of Culture, Xinhua News 
Agency, and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), the State 
Administration of Press and Publication (SAPP), the State Information Off ice, the 
Ministry of Information (Mol). Under the CCP, the People ý Daily and Qiu Shi (Seek 
Truth) Magazine are also important media institutions. The key representatives of these 
institutions are included in a working group, which may be organized by two different 
administrative systems. The organizers of the State Council and the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD) contribute solutions to administrative issues and ideological problems 
concerned in mass media, respectively (Interview 2). 
Each of these institutions has provincial and local branches. Parallel to the state 
system, the Party organization is headed by the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) of 
the Central Party Committee (CPC). The CPD has sections at all levels of administration 
of which all media must take account. Overall, the Party's propaganda system is headed 
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by the information and cultural networks of institutions under the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP, the most powerful decision-making 
body in China. The CCP's propaganda departments at different levels are in charge of 
policy matters in accordance with the Party Principle (dangxing), which means, all news 
media must adhere ideologically to the party line, propagate the party messages, and obey 
its regulations. Every news organization is a work unit (danwei). The party's organization 
(dangzuzhi) within a media unit plays a key role in decision-making. 
Before 1992, the media units were organised like other government bodies at 
central government, provincial, district, county or township levels. Each media unit has 
its administrative rank. For instance, Xinhua News Agency holds the rank of a ministry 
whereas the provincial Southern Daily (Nanfangribao) has an administrative rank at 
district level. At the top of the hierarchy are the party organs, controlled by the Central 
Committee of the CCP, such as Xinhua News Agency and the People ý Daily. At the 
provincial or regional level, there is at least one organ of the Provincial Party Committee, 
for instance, the Beying Daily in Beijing. Other than the Party organs, there are some 
special publications sponsored by associations, for instance, China Women ý Paper of the 
National Women's League. By law, the State Council is the owner of all mass media. But 
the regional and local media can enjoy managerial autonomy. After 1992, a few media 
units, for instance, the well-known Caying magazine, have no such administrative rank. 
Most of their managers are recruited from the job market, rather than being appointed by 
the Party or the government (for more discussion of Caying, see Section 5.3 of Chapter 
Five). 
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2.2 Mechanisms of Operational Control 
Broadly, there are four principal ways for the authorities to manage and control the 
mass media in China: unified Qongyi), two tracks (shuanggui), hierarchical (fengli), and, 
departmental control (bumen guanh) (Interview 2; Fu and Cullen, 1996: 28-38). 
The unified mechanism refers to the arrangement whereby the unified leadership of 
the CCP exercises control over the mass media through the CPD and its subsidiary 
departments. The CPD governs the mass media both in terms of ideological guidelines of 
media content and general direction of media reforms. It also supervises news media at 
the national level directly and others indirectly. For doing that, there is a team under the 
CPD, comprised of several heads of key national news media, to supervise day-to-day 
operations in news reporting, and to deal with co-operation matters within these 
important national media, such as Xinhua News . 4gency, the Renmin Ribao (People ý 
Daily), the Central People ý Radio, the CCTV, the Economic Daily, and the Guangming 
Ribao. . Since 1992, all directors of the team are from the Domestic Department of 
Xinhua (Interview 3 and 4). 
The two-track mechanism is a system under the dual leadership of the CCP through 
the CPD and the government via its media administrative institutions. They manage the 
news media with different logics, such as Party logic, cultural logic, and media logic. The 
governmental institutions maintain day-to-day managerial control, acting as agents to 
execute the objectives of the M. 
The hierarchical mechanism is the system arising from the provincial channels of 
media management. Each province has its own propaganda department under its 
provincial party committee, and it also has a branch bureau of the SAPP. But the 
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propaganda departments play a decisive role in ideological affairs. 
The departmental mechanism refers to the fact that every news medium must be 
sponsored by an organ of the CCP, a government department or a legal association. The 
sponsor must take responsibility for supervising its news media. This sponsorship 
mechanism enforces internal accountability to buttress the external control by the CCP 
and the government. It is enhanced by an internal supervisory system, which is legalised 
by the Responsibilities of the Sponsoring Unit and Supervisory Unit of Publishing Units 
Provisional Regulations enacted on June 29,1993. Accordingly, a three-tier internal 
supervisory system must be established in all news units. They are 1) the publishing unit, 
that is, the news media itself, 2) the sponsoring unit; and, 3) the supervisory unit. The 
supervisory and sponsoring units have responsibility for supervising the news medium, 
examining news reporting, and vetting key articles, commentaries and reporting. 
The CPD plays a key role in the control mechanisms. The head of the CPD is often a 
close follower of the General Secretary of the CCP, for example the relationship between 
Ding Guangen and Jiang Zemin (1992-2002), and the one between Liu Yunshan and Hu 
Jintao (2002- the present). The CCP always appoints the cadres to head some key news 
media, such as Xinhua News Agency, People ý Daily, CCTV, and so on. 
In addition, the CCP established a macro system to oversee the news media. In 
January 1995, the General Office of the CCP promulgated 'Several Opinions on Further 
Improving the News Consensus by the CCP ý Propaganda Department', which elaborates 
6 one system and five mechanisms' (yige tixf, wuzhongjizhi) as a framework to govern the 
mass media. The system refers to the media control system, which is headed directly by 
the CPC and the Party committees of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. 
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It is overseen by propaganda departments at different levels, and administered by 
governmental media institutions. The mechanism refers to informing (xinxi), guiding 
(yindao), harmonizing (xietiao), safeguarding (baozhang), and constraining (Vueshu). 
'One system and five mechanisms' provide an interactive media regime. Accordingly, 
there are sub-systems such as the news reading system, news research system, news 
informing system, news conference system, internal communication system, and so on. 
The regime effectively controls the whole chain of news media from the news reporting 
to news production, and from product creation to product distribution. But it seriously 
undermines the autonomy of media units in reporting what the readers and audiences 
want to know. On July 1,2001, the CPD launched a warning system Yinggao zhidu), to 
enhance the self-censorship system. If a media unit is warned over three times, it has to 
restructure under the supervision of the SAPP (Lang Jingsong, 2003: 90). 
According to the Administration of Newspapers Provisional Rules enacted on 
December 25,1990, a licensing system is formalised for newspapers and magazines. 
Establishing a new paper or magazine, no matter whether it is aiming at the national or 
local market, must be approved by the SAPP before a licence is granted. Article 10 
defines several preconditions for establishing a new medium. They are 1) fixed and 
competent sponsoring and supervisory units within government; 2) a specific subject 
matter and editorial policy that are consistent with the portfolio of its sponsoring and 
supervisory units; 3) competent editors and reporters; and 4) the necessary premises, 
equipment and capital. Accordingly, the rule legally excludes the independent media 
without governmental sponsorship. There has been no approval of news publication 
registration since 1995 (Chinaý Daily, May 10,2003, p. 9). However, there have been a 
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few 'new' newspapers published in China. These new papers, partnering non-state-owned 
investors, are operating under former publications' registration numbers. 101d newspapers 
are often poorly run, but they can make profits by selling their registration numbers. This 
practice is not illegal, though the administration discourages it. 
Through the external and internal controls, the media authorities, to a great extent, 
have the capacity to monitor day-to-day operations and the long-term development. 
Therefore, the outstanding characteristic of China's media governance is its highly 
centralized licence and approval system (Gaodufizhong de shenpi zhidu). Every step of 
media reforms and operations is strictly approved by the authorities. It becomes a 
bottleneck for media development. As a radical liberal commentator, Jiao Guobao, 
suggests, 
'The CPD, together with the whole propaganda system in China, has seriously 
damaged the Chinese image in the international community. The essence of the 
CPD is to recreate fascist Germany's "repeating a lie a thousand times for it to 
become true". The operative purposes and mechanisms of the propaganda system 
are completely counteractive to modem civilisation. 2 
There are a few complains on the traditional models of media governance, 
particularly on allocation of media resources, which are plan-oriented, rather than 
market-oriented. Such dissatisfaction over media resources becomes one of motivations 
for media reforms, which will be discussed in the following chapters. Media practitioners 
' For instance, the Economic Observer in Beijing, the 21 Century Economy Herald in Guangzhou, Beqing 7-Imes in 
Beijing, and so on, are operating in this way. 
2 Jiao Guobiao, 'Taofa zhongxuanbu' (Crusade Against the Central Propaganda Department), at 
<http: //beiiinjzsprin2. com/bi2/2004/280/2004424164220. htm>, accessed on March 1,2004. Although the CPD was 
angered with the essay by Jiao Guobiao, it imposed no severe punishment on him. Sponsored by the Ford Foundation, 
Jiao Guobiao went toAmerica as avisiting scholar after he quit hisjob in Beijing University in mid-2004. 
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and authorities complain that the number of newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, 
broadcasting stations, and TV stations in a given administrative area, does not depend on 
the market demands, but on the rank of the administrative area. Liu Binjie, deputy 
director of the SAPP, stated at the School of Journalism of Beijing University, on 
September 19,2003, 
'The model of central planned media governance is not compatible with the 
market-oriented economy. China has already established the framework of a 
market economy, but the media industries could not keep up with the pace. '(Liu 
Binjie, 2004: 27) 
3 THE CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL MEDIA GOVERNANCE 
3.1 The Local Flourishing Media against Central Control 
Since the 1980s, the Chinese economic reforms have called for a more efficient 
communication infrastructure that can provide more timely information and more 
effective economic promotion. Although China has a licensing system to defend the 
CCP's dominance over the mass media, there was a huge investment in the media sector 
when the Chinese economy boomed. Local governments and ministries were keen to 
have their own media to express their voice. There were 2,137 newspapers, 9,029 
magazines, 2,000 TV stations and 81 media groups by 2002 (China Business Weekly, 
August 17,2003, p. 12), compared with 185 newspapers, 32 TV stations established in 
1979 (Burgh, 2003: 29). With an annual growth of 8 per cent in gross domestic product 
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(GDP) and the advertising market expanding at an average rate of above 40 percent since 
1992, the potential of a huge media market in China has been increasingly recognized 
(Zhou, 2002: 73). In the mid-1990s, nearly 90 percent of urban households had colour 
television, and more than 80 percent of rural households had either black-and-white or 
colour television. By 1998, there were 300 million TV sets in China and this figure will 
increase to 400 million within ten years (Lu Di, 1999: 199). In 2003, China radio and 
television covered 93.34 per cent and 94.62 per cent of its population. There were 282 
radio broadcasting stations, 744 media and short wave radio transmitting and relaying 
stations, 320 general television stations and 62 education television stations throughout 
China. Subscribers to cable television programs reached audiences of 105.08 million. In 
that year, China produced 140 feature movies, 61 scientific, educational, documentary or 
cartoon films and I special movie. National and provincial newspapers issued 24.36 
billion copies; magazines, 2.99 billion copies; and books, 6.75 billion copies. 3 
Table 3.1: Radio and TV Broadcasting and Publications, 2003 
Item 1 1 Figure 
Ratio of radio broadcasting covering rý7-- 
Ratio of TV broadcasting covering 94.8% 
Publication of magazines 7ý 
Publication of books 6,750 million 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of Cluna, ZUU4 
The increase of investment in media domains enabled Chinese people to have more 
3 These figures come from the Chinese official website. See 'Statistical Committee of the People' Republic of China 
on the 2003 National Economic and Social Development', at 
<hn: //www. china. orR. cn/e-companv/04-03-20_/RagcO4OlO2. htm>, accessed on June 7,2004. 
82 
ChapterThree The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
information accessibility; therefore, the increase of media accessibility changed media 
consumption behaviour in China. The consumption of media shifted from previous 
'political study' groups at workplaces in pre-1970s, to informal groups of friends and 
neighbors in their flats in 1980s, and finally to individual private consumption from 
1990s. This transformation from public participation to private consumption has enabled 
the Chinese people to avoid interruptions of media consumption from the Party, and 
further create their own interpretation of media content. 
The rapid growth of media industries in China, together with its successful 
economy, is mainly attributed to political decentralization (Williams, 2001). 
Decentralization has reshaped the power distribution and political relations within the 
communist party-state system and the central-local system. It allows regional and local 
bureaucrats to benefit from it through preferential policies, with the relationship of 
'reciprocal accountability' among the party elites (Shirk, 1997; An Chen, 1999: chap. 7). 
The relationships between the provinces and the centre have become a crucial factor in 
national decision-making (Ferdinand, 1991; Zheng, 1997: 215-224). Decentralization 
created a new way to maintain Chinese political stability in the era of globalization. It is 
based on rapid economic growth, which in turn requires greater flexibility at all levels of 
the political system. The central government allows such flexibility, as long as it 
contributes to economic growth and political stability (Lieberthal, 1995). As a result, 
there is an implicit national Political bargain. Jean Oi terms this distinctive form of 
governance as 'local-state corporatism', which constitutes a hybrid form that utilizes 
local capacities inherited from the Maoist era and it is blended with forms found in 
capitalist developmental states (Oi, 1995: 1132-49). One of the surviving factors for the 
83 
ChapterThree The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
local authorities is that they are keen to draw on foreign capital or overseas Chinese 
expertise to facilitate economic development. Therefore, the local officials are keen to 
absorb foreign capital, including from TNMCs. The relationship between the center and 
provinces is described as 'the mountains are high, and the Emperor is far away (shangao 
huangdi yuan)' in a Chinese saying. Therefore, the orders (mingling) of the central 
government may not exert as strong an influence on the local governance as they did 
before (Breslin, 1999: 63-72). In terms of governance institutions, as Shiping Zheng 
contends, institutional restructuring may be made when economic modernization 
continues to generate more divergent interests between the centre and localities and 
among various regions (Zheng, 1997: 264). 
The same happens in the media sector (Wu, 2000). All provincial governments and 
different administrative departments would like to take more initiatives. The 
fragmentation among different branches of power is politically more important. To a 
great extent, it seems to have disrupted the policy-making process. Although the party 
prohibits media operators from distributing foreign channels without official permits, 
some cable stations, particularly in coastal provinces like Guangdong, transmit the 
signals of STAR TV and other TNMCs' channels. Moreover, when competition along 
with rapid media expansion becomes increasingly intensive, the local governments 
encouraged commercialization of mass media. It firstly has taken place in Guangdong in 
the 1980s and spread to other provinces in the 1990s. It has become a way for most media 
units to survive in the marketplace after the government stopped subsidies. It has also 
become an increasing tendency to create products catering to the assumed tastes of target 
audiences as opposed to the tastes of the central party-state's propaganda cadres. 
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Therefore, media commercialization introduces incentive structures into public service 
provision through contracting-out, quasi-markets, and consumer choice. Each city in 
China has several newspapers and television channels, catering for a vast rang of tastes. 
Under cutthroat competition, many local stations would like to broadcast imported 
TNMCs' programmes to attract audiences, though they are not officially allowed to do 
this. Furthermore, the local media still play a significant if not dominant role in the 
formulation of governing policy. Therefore, media governance is moulded by different 
contexts between provinces (Long, 1995/1999: 51-62). In general, the officials in coastal 
areas are bolder in encouraging flexibility of regulations than those inland. The balance 
between states and markets, as Susan Strange suggests, has shifted in a way that makes 
the state just one source of authority among several, leaving a blind-spot of non-authority 
or ungovernance (1996: 14). The result of media commercialization in China is, as Daniel 
Lynch observes, 'a saturation of the media with so-called "spiritual pollution", "vulgar", 
"pornographic" and "feudal superstitious" communications that undermine the state's 
efforts to build a "socialist spiritual civil ization". (Lynch, 1999: 6) These media 
products, which have received profound governance concerns, have become targets of 
vigorous criticism and political campaigns. 
3.2 The Penetration of Global Media in China 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy benefits from the integration into 
global society since the 1990s (Pei, 1994). After the party no longer regarded the major 
capitalist countries as imperialism power engaged in a zero-sum struggle with the 
socialist countries and the less developed countries in the 1980s, the CCP began to take 
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more measures to integrate into the 'global family'. Since 1992 China has zealously 
participated in international institutions like the World Bank. As a way of successfully 
continuing to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), China continued to negotiate with 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) after it failed to gain membership of GATT in 1995. 
It adjusted the administrative and legal structures, deregulating even in some sensitive 
sectors such as telecommunications. Therefore, there has been a steady increase in the 
proportion of business messages circulating in China that have originated from abroad. 
The authorities have been keen to employ foreign information to stimulate awareness of 
the fact that 'China faces a serious crisis in the global village'. 4 Moreover, the foreign 
actors, such as international institutions, transnational corporations, employees, and so on, 
demand original, direct communication with their headquarters and branches worldwide. 
It makes penetration by the global media possible. 
From the early 1980s, TNMCs entered the Chinese magazine market in non-political 
areas, such as finance, fashion, technology, and so on. Most international magazine 
brands, such as Business Weekly, Fortune, Newsweek, Elle, Figaro, Cosmopolitan, were 
permitted to publish Chinese editions with official publishing units (Lam, 2000: 47). The 
most Popular news websites in China, like 'sina. com'and 'sohu. com', are joint ventures. 
An upward tendency appeared due to the increasing number of television stations since 
the early 1990s, though there are no official data published. Take Viacom for example. 
Since 1995, its MTV sold programmes to more than 100 television stations. It also 
successfully promoted Nickelodeon, a children's education programme, to nearly 100 
channels covering 20 provinces (Ye Zhan, 2002), as well as to CCTV from 2002, 
4 Ilis concept originated from former Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang for the purpose of taking part in the global 
community and promoting domestic political and economic reforms. 
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accounting for 300 to 500 million audiences (Zhou Jiwei, 2002: 67). Several satellite 
systems including Star TV broadcast their programmes to China (Lynch, 1999: 119-121). 
By 2002, China had approved 22 international broadcasting networks to enter the 
Chinese market, including the BBC, CNN, CNBC and Sky News (Economist, 
Oct. 27,2001). This number had increased to 31 by 2004 (Interviewee 24). Since China's 
entry into the WTO, AOL Time Warner and News Corporation have been permitted to 
broadcast some channels in Guangdong Province. In the feature film sector, foreign films 
account for an increasing part of the box office revenues. They even dominated half of 
the total revenue in 2003 (Li Chui, 2003: 70). The flourishing foreign media has 
threatened the survival of Chinese domestic media, undermining the government's 
previous expectation that the media industry should be one of the driving forces of 
economic growth. 
The rules of the political game in China remained the same, but a news story that 
appears in the international media, particularly in the media with worldwide influence, 
such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, and so on, has more 
impact upon the CCP and the Chinese government than a story in the local media, even if 
the story originated from a Chinese source. SARS broke out in the spring of 2003 in the 
south of China, but the government suppressed it for several months. It was originally 
reported by Guangzhou's Southern Metropolitan Paper and Beijing's Caying Magazine 
in February. However, the Western media have much more influence on the Chinese 
government. In mid-April, American news weekly 271me and other Western media 
exposed that Chinese officials had intentionally covered up the fatal disease. They also 
criticised the Chinese authorities and called for isolating China from the global 
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community. The Chinese government was under great pressure from global criticism. 
Soon it stepped up effective efforts to constrain the disease. In addition, it soon resulted 
in a great improvement of the governmental news release mechanism, though this 
mechanism was first implemented in 1983 (Interviewee 50). 
3.3 The Agreements of the WTO 
The WTO negotiations strengthened and consolidated liberalising forces in the 
Chinese economic and political arenas. On November 11,2001, China finally became a 
member of the WTO after a 15-year-long negotiating process in which 'dark hair has 
turned gray'. 5 The accession to the WTO may be a watershed for Chinese society 
because the government made a strong commitment (Kong, 2002: 1; Wang and Cheng, 
2001: 297-328). It poses heavy pressure behind China's reforms not only in improving the 
quality of goods and services, but also in promoting the rule of law and reducing 
governmental intervention. 
The WTO has given rise to several issues that force the ruling party to conduct 
substantial structural changes in terms of institutional reforms and administrative 
transformation. 6 During the short transitional period from 2002 to 2004, the government 
amended thousands of obsolete laws and regulations at the national and local levels. 
Meanwhile, in order to support the development of many industries previously closed to 
foreigners, many new laws and regulations have been promulgated to encourage 
5 It is a famous phrase which described the hard process of China's negotiation of accession to the WTO by former 
Primer Minister Zhu Rongji in the NPC's news conference on March 18,1999 
6 seeaspeechby the Director of SABFT on August 14,2002, 'WTO yu guangbo yingshiye gaige[ WTO and reforms 
of broadcasting, film and television]', at http: //academic. mediachina. net/xsid view? id=680. accessed on November 8, 
2002; see also Lui, Jiezhong, 'WTO dui xinwen gaige de tuidongli tanxi[ The Push of WTO on Press Reform]% at 
httl2: //www, cddc. net/shownews, asp? newsid=3784, accessed on Sep. 30,2003. 
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international participation (Kong, 2002: 2). In addition, millions of officials, legislators 
and judges have been required to amend their outdated norms rooted in the planned 
economy era and admit universal rules from the global community, in which a market 
economy opens up to foreign participation and becomes committed to the principle of 
transparency and non-discrimination against foreign goods and services. In this sense, the 
entry into the WTO is the beginning of a real wave of profound reforms prevailing in 
China. 
The TNMCs also impose heavy pressure on the Chinese media authorities. There is 
a gap between the Chinese legal regime and the WTO requirements when it comes to the 
enforcement of Chinese obligations under the Accession Protocol and the WTO 
Agreements. The protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) is an essential 
component of economic reforms and opening-up policies. China formulated laws and 
regulations in this field in the late 1970s, after joining relevant international conventions 
and organizations. Aiming at developing a world dimension and world standards, China 
undertook to align with the WTO Agreements. However, there are increasing disputes on 
IPRs between the TNMCs and Chinese media. Due to the weak law enforcement of the 
government, the infringement of copyright is a serious problem that impairs the TNMCs' 
benefits. 
3.4 The Advanced Communication Technologies 
The significance of transformative notions such as Giddens' 'time-space 
distancization' (1990) characterizes the shrinking time horizons for decision-makers, and 
marks their ability to harness the declining transportation and communication costs to 
89 
ChapterThrec The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
spread decisions over wider and more diverse spaces. The approach of technological 
determinism focuses on the wide- ranging sources and uses of power outside the 
legal-regulatory apparatus. Most of them rise from the increasing accessibility of 
information for ordinary people, though it tends to neglect the state's capacity for 
information control. As Joseph S. Nye Jr. suggests, 'technology affects society and 
government, but the causal arrows work in both directions. '(Nye, 2002: 2-3) 
In China, the CCP successfully ushered in communication technologies (CT) to 
promote its mass campaigns and mobilise its administrative centralization in its history 
(Lynch, 1999). But it has to adjust administrative measures, and even partly lost some 
capacity and control over the CT. Having a huge amount of investment since 1992, the 
rapidly growing telecommunication networks link Chinese society --- via telephone, fax, 
and the Internet-with potential interlocutors in nearly 200 foreign countries and regions. 
Beginning with a few academic networks in the late 1980s, the Internet, which offers the 
Chinese an important window to the outside world, has experienced substantial growth 
since 1994, particularly after 1999. As table 3.1 demonstrates, the capacity of the Internet 
networks in China increased dramatically within several years. In 1997, China had 
620,000 Internet users, but this number soared to 79,500,000 in 2004, more than twelve 
times that in 1997. Chinese Internet users, who are no longer required to be registered in 
police stations, have become a significant force, because of their status as urban 
intellectuals, businessmen, professionals, and college students. Moreover, fiber-optic 
cable, satellite, and digital broadcasting are multiplying the number of television channels, 
and these are supplemented by video, CD-Rom productions, and on-line services. 
Thanks to the advance of communication technologies, 'human interaction in a 
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world where its cost is no longer a significant bar need not be confined within national 
boundaries' (Pool, 1990: 13). Many domestic problems are now handled internationally. 
This has visible effects on the spatial organization of human activities both within and 
among nations. It is a significant threat to the information control by the CCP. There was 
a case of a schoolhouse explosion in which 42 children died in Jiangxi's Wangzai County 
in December 2001. Premier Zhu Rongji and the Xinhua News Agency initially attributed 
the disaster to an accident. However, it was effectively challenged and criticized on the 
Internet. Finally, Zhu Rongji had to make a rare apology to the public (Interviewee 5). In 
this sense, the advanced CTs have enabled the Chinese people to access more information 
they are interested in and the virtual political participation has increased dramatically 
Table3.2 Internet Growth in China 
Computer Hosts Internet Users Domain 
(. cn) 
names Web Sites International 
Bandwidth (Mbps) 
Nov 1997 299,000 620,000 4,066 1,500 18.64 
July 1998 542,000 11,750,000 9,415 3,700 84.64 
Jan. 1999 747,000 2,100,000 18,396 5,300 143 
Jan. 2000 3,500,000 8,900,000 48,695 15,153 351 
July 2000 6,500,000 16,900,000 99,734 27,289 1,234 
Jan. 2001 8,920,000 22,500,000 122,099 265,405 2,799 
Jan. 2002 12,540,000 33,700,000 127,319 277,100 7,597.5 
July 2002 16,130,000 45,800,000 126,146 293,213 10,576.5 
Jan. 2003 20,830,000 59,1000,000 179,544 371,600 9,380 
July. 2003 25,720,000 68,000,000 250,651 473,900 18,599 
Jan. 2004 30,890,000 79,500,000 340,000 600,000 27,216 
Source: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of 
China's Internet (several years). Available online: http: // 
htt]2: //www. cnnic. net. cn/download/manual/statistical report I 3th. of, accessed on February 12,2004. 
(Hung, 2003). As an integral component of globalization, it 'is employed by global 
capitalism to spread its ideologies and values through multimedia images, icons, and 
other means. ' (Liu, 2004: 20) The gap between Party line and reality has widened, 
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'eroding the legitimacy of CCP rule' (Clemens, 1999: 4). The authoritarian regime may 
find it difficult to survive due to an increasing source of reference and greater 
governmental transparency, in the Chinese word 'toumingdu' (Ferdinand, 2000). An 
example of this potential was the way the Soviet dictatorship was undermined by 
photocopying (Clemens, 1999). It is a big challenge for the CCP to retain political 
dominance in the information age. 
3.5 The Claims for Media Legalization 
According to the Constitution of the PRC in the 1982,1993, and 2004 versions, 
there are at least five articles relevant to the media industry and press freedom. It defines 
the character, target and function of the mass media. It says the media is a 'service for the 
people and service for the socialist country' (Article 22). It also defines press freedom in 
China (Article 35 and 47). Article 35, for instance, clarifies that 'citizens of the People's 
Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession and of demonstration'. Article 47 also clarifies that the Chinese people 'have 
freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural 
pursuits. ' Moreover, the Constitution emphasizes that the mass media are under the 
supervision of the State Council (Clause 7 in Article 89), rather than the CCP. 
According to the Constitution, Chinese citizens have the right of press freedom. 
Therefore, Sun Xupei, a prominent scholar, argues that China does not lack the 
constitutional base for press law (Sun Xupei, 1994). However, the Party regards the news 
media as its ruling instrument. Subsequently, the Party regarded the establishment of 
private media as illegal, bourgeois 'liberalization'. The fact that the Party, rather than the 
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government, controls the media industry is already an abuse of public power and 
violation of the Constitution. Therefore, Tong Bing, a scholar in Fudan University, argues, 
'it is the party itself who may make the biggest mistakes. '(Tong Bing, 2003: 19) Sun 
Xupei also argues that no matter what law is made by the NPC, what decree is made by 
the government, or what principle is made by the party, all systems emphasize the bottom 
line that the news media must have the CCP's characteristics of ' "mainly positive 
reporting" (1984), "[media is] regarded as social benefits as top goals" (1990), and " [the 
Party] considers internal and external effects, reminds the social effects [of the mass 
media]" (1983). ' (Sun Xupei, 1994: 19) Therefore, the media industry is subordinated to 
the party and becomes an ingredient of propaganda institutions; freedom of press is 
limited. As a result, it is a contradiction between the Constitution and the administrative 
laws and decrees. The Constitution allows citizens to have freedom of press, freedom of 
speech, and independence of news media. However, the official regulations infringe the 
Constitution with their changeability, state hysteria, and low quality. Jiao Guobiao, an 
associate professor in the School of Journalism and Communication of Beijing University, 
suggests, 
'the evil of the CPD is to play a role as killer against the Constitution. In theory, 
the CPD is an official department in the CCP and it should play a role as defender of 
freedom of press and freedom of expression in accordance with the Constitution. In 
practice, the CPD abuses the Constitution. Defending the Constitution, we must 
crusade against the propaganda systerns. ' 7 
7 See an essay by Jiao Guobiao, 'Crusade Against the Central Propaganda Department (Taofa zhongxuanbu)', at 
http: //beiiingspring. com/bj2/2004/280/-2004424164220. htm. 2 
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China has been trying for over two decades to develop a Media Law, but China and 
the world are still waiting. Before 1979, media policy in the PRC was clear. That is, the 
media were both the mouth and tongue and the eyes and ears of the CCP. Since 1979, 
voices demanding a Media Law have been increasing. In 1984, the CPD's Press Bureau 
submitted a proposal to produce a Media Law (Chao Peng, 1999: 201), but it was aborted 
in 1989. Particularly after 1992, the ownership of news media has transformed from a 
party-state monopoly to a multi-tiers structure, in which the state, public organizations, 
the private sector and foreign investors can own different media outlets (Tong Bing, 
2003: 15). Some authors suggest the reason for the lack of clarity and effectiveness in 
media regulation is the 'lack of both human and material resources' (Chen and Fu, 1998: 
161). The media practitioners, however, complain that the CCP deliberately delays the 
establishment of the Media Law, because the market force is increasing much more than 
in the past. If a Media Law existed, media practitioners would use it to struggle for their 
freedom! 
The violation of the Constitution and the delay in the media law have made China's 
journalism ambivalent and incompatible with developing the media industries. Some 
warn that there would be serious consequences if political reforms did not accompany 
economic reforms (Goldman, 1994: 299). After 1992, there has been some discussion of 
the laws, responsibilities, and rights of journalism. Chinese media practitioners 
complained that, because there are no legal safeguards for the watchdog function of mass 
media, journalists have a hard time simply investigating a story, let alone openly 
criticizing the government. In recent years, the media practitioners and academics have 
desired a legal system for defining the obligations and rights of journalists and the news 
94 
ChapterThree The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
media, because there are increasing cases where the rights of news reporting are trampled, 
the journalists are caught, tortured and even jailed, and the news media suffer retaliation 
and are closed down. 70 percent of Chinese journalists involved in law cases were 
defeated, but the percentage in the USA is only 7 (Tong Bing, 2003: 18). Zheng Baowei, a 
scholar in People's University, argues, 
'the most important precondition for public scrutiny (yulunfiandu) is to establish 
a set of media laws, to improve the legal system, and to insist on rule of law. The state 
must draft and promulgate a Media Law or Public Scrutiny Law, to rule and manage 
news criticism and public scrutiny, rather than ruling by the interests of the party and 
government leaders. '(Zheng Baowei, 2000: 38) 
The challenges from the rapid development, globalization, advanced technologies, 
decentralization, and self-awareness of civil rights, provide a 'bottom-up' analysis for the 
transformation of media governance. This section demonstrates the crisis that the CCP 
and the government confront. The increasing number of imported programmes 
undermines the state's efforts to build a 'socialist spiritual civilization'. The advanced 
communication technologies have been achieving significant inroads by linking dissident 
networks and forcing the security apparatus into a seemingly futile race to try to stay one 
step ahead of technology. Commercialization reforms generate reforms in the media 
sector, providing increasing news stories on sensational issues such as crime, smuggling 
and prostitution to lure readers. The growing diversity of communication messages may 
give rise to many kinds of public sphere (Habermas, 1989), challenging the CCP's 
capacity and control over the media. Tensions emerged as top-down models of public 
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information dissemination gave way to more autonomous and plural forms of media 
production and to distribution mechanisms sustained by the flourishing market economy 
and participation of global actors. Therefore, as Willy Wo-Lap Lam argues, information 
technology would challenge the traditional governing system in China (Lam, 2000: 38). 
The quaint Communist party 'reading groups' of censors, the vague media laws and 
regulations which encourage self-censorship, and the more blatant controls such as 
intimidation, arrest and imprisonment of journalists, may be disrupted in the age of 
globalization. 
4 THE FADING PARTY CHARACTERISTIC 
4.1 The Changes of Media Guidelines 
Basically, media governance in China, together with other political and economic 
policies, has been established in conformity with the 'Four Cardinal Principles', which 
are 1) Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought; 2) the socialist road; 3) continuation of 
the people's democratic dictatorship; and 4) absolute political dominance by the CCP 
(Deng Xiaoping, 1994). It is based on Mao Zedong's thought, but it seems to be slightly 
and continuously adapted in the 1990s. The adaptation might reflect the CCP's 
weakening control over the media. 
Before 1979, the Chinese media were completely dominated by the CCP. In May 
1942 Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature that laid 
down guidelines for literature, art, and journalism that have been in use ever since. As 
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Mao stated, there is no such thing as art for art's sake. It exists primarily for politics, and 
not for amusement or entertainment. All kinds of art have their class nature (Mao Zedong, 
1993: 389-391,409-410). In other words, the mass media are an apparatus of the CCP's 
propaganda and private media are forbidden. After the Yan'an Forum, Mao's approach, 
'from the masses, for the masses', has become the principle of media governance in 
contemporary China (Liu Binjie, 2004; Hsiao and Cheek, 1995). Accordingly, actively 
involving the masses in implementation of the leader's decisions can acquire popular 
support for those policies. Any policy should seek to gather information from the 
populace but it is the leaders who make the final decisions (Mao Zedong, 1983). The 
mass line is a principle in which society is dominated by the state. Individual advocacy or 
interest-group activity is regarded as legitimate neither theoretically nor practically. Its 
character is the directive operation from the top leadership, whose decisions are mainly 
expressed in documents, rather than through the Constitution and laws in Western 
democracies (Wu, 1995). 
The years after 1979 saw a slight adjustment in this governing model along with 
open-door policies and 'four modernizations' policies. The functions of the mass media, 
thus, gradually shifted from a complete propaganda mechanism to news, social education, 
and entertainment orientation (Interviewee 51). However, nationalism and 
anti-foreignism are two strong forces in shaping media policy. As importation of foreign 
programmes was increasing, the CCP began to pay attention to the political implications 
of imported programmes, whose consequences are visible in the long term. The 
nationwide discussion on 'practice as the only basis for testing truth' and the emergence 
of the Xidan Democracy Wall provoked the CCP to campaign against 'spiritual pollution' 
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in 1983. Moreover, the nature of Party journalism was defined as 'an organ of the Party, 
the government and the people' (Change, 1989: 56; Lee, 1990: 8). Tighter press control 
returned after the Tiananmen Square Incident when the CCP promoted a campaign 
against 'peaceful evolution' in the early 1990s. Former President Jiang Zemin asserted, 
'truthfulness in news means precisely to uphold the Party's ideological line. '(Quoted by 
Herbert, 2001: 138) 
The year 1992 was a turning point for Chinese reforms with the call from Deng 
Xiaoping for 'more opening and deeper reform' when he visited the south of China. 
Market forces gained momentum after the CCP accepted a market economy at its 
Fourteenth Party Congress in late 1992. Zhao Zhiyang's political reform approach, 
previously characterised as 'authoritarian liberalism', was redefined in practice. Media 
guidelines seemed to be transformed from the rationalization of Leninist propaganda to 
limited liberalization of press freedom. Journalistic institutions began to be managed as a 
kind of enterprise, though the essential function of the news media and Chinese 
journalism could not be changed. By maintaining the core of Party guidelines in the past 
decades, media governance has often been required to 'act quickly and sensitively to even 
the slightest fluctuations in political direction' (Anke and Rowan, 2002: 18). Thus, media 
policy is in a perpetual state of change. Within the reform camp, some have argued that 
China should develop its own form of 'press freedom with Chinese characteristics', 
rather than simply borrowing the Western model. They argue that the party is still the 
owner, the manager, and the practitioner. But the media industry has made great progress 
by having more audience feedback, public debates, and professional associations. Media 
commercialization has been blooming after the CCP decided to reduce subsidies to media 
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units, providing more opportunities for non-party units to participate in the media 
industries (Interviewee 2). 
In the early twenty-first century, reports in the Chinese news media have become 
less bureaucratized. The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in spring 
2003 weakened the rationale of the CCP's information control system. The nationwide 
panic prompted the new generation of Communist leadership to embed a doctrine of 'tell 
the truth' into the mainstream media. The outbreak of SARS and the cases of Sun 
Zhigang and Zhu Zhengliang, 9 all pressed the new leaders to establish a release system 
of government information. The news media now show great concern for people's safety 
and their lives and public health. In 2003, the domestic media battled fiercely against 
rampant discrimination against migrant workers in pay, education of their children and 
medical care. Together with relevant government departments, the media forced many 
recalcitrant bosses to pay delayed wages to migrant workers before the Spring Festival of 
the Year of the Monkey. The media and the audiences claim that they have the right to 
know the governmental activities. Li Changchun, the chief of the CCP's propaganda and 
an associate of President Hu Jintao, announced, 'News reportage should uphold "Three 
Proximities" (sanflejin), that is, proximity to the public; proximity to reality; and, 
proximity to day-to-day life. '(Li Chuangchun, 2003: 3-10) The media and audiences 
claim that they do not need numerous images of leaders on the screens, on the front pages 
of newspapers, or in radio headlines. Rather, they need diverse information and 
transparency of governmental activities. Therefore, the new generation of leaders 
' After Sun Zhigang was beaten to death in police custody on March 19 2003 in Guangzhou, the CCP acted swiftly to 
demand a thorough investigation and punishment of the officials who had abused their power. Zhu Zhengliang was a 
farmer from Anhui province who travelled all the way to Beijing to set himself on fire to protest against the local 
government's decision to relocate his family. The core leaders intervened and solved his problems. All cases were firstly 
reported by the bold presses in Guangdong Province. 
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promoted administrative reforms, such as simplifying the ritual of leaders' overseas visits, 
shortening reporting on leaders' activities, setting up a regular government news release 
system, and so on, to preserve the institutional establishment. 
4.2 The Media as an Industry 
Zhu Yulong is the Party Secretary of an impoverished village in east Sichuan 
Province, but the total amount of money he spends on subscribing to 20 newspapers 
and magazines every year is around 150,000 yuan (US$18,122). It cost every villager 
about 10 yuan (US$1.21) annually (China Daily, Sep. 2,2003, p. 2). It takes more 
than half of the total budget for administrative expenses. Zhu is not an avid reader, 
nor do his fellow villagers have insatiable appetites for information. Most of these 
publications go straight into the waste-paper basket. Their subscription is an 
administrative order, which is one of the critical problems in China's party 
publication. Government spending covers about 6 to 10 billion yuan (US$725 
million-1.21 billion), nearly half of the total annual subscription fee (16 to 20 billion 
yuan). Of the 2,137 newspaper titles in the country, at least 1,250 of them depend 
on the subscriptions like those of Zhu Yulong. There were many complaints from the 
bottom that the central government finally decided to reduce the number of unwanted 
publications to 1,000 titles in late 2003(China Daily, Sep. 2,2003, p. 2. ). While the 
rest of China strides onwards from central planning to a market economy, many of 
the news media remain in the hands of government agencies and party organs, though 
there have been a few experiments where the government allowed selected media 
units to operate like profit-oriented enterprises, such as China Securities Paper When 
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selling a newspaper is part of administrative power, mandatory purchases are 
unavoidable. In the television sector, two thirds of TV drama could not recoup their 
investment (Wang Jianru, 2002: 38). The deficiencies of the media system placed a 
great financial burden on the government. 
In the fall of 2003, China's authorities began to regard the media as an industry, 
which contributes to national economic growth. It is a break through in Chinese media 
history, in line with the 'Three Proximities' guiding journalistic operations. The 
motivation for the media reform mainly stems from a contrast between the 
under-developed media sector and other booming sectors under the same market-oriented 
economy. A significant factor is the conservative political climate, in which the news 
media have to play a dual role that leads to a confusion of media targets between public 
service and economic achievement, conflicts between the propaganda media and the 
mass media, and incompatibility between political propaganda and social service 
functions. As an official in the CPD states, 
'From 1979 to 1985, China's news media reached quite an advanced peak, in 
which the quality of newspapers and publication was even higher than that of 
nowadays. After that, we had a few fluctuations and turmoil in terms of ideology, 
culture and society. From the 1990s, China's media were set on the right track 
with gradual development. In 1992, the private sector was allowed to become 
involved in publication. However, after that, the media reforms could not keep up 
with the development of the market economy. Only in 1999 when it achieved 
some degree of success in the negotiations with the WTO did China have to 
101 
ChapterThree The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
compromise with international market forces in the news media sector, making a 
commitment to open up some areas in the media industries. Under such 
circumstances media reforms became an urgent issue. '(Interviewee 1) 
After a long delay, the Chinese media authorities launched a bold systematic reform 
package from 2002, splitting the news media into public service units and commercial 
units. In November 2002, the CCP's Sixteenth Congress clarified, 'Development requires 
that we uphold and deepen reform. It requires that we do away with all notions which 
hinder development, change all practices and regulations which impede it and get rid of 
all the drawbacks of the systems which adversely affect it. '(People ý Daily, Nov. 17,2002, 
p. 1) The Sixteenth Party Congress regarded culture, including the mass media, as an 
industry. In order to develop cultural undertakings and industry, the party requires that it 
is imperative to meet the requirements of developing advanced culture and always places 
social benefit first. The state supports and protects public cultural undertakings, 
encourages them to enhance their vigour for self-development, continues to improve the 
policies and measures for developing public cultural undertakings, and strengthens 
cultural infrastructure and boosts various types of popular culture. On the early stage, Li 
Chuangchun, a member of the Politburo of the CCP, clarified that the key to cultural 
reforms is to solve the structural problems in the media system. Thus, a new cultural 
system should be created (Li Chuangchun, 2003). On August 12,2003, the CCP Politburo 
hosted the seventh collective study meeting to discuss developmental strategies of 
cultural industries. After consulting with media experts, President Hu Jintao pointed out, 
'According to the characteristics and rules of socialist culture in the new 
102 
ChapterThree The Media Institutional Transformation Since 1992 
environment, and according to the requirements of cultural achievement, we must 
promote cultural system reforms and institution building for the sake of supporting and 
defending our public services, and strengthening the capacity and competitiveness of the 
cultural industry. '(Xinhua News, August 13,2003; People ý Daily, August 14,2003, p I. ) 
Hu's speech became the basic document in the session on 'Further Reforms on Science, 
Education, Culture, and Health Systems' in 'The CCPý Decision on Several Issues on 
Improving Socialist Market-oriented Incorporated Economy Systems', which was passed 
at the third session of the 10h Party Congress in October 2003 (The People ý Press, 2003: 
30). 
Therefore, a notion of the public service (gong yi xing) was a subject of debate in 
China's communications system, with the focus on bureaucratic conflicts over 
convergence and segmentation of consumer interests. To ensure the preservation of the 
citizen's right to be informed and to communicate freely, which is the essence of political 
democracy, the Western media authorities regard public service as a mechanism to 
balance the capital accumulation imperative of communication firms with democratic 
values. In the Chinese context, although the CCP always asserts that its mass media 
represent the people's interests, the mass media only stand for the interests of a small 
number of the CCP members in supreme power. The cultural reforms attempt to establish 
some stable institutions that allow at least some public participation, though the CCP is 
unaccountable to the public. The reforms, in which for the first time the CCP 
distinguishes between the media roles as propaganda tool and as economic growth 
mechanism, aim to separate the public service sector and the commercial sector 
nationwide. The concept of 'commercial culture industry (shangyehua wenhua chanye)', 
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as Yin Hong and Li Degang argues, lifts the regulatory barriers on culture and media 
marketization, providing a political guarantee for sensitive cultural and media industries 
(Yin and Li, 2004: 5-9). 
With the definitions of public service and commercial operation, the reforms in 
China's television industry stepped on to a new stage after 2003. From the central to the 
local levels, the Chinese TV units have been keen to launch a grand reform. The SABFT 
states that public service broadcasting (PSB) follows the government, while commercial 
operations follow the market; public service units are non-enterprise organizations that 
serve the social informative requirements with non-profit orientation for citizens; 
commercial units are profit-oriented enterprises which produce and operate media 
services for consumers. According to the government's ideal model, there are some 
public media institutions that are fully subsidized by the state and government, and others 
must be transformed into self-reliant, self-management, and self-development marketised 
units, particularly in sectors such as TV drama, education programmes, and entertainment. 
The aim of the reform is to restructure the media system in accordance with 
market-oriented principles but not to undermine the Party's agenda-setting (Yulun 
daoxiang). It is designed to try to balance the commercial and public interests. Therefore, 
the media institutions began to separate core news sectors from the marginal sectors, the 
content production from broadcasting networks, ideological information from cultural 
entertainment. They formulated a new media system, 'in which the government 
subsidizes the public service units, and the market orientates the commercial units. '(Yin 
and Li, 2004: 8) 
The government has accelerated the reforms of 'separating government 
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administration from enterprise (zhengqifenkai)' in the media sector, though it had been on 
the agenda of political reform in the mid-1980s. Accordingly, media units have autonomy 
in management; the government cannot interfere with media operations; media units 
become self-governing under the relevant laws; and social associations play a role as 
public supervisor. Many measures, including permitting private investment in the 
television sector, have been stipulated in order to boost the media industry (Interviewce 
2). Furthermore, in 2003, the SAPP established an evaluation system for the press and 
publication, requiring a market feasibility report before a new paper or a significant 
reform in existing papers. Meanwhile, a withdrawing system is to be established for the 
sake of closing some papers with market failure (Shi Feng, 2004). By the end of 2004, 
there were 35 media groups selected in the cultural reforms (Yang Chiyuan, 2005: 10). 
The recognition of the media as an industry has rich implications for China's media 
politics. If the media units move towards a modem firm system, in other words, if the 
media regulators continue to transfer decision-making power from central and local party 
committees and state bureaucrats to media managers, the party-government control over 
media units might be unavoidably weakened. The Company Law promulgated in 1993 
may provide corporation governors, such as shareholders, boards of directors, and 
managers, with a legal foundation allowing them to fend off the political control of the 
party government. These reforms aimed at transforming the Chinese media into 
self-sufficient corporations, rather than government-affliliated organizations. Government 
departments to which the media are affiliated could not interfere in the contents of reports 
(Interviewees I and 2). Therefore, there may be greater opportunities for the media to 
play the role of 'watchdog'. 
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5 MEDIA INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AFTER 1992 
As the global momentum of technological innovation, convergence, and market 
liberalisation has reshaped the benefits of participation in the global media trade since the 
1990s, the process of institutional policy-making has become complex. Globalization has 
had a wide range of direct and indirect consequences on the government's traditional 
ability to steer society and the economy (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 58). Through the 
decentralization of authority and opening up to outside resources, the economic reforms 
have driven the Chinese society into a state which is gradually retreating from its Leninist 
system of party-state governance (Lee and Zhao, 1995: xxv; Winckler, 1999). In general, 
as one commentator points out, 
'State responses to these effects have to a considerable degree aimed at not just 
ameliorating and mitigating the effects of globalization but also developing and 
strengthening transnational institutions through which states in concert pursue their 
interests vis-a-vis global capital. '(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 59) 
The governance response to the internal and external influences is to reunify its 
bureaucracy and to transform its governing institutions. The unified bureaucracy has 
demonstrable advantages: reliability, predictability, probity, cohesion and continuity, 
providing 'direct, hands-on control of services through hierarchical, rule-based 
disciplinary structures. '(Rhodes, 1997: 100) From 1992 onwards, media governance has 
been formatted in three aspects: bureaucratization, specialization, and professional ization. 
The media transition can be observed in the restructuring of state institutions and the 
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changes in their operational modes and social composition. Restructuring has involved 
the adaptation of existing institutions and the creation of new institutions. Regulatory 
reforms and market restructuring have been the hallmark of the past few years around the 
WTO accession. It makes regulatory bodies add an international dimension to their 
agendas and activities. More importantly, it acts as a means for transforming China into a 
complete market economy, in which the state has sought to regulate the media market at 
the macroeconomic level, rather than the microcconomic level. 
5.1 Bureaucratization of a Triple-Actor Framework 
When China began to embrace the market-oricntcd economy and integrate in the 
global community, it restructured the political, economical and social functions of 
governmental institutions. A developing regime like China needs greater economic 
efficiency in the public sector. Ilowcvcr, it must be balanced against the needs to 'create 
some of the predictability, universality, and probity associated with Weberian 
bureaucracy. '(Pctcrs, 2000: 7) Before the 1990s, the CPD was in charge of newspapers, 
magazine publications, political science curriculum in the schools, the arbitration of 
copyright disputes, as well as education, sports, and health. This authority has been 
provided by the Central Propaganda and Ideological Work Leading Group, which was 
made up of roughly half a dozen senior officials (Intcrvicwee 1; I-Isiao and Check, 1995: 
153-168). However, the ruling CCP has been driven by market forces to reform the state 
institutions. Its goal is to separate the functions of Party from those of government. After 
the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1992, the governing functions were 
gradually returned to the respective government institutions under the framework of 
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political reform named 'separating party and government functions (dangzhengfenkai), 
though it initially stemmed from the one at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. 
According to some insiders, the first step was the separation of decision-making. It 
included abolition of the practice of party secretaries without government positions being 
in charge of government work, abolition of the concurrent holding of the top government 
positions by the top party leaders at different levels, and restructuring ministries into a 
more cfficicrit administrative framework. The following step was the separation of the 
organization and personnel system. The reform included the abolition of the party 
leadership group in the government, and of nonparty organizations; abolition of the 
party-related departments in every level of the government departments and bureaus; 
abolition of the party leadership group system in enterprises, and adjusting the party's 
personnel management system (Pen, 1995). 
In this way, the two sets of functions of media governance assumed by the ruling 
CCP and the government have been clarificd. The government is in charge of the issues 
of technology, regulation, and administration; the party controls programming policies, 
content, and reporting themes. Under the supervision of the State Council, the media 
administrative system includes the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Broadcasting, 
Tclcvision, and Film, the State Media Publication Off ice, the Academy of Social Sciences, 
and the Xinhua News Agency; under the Party Secretariat, it includes the Propaganda 
Department, the People ý Daily, and Qiushi (Interviewees I and 2). 
The National People's Congress (NPC) is one of the leading roles in the 
thrcc-comercd power game, in which the Party, the government and the NPC 
institutionally play their individual roles in terms of policy-making, state governance, 
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ideological control, and so on. After many bargains in the annual national conference 
from 1992 to 1997, the Party-government separation and the expansion of congressional 
authority gradually jumped to the top of the agenda. Congresses share some 
policyrnaking power and slightly weaken the Party control over the government 
(Interviewce 42; Yang Fcngchun, 2002). The NPC with increasing power has become a 
critical institution for media legislation, though it has to closely follow the Party line. To 
some degree, it has created a sophisticated legal system of regulations and laws on media 
industries since 1992. The protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs) is a good 
example. One of the complaints against China from TNMCs and other international 
institutions like Microsoft is the weak protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
China committed itself to implement the TRIPs Agreement soon after its accession to the 
WTO without a transitional period. In order to comply with these rules the NPC, rather 
than the CCR accelerated its legislation on media regulations and relevant laws. The 
Patent Law, the Trademark Law and the Copyright Law had been revised before 2001. 
Under the supervision of the NPC, the State Council amended or enacted regulations on 
IPRs, including the Regulation on the Protection of Computer Software, the Provisions 
on the Implementation of the International Copyright Treaty, the Regulations on Customs 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, the Notice on the Interim Regulations on the 
Protection of Copyright of Books and Magazines, the Detailed Rules of the Interim 
Regulations on the Protection of Copyright of Books and Magazines, and the Regulations 
on the Administration of Audiovisual Products. In addition, there are other applicable 
administrative regulations and ministerial rules constituting a TRIPS-compatibic IPRs 
regime. For instance, the amendments to the Copyright Law in 2001 clarify the payment 
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system by broadcasting organizations that use recorded products. The Regulation on the 
Internet was also made in 1996 by the NPC. Therefore, the CCP is not the only authority 
involved in governing the media industries. The weight of the NPC and the legislation 
becomes obvious, demonstrating a sign of rule by law in China. In the words of a Chinese 
saying, it is becoming a kind of 'political civilization' (zhengzhi wenming) (Xuexishibao, 
2003). 
The legal arrangements dciinc the roles of the NPC, the State Council and the CCP, 
clarify the governing functions in different governmental institutions, offer the legal 
definition on the relations between economic actors in the marketplace, and provide the 
resolution for economic disputes. Take for example the dispute between the Southern 
Metropolitan Paper and Shenz-hen Media Group in Spring 2001. Fearing its rival's rapid 
expansion in Shenzhcn market, the Shenzhen Afedia Group banned the sale of the 
Southern Metropolitan Paper in Shenzhens newspaper booths. The Southern applied for 
mcdiation from Guangdong media administrations, rather than the CCP committee, and 
finally regained access to the Shenzhcn market under legal protection (Intervicwee 48). 
The roles that the CCP, the NPC and the government play in media governance have 
become clearer since 2003, when China promoted an aggressive media reform to 
establish a new media system in accordance with the so-called 'complete market 
economy' (Peopleý Press, 2003). On the one hand, the reform is to create a macro 
management system, which rcfcrs to a system 'led by the CCP, administered by the 
government, sclf-regulated by industrial associations, and self-opcrated by media units'. 
The government ministries govcm individual media industries by providing policy 
frameworks at the macro level, and not interfering with concrete operations in individual 
110 
Chapter'llree The Media Institutional Transfomation Since 1992 
media units. The different media industries are required to establish their own 
associations to regulate their industrial issues and resolve business issues with foreign 
counterparts. These associations are agents between the state and the market. Media units 
become independent bodies in the marketplace with operational autonomy. This 
framework of media reform clarifies that China's media governance employs a market 
macro management model, in which the party and government bodies no longer interfere 
with the day-to-day management in individual media units. In other words, the reform 
aims to remove the centraliscd planned approval model that the party and government 
previously used to control all media operations. On the other hand, the reform aims at 
establishing a micro system, in which news media units are divided into two categories. 
One is the public service units, which are non-profit-oricnted organizations sponsored by 
the government. The other is the commercial units. Except for some key mouthpieces of 
the Party and the state, all media units are required to become commercial units, and the 
government allows them to operate through various means such as listing on the stock 
market, mergcr-acquisition, and privatization (Liu Binjie, 2004: 25-58). In addition, a 
supervision system is set to clarify the media supervisors, who must completely draw 
back from day-to-day management in media units. According to Xu Guangchun, the 
separation of governing operations and managing operations does not mean that the 
media groups, television stations, radio stations, and newspapers arc not administered by 
the government. Instead, the government deals with the regulatory issues, while the 
media units manage their own operational business (Xu Guangchun, 2003). The 
supervisory bodies of the news media must strengthen their capacity for agenda-sctting, 
supervising media quality, and preventing the loss of state-owned capital (People k Daily, 
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April 10,2004, p. 4). 
According to the reform package, government and Party officials have been 
forbidden to take up any part-time position in newspapers and magazines since 2004. 
There are several measures to separate the party and the government from the media 
industries. Separation of supervision and operations (Guanbanfenfi) is important to 
establish a system of good governance, which refers to the reform in which the party 
and government organizations withdraw from media operations. In the newspaper 
and periodicals sector, there are several separations. The first one is personnel 
separation. No personnel in the media can have any position in party and government 
organizations. In turn, no official can participate in managing news media. The 
second is financial revenue separation. The news media have rights of self-operation 
and independent financial operations (zizhuj1ngying, dull hesuan). No organ of the 
party and government can claim any fee from the news media, as well as transfer 
money to media units. The third is that no Party-governmcnt organizations can take 
part in media circulation, advertising, and other media business, via any means such 
as phone-ordcr, documcnt-order, conference suggestions, and so on. All officials must 
withdraw from the reporter's station, which arc regional branch offices of a news 
media organization. In order to separate the personnel, distribution and financing of 
the newspapers and magazines from government and Party organs, a working group 
made a journey to 20 provinces, regions and municipalities to supervise print media 
reform (Xinhua Aleivs, Oct. 22,2003). 
There are some signs that the Party is concerned about the increasing strength of 
different governing actors. In an interview with a German journalist in December 1998, 
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Li Pcng, the chairman of the NPC, argued that China needs a press law to protect the 
freedom of the press. Since the regional outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) in the spring of 2003, the State Council has been entrusting legal experts with the 
task of drafting a regulation on publicizing government information - the first rule in 
China designed to make government work known to the public. The new rule conforms to 
the trend of globalization where governments are expected to release their information as 
widely as possible. It is also in line with the World Trade Organization's requirement on 
the transparency of domestic policies. 10 The regulation, of course, needs to have strict 
penalties for officials who deliberately prevent the public from knowing the facts; 
otherwise it might be seen as a worthless scrap of paper. The government of Zhuhai in 
Guangdong Province has been testing a regulation of press supervision since 1999. In 
Changzhi, Shanxi Province, with the support from the Party secretary, the local Party 
newspapers criticized its vicc-mayor by name on March 31,2001 (Gong Dcwang, 
2004: 3-15). Overall, a few media academics and professionals believe that the Chinese 
journalism system should have some innovations. In May 2003, the Regulations of 
Shanghalfor the Opening of Government Information was promulgated. According to 
this local regulation, government information rclating to the economy, social 
administration and public services are supposed to be made public, except for six items 
with the nature of national secrets. All citizens, corporations and other organizations have 
the right to make inquiries to the government. Official information must be disseminated 
to the public in the form of bulletins, newspapers, magazines, government websites, press 
conferences, radio, TV, and public reading rooms (Wang Ruyuc, 2003). These 
10 Source: 'Rule to Disclose Govemmcnt Inrormation', on the official wcbsite or the PRCý at 
cmmcnt/43994. htm>, access on May 5 2004 
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arrangements produced an increasing source of reference and greater governmental 
transparency, making media governance more institutionalized. 
The press law is reset on the NPC's agenda. After the delay in the media law 
because of the Tian'anmen Incident, proposed legislation creating the first Media Law 
was been put forward again by 95 deputies to the 9th NPC in early 2000. The incumbent 
9th NPC Standing Committee has put the legislation on its five-year work agenda 
(Xinhua Neivs, Dec. 2 8,2000). 'The Developmental Strategies of Press and Publication 
from 2000 to 2010' by the SAPP also shows that 'the legal construction in press and 
publication by 2010 should establish a legal system for the news media, regarding 
"Publication Law", "Press Law", and "Copyright Law"as the core. '(Intervicwee 42) 
Although the press law is still lacking, the private property right is finally protected 
by the latest revised Constitution in March 2004. Some argue that the delay of press law 
by the Party could not last forever because the force of Chinese civil society is increasing 
much more than anytime before. More importantly, legal 'reform' is a hot topic in current 
politics (Williams, 2001: 165). According to market-oriented analysis, economic 
competition would produce a marketplace of ideas with appropriate diversity (Entman 
and Wildman, 1992: 5-19). Following the right track toward the market economy, the 
propaganda messages may be reduced, though they may not disappear. The rights of news 
media may be well protected in a society with the rule of law. 
5.2 Specialization of Administrative Institution 
Specialization of administrative institution rders to the process of institution 
building in which special regulatory bodies deal with special media governing issues. Its 
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aim is, as a party official emphasises, 'to enable the administrations to sustain a 
technically proficient management according to social demand. '(Interviewee 1; fie 
Xiaoming, 2004: 173) Regarding the media as an industry, a separation of 'content' from 
'distribution' would desire special regulatory bodies. Institutional bodies of media 
governance include state ministries and state and local bureaus. The administrative 
structure at the national level is replicated more or less at local levels. Every province and 
municipality has its own bureaus under the dual leadership of the Party and the 
government. But the State Administration of Press and Publications (SAPP) does not 
have offices below the provincial level. This specializing process has weakened the 
monopoly of party hegemony and modified the context in which bargaining over 
mcdia-policy-making occurs. It is a process whereby the power groups within the CCP 
and the government manage the major redistributions of funds and power involved in the 
transition from centralized planning to market competition. The aim of this administrative 
reform is to restrain and maximize bureaucratic power. In this process, the monopoly 
power of the CPD has slightly weakened; the other special regulatory bodies, such as 
SAPP, enjoy more administrative power. 
In the print media sector, the SAPP was established in 1987 at a semi-ministerial 
level, but it was upgraded to ministry level in 2001, when reformist Premier Zhu Rongii 
promoted liberalization policies in the media sector. The main concern for the upgrading 
is to deal with incremental issues about TNMCs in the Chinese media market in the 
post-WTO years (Intcrviewce 41). The SAPP's duties arc to draft and enforce press 
regulations and policies, license publications, and monitor texts. Under the supervision of 
the CPD, this government agency could not exert authority over central Party newspapers 
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like the People ý Daily. However, it has the right to govern the print market throughout 
the country. For instance, it approves the expansion of a media publication schedule for 
any print media from national to provincial levels. In order to regulate the flourishing 
print media, the SAPP developed into a ministry bureau in April 2001 under the 
supervision of the State Council. According to the agreements with the WTO, China 
promised to open its publications retailing market within three years from 2001, and it 
did so in May 2003. From 1987 to 2000, the SAPP enacted 25 administrative laws and 
principals to guide the development of media industries. For instance, 7he Temporaq 
Principles of Neivspaper Afanagement' issued on December 25,1990 and '7he 
Ordinance on Publication' issued on January 2,1997 act as governmental and industrial 
laws. 
In the audiovisual sector, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT) 
replaced the Broadcasting Bureau in the early 1980s, but it was downgraded to a 
scmi-ministry bureau as the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) 
in 1998. The SARFT has a dual identity as both a news organization and a broadcasting 
administrative bureaucracy. It is in charge of the three national broadcasting networks of 
China National Radio (CNR), China Central Television (CCTV), and China Radio 
International (CRI). The SARFT controls their programmes via its editorial board. This 
board includes deputy ministers, heads of the three radio and television networks, and 
leaders of other departments, such as the Film Bureau, the Broadcast Publishing House, 
and the Television Arts Committee. Its duties include delivering Party and government 
directives to the news outlets, drafting strategies for carrying out these directives, 
organising and coordinating large-scale media campaigns, approving major media 
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activities, propaganda plans, programme changes initiated by the broadcast networks, and 
exercising editorial control over important news items and programmes. The SARFT is 
also in charge of every aspect of the country's broadcasting operations, such as issuing 
regulations, setting technical standards, training personnel, and coordinating research, 
playing its part in a huge government bureaucracy (Anke and Rowan, 2002: 18). 
In terms of the electronic media sector, three generations of regulatory regimes 
appeared in the 1990s (Tan, 1999: 261-276). The first one was a fragmented structure 
before 1994, including the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), and its rival 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Electronic Technology (MET), the former Ministry of 
Radio, Film and Tclcvision (MRFT). The second regime during 1994-1998 was a 
transitional organization, which was the National Joint Conference on State Economic 
Information. The third emerged in March 1998. At the first Session of the Ninth People's 
Congress, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), the Ministry of the 
Electronic Industry (MEI) and parts of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Tclcvision 
(MRFT) merged to form the Ministry of Information Industry (Mll). The State Council's 
Steering Committee of Mll has been integrated into a newer super-ministry. The tasks of 
establishing a new ministry are to oversee the governance of Chinese communication 
networks, and to coordinate state policy on construction and governance of electronic 
media as voice, video and data technologies converge. Subsequently, the government 
split-up China Telecom to establish China Afobile, China Unicom, China Nelcom, 
Rail. com, Jilong, and China Satcom to encourage competition in the different sectors of 
telccoms, including f ixed-line, mobile, data, paging, and value-added services. 
The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) under the CCP is in charge of all 
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ideological supervision. It plays its role by agcnda-sctting. Two bureaus named the 
Publication Bureau (cubanju) and the News Bureau (xinwenju) act as censors. Each of 
them mainly consists of three offices, which deal with the issues of newspapers, 
publication, and content censorship. Within the CPD, there is a team dealing with the 
issues raised by the transnational media corporations. It is located at the Publication 
Bureau, and it is comprised of several members who are good at foreign languages. Some 
have been trained in the West. The Ministry of Culture and the State Press and 
Publication Administration retain an interest in editorial matters, as do propaganda 
departments at all levels. 
In April 1996, the Administration of the Release of Economic Information in 
China by Foreign News 4gencies and their Subordinate Information Organizations 
Provisions were enacted. Accordingly, Xinhua News Agency became the authority to 
govern the release of economic information in China. No foreign news agencies and their 
subordinate branches can distribute economic information in China without official 
approval. Thousands of Chinese subscribers to foreign news services like Reuters and 
Dow Jones are required to register with Xinhua. 11crice, Xinhua plays a role in filtering 
news that is forbidden or that slanders or jeopardizes the Chinese national interest. 
According to some insiders, the main reason for that is political consideration on 
information control and intentional protection of a domestic monopoly. (Interviewee 6) 
The intellectual issues are supervised by the China Intellectual Property Office, which is 
under the State Council. 
Under the State Council, there is a special office to manage information publicity. 
Although it is not a regulatory body, it always stipulates that some orders should be 
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issued by the other regulatory bodies like the Propaganda Department. According to the 
, 4dministration of Foreign Reporters and News Organizations &a1ioned in the PRC, 
which was promulgated by the State Council in January 1990, the press department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the authority in charge of the activities of foreign reporters 
and news agencies in China, such as sending accredited reporters, establishing news 
branches, or interviewing key Chinese leaders, and so on. 
Each of the ministries established a special bureau responding to the issues raised 
by TNMCs. But there arc conflicts between ministries. The Mll and SARFT are battling 
out a turf war. The SARFT is anxious not to cede any further power to the supcr-ministry, 
while the M11 is aiming at controlling all information networks including those of the 
broadcast industry with its cable holdings (Anke, and Rowan, 2002: 18). The idea of 
policy convergence within the new Mll organizational system tried to eliminate the 
bargaining model in which numerous players are challenging for a slice of the new 
information infrastructure. The SARFT, together with its ideological head of the Central 
Propaganda Department, sees itself as an important player in the lucrative cable 
television industry. The specialised administration under commercial media operations at 
times means that each executive branch fights for its own interests rather than working 
together for combined solutions. 
5.3 Professionalization of Aledia Staff 
Together with bureaucratization and specialization of media govcmancc, the concept 
of professionalization of media staff, to a great extent, has much wider implications than 
Nathan's term 'mcritocratic', which only means the technocrat replacing the 
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revolutionists at the centre of the Chinese regime in the promotion of political elite 
(Nathan, 2003: 6-17). The term used here refers to the participants in the whole 
governance process, including government information officials, media regulatory 
officials, institution members, and think tanks, and so on. Since the 1990s, these people 
have become more professional ised with expertise. They effectively help reduce or even 
resist the bias resulting from ideological and factional considerations. 
First, the governmental spokesmen have been regularly trained in a three-tier 
government information releasing system. During the SARS outbreak in early 2003, 
China establishcd an epidemic and health emergency reporting system, which greatly 
advanced the news releasing system featured by the spokesperson system. The three-tier 
system features spokespersons for the State Council, all the ministries, and provincial 
governments. All the central departments have appointed spokesmen and more 
spokespersons have emerged in cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Nanjing 
(Xinhua News, May 27,2004). According to Wang Xingming, the director of Human 
Resource Bureau of Information Office of the State Council, from September 2003, 
China has trained 900 spokesmen nationwide and the number was expected to reach 2000 
by late 2004 (Shcng Liu, 2004). 
Second, an increasing number of experts have been promoted to the crucial 
regulatory bodies. Unlike the previous revolutionists, the heads of media ministries have 
become more prolcssionalised since the 1990s. The first minister of Mll, Wu Jichuan, is a 
telecommunications expert. Since the 1980s, all presidents of Xinhua News Agency, for 
instance, Mu Qing (1982-1992), Guo Chaorcn (1993 -1999), and Tian Chongming 
(1999- the present), have a reputation in Chinese journalism. The heads of MRFT (later 
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SARFT) in the 1990s, Sun Jiazheng (1994-1997, Tian Chongming (1998-1999), Xu 
Guangchun (1999-2005), have relevant backgrounds in the media industry. Unlike their 
predecessors before 1992, most of the media staff-members have good educational 
backgrounds holding a college degree or even higher ones. Some can speak one or 
several foreign languages. During the process of professional ization, TNMCs have made 
strenuous efforts to 'modcmise' the media governors. For example, Bertclsmann 
promoted a programme for the officials working in the CPD in 2001. Several officials 
were sponsored and went to German media institutions for managerial training. The aim 
is to 'make Chinese media regulators more open-minded' (Intervicwee 20). Sponsored by 
TNMCs, an official from the Press and Publication Bureau in the CPD was sent to 
Canada from 2001 to 2002, training in the programme of media management 
(Intcrviewce 1). 
Third, the status of the media staff has been transformed from semi-official to 
enterprise employee. After a two-ycar-long experiment, the media authorities 
promulgated a decree in 1996, 'The Provision of Further Reform on Personnel in 
Broadcasting Television and Film Sectors. The main aim is to reform the personnel and 
fund distribution systems, and to establish employment, incentive, and training systems. 
Accordingly, the current employees have to be transformed from fixed iron-rice-bowl (tie 
fan ivan) to non-fixed employed staff, all new recruits arc non-fixed employees; the 
evaluation of employee depends on their performance and position (gangwel pirl)-ong), 
rather than the so-called profession evaluation system (licheng pingshen); individual 
salary is determined by performance and position (gangýveijixiao gongzzi). 
Fourth, media staff has begun to be trained not only at home but also abroad in 
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order to consolidate competitiveness. From 1999, Guangdong province selected a few 
editors and reporters to attend some media institutions and universities in the USA and 
UK (Interviewee 21). Similar developments have also been taking place in Beijing. 
Between 2001 and 2008,20 media practitioners from different media have been and will 
be sent to British universities for one-year training (Interviewee 8). Some open-minded 
reformers have accepted the ideas of media professionalization, which transforms the 
nature of political discourse. It also narrows the discussion to questions of technique and 
effectiveness that can be approached with detached realism, and changes the performative 
content of journalism. In this way, the media practitioners in China have more 
open-minded, professional, and reformed ideas. They grow by being more aware of the 
role of the press as a watchdog. 
Fifth, think tanks in media research institutions have become expressive of 
diverse viewpoints, replacing the monopoly of Marxist theory. 
In short, the professional ization of media participants has gradually resulted in the 
erosion of the propaganda functions of the mass media. In the existing operation, the 
media is constituted of two systems. The open (gongkai) system of positive propaganda 
in the media is intended to mobilize audiences to act on party policy. The ideological 
basis for this mobilizational role for the media can be found in the classic Maoist 
formulation. People are to internalise the refined version of their own needs as 
systematized and popularized by the party (Mao Zedong, 1983). The internal (neibu) 
system, which has greatly affected the CCP's decision-making, is to respond to the 
enquiry and reportage of what the masses are up to and what their problems seem to be. 
Journalists who produce public propaganda in the open media also make reports in 
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limited circulation periodicals (some are generally available to officials, the others may 
remain quite secret) that inform the CCP leadership about social conditions so it can 
'refine and systematize' solutions to current problems (Hsiao and Cheek, 1995: 76-87). In 
the 1990s, the profit-oriented commercialized mass media would like to pursue the mass 
appeal media content and fonnats, rather than being profit-losing internal media outlets 
with a small circulation. The increasing channels to access information, both by the 
domestic and transnational media, cause the officials to be less dependent on the internal 
media. As a result, the internal media outlets diminished dramatically. The circulation of 
Xinhua's Selected Reference (Neican Xuanbian), which is an important internal media for 
the official at township level, decreased to 250,000 in 2003 from 600,000 in the 
mid-1990s (Interviewee 12). In addition, media workers are aware of the media's role as 
watchdog are reluctant to write stories for the internal media, because it cannot bring any 
benefits to themselves. 
Moreover, media coverage of meetings and the activities of leaders has been slashed, 
and the number of reports on topics concerning the daily lives of ordinary people is 
increasing noticeably. One of the complaints from audiences to the Chinese media is the 
coverage of meetings and the activities of leaders. For instance, the National News at 
7prn on CCTV, receives complaints about being too lengthy and boring. While a certain 
quantity of media coverage of meetings and the activities of leaders helps people feel the 
pulse of the country's political life, excessive reports of such kinds can easily bore them. 
More seriously, it may also give rise to a negative tendency whereby media organizations 
play down or even ignore the demands of ordinary people while putting too much 
emphasis on leaders' activities. Such worries are not groundless, given that media 
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organizations in China tend to devote a large amount of their coverage to the routine 
activities of leaders and various kinds of meetings. In comparison, reports on the 
activities of ordinary people and grassroots; concerns are far from adequate. The force of 
reforming the news and current affairs finally prompted a decision approved by the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee in late March 2003 
to improve the press coverage of meetings and leadership activities (China Daily, April 1, 
2003, p. 1). Judging from the new leadership's down-to-earth attitude towards work, the 
professional ization of media participants is not just a mere formality. Instead, it may 
bring about a healthier way of working in government institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
As a starting point, this chapter overviewed the transformation of media 
institutions in the course of globalization, providing the background for examining 
deregulation and re-regulation of media policy, de-monopolization of media structure, 
and de-propagandization of media culture, which will be discussed in the fowling 
chapters. The stable, gradual, and predictable institutional transformation toward 
institutionalization of media governance clarifies the different roles of participants. This 
chapter examined four principal actors and participants in the media governance. First, 
there are the politicians who are ultimately responsible for legislative decisions. Second, 
the civil servants turn broad policy into detailed proposals and oversee its 
implementation. Third, the regulators appointed by politicians have their rights to 
manage the media markets. Fourth, the media units are seeking opportunities to promote 
and protect their interests. All these participants contribute to institutionalization in 
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China's media governance under on-going globalization. We may expect that the fifth 
actor, the citizens, would become involved in media policyrnaking. 
This chapter also examined the transformation of governing models in China's 
media politics. The party and the government control the media at the macro level instead 
of the micro one. The public units promote party propaganda and social services, while 
the commercialized media units engage in risk-taking and profit-seeking activities. In this 
way, the 1990s saw a transitional period for China's media governance in transforming 
the governing guidelines, the governing bodies, and the governing professionals. In a 
path of institution rebuilding, which views stability as the first task, the governing system 
has gradually shifted the power from the few to the many. Under the institutional 
arrangements, there are a few actors participating in the whole media governance, rather 
than the Party itself. The stability of any given polity 'depends upon the relationship 
between the level of political participation and the level of political 
institutional ization. '(Huntington, 1968: 79) In Huntington's sense, when political stability 
can be maintained in a society, the more political participation it has, the greater 
complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence the society's political institutions will 
have. In the Chinese context, the participation of regulators, domestic media players and 
even transnational media players has been increasing. It has also steered 
institutionalization of media governance in a stable direction, which is based on the rule 
of law, rather than the rule of the Party. To emphasize the rule of law as opposed to the 
rule of individuals is a top priority for political reform, though nowadays China lacks a 
governing system like that in the West, in which the highest authority is a body of law 
that applies equally to all participants. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEREGULATION AND RE-REGULATION: 
THE BARGAINS BETWEEN MEDIA ACTORS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the increasing integration into international society and the greater 
presence of TNMCs, media governance in China is driven toward differentiation and 
specialization of media institutions, deregulation and re-regulation of media policy, 
de-monopolization of media structure, and de-propagandization of media culture. The 
model of media governance has transformed from a 'leader-determined' model into a 
'consensus-building' model, in which there are more participants in media policy-making 
and increasing governmental transparency. As a starting point, Chapter Three has 
examined the media institutional transformation, arguing that the model of media control 
by the CCP and the government has shifted from centralization to limited localization. It 
means that the ruling CCP has begun to focus its influence on mass media more at the 
macro level than completely at the micro level; local governments and media units can 
have limited autonomy to deal with their own issues. Since 1992, China's media 
governance has experienced dramatic changes in terms of governing guidelines, bodies, 
and professionals, responding to the challenges from media globalization. 
Following the discussion of regulatory institutional transformation, this chapter 
will explore some crucial questions related to regulation changes, arguing media 
globalization has had a profound influence on China's media structure, leading to 
dismantling the party-monopoly of the media market. In responding to the pressures of 
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globalization, three factors have induced the authorities to change the media system. 
They are party logic, cultural logic, and media logic. More concretely, these factors are 
determined by concerns for media diplomacy, economic growth, and cultural protection. 
Therefore, this chapter analyses the following questions: To what extent does the 
institutional transformation affect media regulation in China? How do the regulatory 
actors affect the outcomes of media policy-making in the globalization era? Do these 
institutional arrangements affect the TNMCs in China? How do the TNMCs impose 
pressures on China's media governance? 
These questions are significant because the penetration of foreign ideas and 
practices into China has never been welcomed by the government, though it has imposed 
heavy pressure on the authorities since the eighteenth century. Foreign imperialist 
invasions in the nineteenth century raised Chinese sentiments of 'anti foreignism', 'a mass 
hostile sentiment toward [any] foreign nation' (Chan, 1994a: 70). During the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries when foreign missionaries entered China, they firstly 
disseminated Christian information in the form of religious bulletins and journals. By 
adding local news, they later transformed these printed materials into news bulletins for 
circulating business infori-nation such as shipping, demands, needs, and so on. After the 
Opium War, several papers and periodicals were available in Chinese and foreign 
languages. Because of their aggressive political, cultural, or social tendencies to 
encourage Westernisation in China, the foreign media were impeded by legal barriers set 
up by the Chinese authorities. Moreover, they were also invoked by local opposition 
parties or organizations to promote their revolutions, such as Sun Yi-wen's 
anti-Qing-Dynasty revolution, Mao's anti-Guomindang communist revolution, and the 
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1989 student protests. As a result, the authorities have established strict regulations to 
control and limit the penetration and expansion of foreign media in Chinese society. This 
control reached its apogee during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, generating 
can extreme form of cultural protectionism' (Chan, 1994a: 70). Only after China entered 
the United Nations in the 1970s did the waves of anti-foreignism begin to ebb. Since then, 
Western programming has been an increasingly strong presence in the Chinese media. 
Consequently, it has exerted obvious influence on Chinese every day life (Lull, 1991). 
Why did the authoritarian regime, which traditionally fears the flow of diverse 
information, accept the TNMCs and the freer flow of international programming in 
general, and Western ones in particular? 
This chapter examines the shift of China's media governance toward foreign media 
after the 1980s in three parts. These examine how 1) the Chinese government flexibly 
deregulated and re-regulated market entry for foreign and private media; 2) global media 
corporations penetrated China's media market through their international strategies; and, 
3) domestic media operators have been driven to commercialization by deregulation 
directly from the government and indirectly from globalization. All these are the 
outcomes of institutional arrangements, which are a combination of party-govemment 
forces, domestic media forces, and the foreign media forces. The deeper economic 
reforms and more open-door policies since 1992 have spurred the regulators to develop a 
legal infrastructure to attract the foreign investments that the state desired. It resulted in 
the fleshing out of its legal system and more transparency in its extensive bureaucratic 
regulations (Lieberthal, 1995: 177). In other words, the changes in regulating the TNMCs 
and the domestic media are intentional outcomes of institutional arrangements in China's 
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media govemance. 
Following the institutional transformation discussed in Chapter Three, this chapter 
focuses on the regulatory issues raised from globalization and the TNMCs. It argues that 
the increase in bargaining between different parties, though still lacks stability, shows the 
model of policy creation has transformed from a 'leader-determined' model to a 
'consensus-building' model. This chapter firstly outlines the degrees to which TNMCs 
penetrated the Chinese media market. Secondly, the case of News Corporation is 
presented to probe how the TNMCs penetrate and break down the CCP's restrictions. 
Following on from this, the existing intertwined media logics in media governance are 
discussed. Finally, the interactions between different actors are addressed and a 
concluding remark is given. 
2 THE INSTITUTIONAL DEREGULATION 
Since the policy of the central government was redirected from a planned economy 
towards the 'socialist market economy' in the late 1970s, the social role of the Chinese 
media became more complicated. Previously it had only one role as a governmental 
instrument of 'class struggle'. The deregulation of market entry for the TNMCs has 
become an important theme in media governance since 1992. The process can be roughly 
divided into four stages: the programme import stage, the transnational broadcasting 
stage, the foreign capital penetration stage, and the open-sky stage. The transformation of 
different stages, to a significant extent, has resulted from the interactions between 
participants, including international institutions, the CCP, the government, TNMCs, and 
the Chinese media. 
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2.11992-1999: The Programme Import and Transnational Broadcasting Stage 
The internationalization of Chinese communications reflected the political climate. 
The period 1980-1989 is considered as the 'golden years' of Chinese television by most 
interviewees. The import of programmes was the main channel through which Chinese 
television could play a part in media globalization. Despite the existence of other 
communication channels, programme imports were the most influential external factor in 
Chinese media evolution. The imported programmes not only changed the structure of 
television content, but also reset the expectations and criteria of the Chinese audiences. In 
1980, when China Central Television (CCTV) began to broadcast a series of Japanese 
cartoons with commercials targeted at children, the percentage of foreign programmes in 
CCTV schedules increased from 2% in 1980 to 12% in 1992 (Hong, 1998: 7 1). After the 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, foreign television and movies were strictly controlled and 
greatly suppressed. The Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT) responded by 
cutting in half the number of time slots on CCTV that were designated for imported 
programmes (Chan, 1994a). 
The economic reforms entered a new stage in 1992 when Deng Xiaoping called for 
developing a market economy without reference to socialism or capitalism. ' Apart from 
the new economic environment, the new technology also provided opportunities for the 
Chinese television to integrate into international society. The satellite AsiaSat-I launched 
in 1989 began to transmit the signals of CCTV to the remote areas of China (Huang and 
I Most of interviewees in the CPD, SAPP and Xinhua News Agency would like to quote the similar phrase expressed 
by Deng's Talk when it comes to its impact on media industries after 1992. 
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Green, 2000: 274). It also introduced foreign satellite television into Chinese families. 
Along with the development of satellite broadcasting, cable networks in China grew fast 
in the 1990s. In 1998, there were 2000 cable stations in China, providing services to 
about 80 million households, accounting for 34.5 percent of total television audience 
(Wei, 2000: 333). The community cable networks and the satellite dishes in China created 
a great potential market for transnational satellite broadcasting. Murdoch's STAR TV, 
through AsiaSat-l, could reach 4.8 million Chinese households (Chan, 1993: 21). Its 
Phoenix Chinese Channel became the 'most watched channel' with a 7% audience rating 
in Beijing in 1998 (Wei, 2000: 340). Compared with programme importation, 
transnational broadcasting provides more alternative programming without the filtering 
of censorship for the Chinese audiences. These programmes always have different 
ideologies and political views. 
2.2 1999-2001: the Foreign Capital Penetration Stage 
The Chinese media authorities relaxed entry restrictions on information technologies 
for the sake of keeping up with the information revolution in developed countries. From 
the late 1990s, a huge amount of investment, mainly from the USA, flooded into China in 
the telecommunication and digital media sectors. Some of them established news 
websites. Good examples are 'sinacom, 'sohu. com, and 'ease. net'. in which American 
companies invested, and have become the most popular web sites in China. All were Top 
Five websites between 1999 and 2003 (CNNIC, 2000,2001,2002,2003,2004), and they 
are listed on the American NASDAC market. From the 1990s, the American-based 
International Digital Group (IDG) increased investment in China after its first step of 
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200,000 US dollars in 1980. Cooperating with the Ministry of Electronics Industry, IDG's 
Computer World was the first newspaper with an official licence from the SAPP. At its 
peak, it had a circulation of 200,000 copies in 2000. By 2004, the joint venture of IDG 
has 16 magazines and six of them are listed in the top ten magazines with the largest 
advertising revenues in the market (Huang Shengmin, 2003: 238). Bertelsmann Intel 
established ajoint venture with the official China Technology Publishing Company in the 
early 1990s, becoming the first TNMC involved in the publication sale market. In the late 
1990s, international media barons, such as AOL-Time Warner and the News Corporation, 
were keen to explore the Chinese television markets, though the government still kept 
foreign capital out of television stations. For instance, 'Golden Continent', one of the 
largest programme-production companies in China, was co-founded by News 
Corporation and China Tianjin Television Station in 1994 (Interviewee 9). Viacom has 
cooperated with 30 cable stations in terms of music, children's, and entertainment 
programmes (Li Yifei, 2003: 170). 
2.3 Post 2001: Open-sky stage 
Under the bilateral agreement signed between the PRC and the US on China! s 
accession to the WTO, the number of foreign film imports is expected to increase from 
10 to 20 per year and soar to 50 by 2004 as long as they conform to China's 'Regulation 
on Film Management' (Xinhua News, June 30,200 1) By early 2004, China has permitted 
31 foreign channels to broadcast - though only to hotels of three stars or above and to 
approved housing compounds (People ý Daily, Feb. 9,2004, p. 5). TNMCs are officially 
allowed to invest in the production, distribution and promotion of film and television 
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drama. They are also permitted to hold less than 50 per cent of shares in Chinese media 
companies. Moreover, China allows limited foreign channels to direct broadcasting in 
Chinese society. In November 2001, an entertainment channel 'Xingkong Satellite 
Channel' (Xingkongweishi), which belongs to News Corporation, made its debut in 
Guangdong Province through the provincial cable network (Yu Wen, 2002). One month 
before, China Entertainment Television Broadcast Ltd. (CETV), a standard 
Chinese-language entertainment channel of AOL Time Warner, became the first foreign 
TV channel to be granted cable television operation in China. CETV is also permitted to 
expand its distribution, beyond its previous base of cable homes in Southern China, to 
hotels and other authorized recipients across the Chinese mainland (Xinhua News, April 1, 
2003). It is a symbol of Chinese television entering a new era, in which the domestic 
media encounter face-to-face market competition with international media giants. Under 
this institutional arrangement, it would be predictable that profound changes may take 
place in the Chinese television industry within a few years. 
A bolder governmental arrangement was launched in early 2004, which lifted the 
official ban on foreign investment in television and film production companies. 
According to the SARFT, minority stakes in Chinese production companies can be held 
by 'strong and influential' foreign companies. Before that, China allowed foreign and 
domestic companies to cooperate on films and television programmes. The state-owned 
CCTV set a timetable to spin off a production company to be listed on overseas 
markets(Interviewee 7). From October to November 2003, the SARFT promulgated four 
decrees (Decree 18 to 21) in the film sector. According to Tong Gang, director of Bureau 
of Film in the SARFT, these decrees give media practitioners more autonomy to operate 
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their business. Decree No. 18 deregulates the centralized approval system and empowers 
local administration to approve film products. Decree No. 19 enables all media players, 
including state-owned, private, and foreign studios, to enjoy the same status in film 
production. Decree No. 21 allows foreign media companies to own a greater share in the 
cinema sector (New Capital Paper, 2003: 3). 
Table4.1 Foreien Satellite TVAiDi)roved bv China (1993-2003) 
Foreign Satellite TV Channel Owner Country or Region 
CNN Time-Warner USA 
HBO Asia Time-Wamer USA 
CINEMAAsia Time-Wamer USA 
CNBC Asian Financials ABC USA 
ESPN Asia ABC-Disney USA 
MTV Asia Viacom USA 
NGC Asia News Corp. USA 
STAR Movie News Corp. USA 
AXN nment USA 
DISCOVERY ABC USA 
HALLMARK Movie Hallmark USA 
BBC WORLD Service British Broadcasting Corporation UK 
NRK-World Premium NHK Japan 
JETV Japan Entertainment TV Japan 
NHK-1 NHK Japan 
NHK-2 NHK Japan 
Phoenix Movie Phoenix TV Hong Kong 
TVB8 TVB Hong Kong 
TVB Galaxy TVB Hong Kong 
Sun Sun Hone Kone 
NOW Tom. com Hong Kong 
Phoenix Chinese Phoenix TV Hong Kong 
STAR SPORTS News Corp. USA 
CHANNEQVI News Corp. USA 
Macao Travel Macao Satellite Macao 
Five Star Five Star Media Macao 
Five Star [Asia] Five Star Media Macao 
CETV Time-Wamer USA 
Phoenix Satellite Channel News Corp. Hong Kong 
B-sky-B News Corp. UK 
Source: Huang Shengmin and Zhou Yan (ed. ) Zhongguo chuangmei da bianju(Ibe Great Change in China's Media) 
(Beijing: Zhongxin Press, 2004), p. 16; Personal interview with an official of the SARFT, July 18 2003. 
The trajectory of media policies since the 1980s, particularly since 1992, 
demonstrates that the neo-liberal camp has successfully broken down the regulatory 
barriers in the media sector. All media giants worldwide have established their networks 
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in China by early 2004, including News Corp. 's STAR, Xingkong, Phoenix, Time 
Warner's CETV, Viacom's MTV, Disney's cooperation with Haihong, Vivendi's alliance 
with Tangnong, and Bertelsmann's book club around China. According to some 
interviewees, there are 200 channels applying for licenses to broadcast in China, after the 
31 channels including CNN successfully got permission to broadcast in up to 3-Star 
hotels in early 2003 from the SARFT. TNMCs, including publishers of the press, the 
cable television, independent producers, broadcasting facilities companies, and financial 
investors, are looking for new investment opportunities in China. Although there is 
intense competition between them, they share a common goal--breaking up the Chinese 
party-monopoly and establishing a regulatory framework that would be favorable to 
commercial enterprises. 
3. MEDIA DIPLOMACY: CASE STUDY OF RUPERT MURDOCH 
Although media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, who has a stake of about 30 per cent in 
News Corp., succeeded in America, South America, and Europe, his path toward the 
Chinese market has not been straight but has zigzagged. Before he came to the Asian 
market, China permitted satellite broadcasting in some given areas. On July 26,1993, 
News Corporation purchased a 63.6 percent stake in STAR-TV from 
Hutchison-Whampoa, and finally took full control in July 1995 (Lynch, 1999: 184). He 
ambitiously asserted in September 1993, 
'The advances in the technology of telecommunications have proved an 
unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere. Satellite broadcasting 
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makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to 
bypass state controlled television. '(quoted by Lynch, 1999: 185) 
This assertion infuriated the Chinese authorities. No more than a month later, the 
government adopted Decree No. 129 of 1993 to constrain satellite broadcasting, 
forbidding individuals from owning satellite dishes. The purpose of the decree was 
self-evident, trying to erect barriers to transnational satellite broadcasting. As a media 
businessman, Murdoch soon adjusted and operated as a 'friendly partner' with the 
communist government. It is a significant condition imposed by the CCP's Propaganda 
Department on market entry for a TNMC (Interviewee 1). In February 2004, Murdoch 
softened his tone in public, 
'We need to be far more aggressive in helping China confront and come to grips 
with its deepening AIDS crisis. We need to encourage China to develop institutions 
that strengthen the rule of law. We need to support and engage grass-roots 
organizations in China - groups such as NGOs - that affirm civil society by tackling 
such problems as environmental pollution and local corruption. And we need to help 
China more effectively combat the rampant piracy of intellectual property that left 
unchecked will undermine the business models of creative companies 
worldwide. '(Murdoch, 2004) 
The case of Rupert Murdoch shows that there are three ways for such media moguls 
to exercise diplomacy and economic power in China. 
Firstly, a good relationship with the Chinese authorities is obviously significant. 
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When operating media businesses in the UK and USA from the 1970s, Murdoch hired 
some super-lobbyists to persuade the media authorities for the sake of official recognition 
in target markets (Hutchison, 1999: 32-35). In China, he employed public relations staff to 
ride out the controversy, appealing to key figures in the CCP's power elite, such as Deng 
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and other leaders. In February 1995, Murdoch hosted a press 
conference in New York, introducing Ms. Deng Maomao, the daughter and biographer of 
China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. HarperCollins, the publishing arm of 
Murdoch's News Corp., bought the worldwide rights to publish the book, My Father 
Deng Xaqping, for an undisclosed fee. When Deng Xiaoping died in 1997, Murdoch 
broadcast a documentary series made by the Chinese government, eulogizing the most 
prominent Chinese reformer. Other members of Deng's family, for instance, Deng Pufang, 
were generously welcomed in sponsoring overseas visits, supporting their activities, and 
even lobbying foreign institutions to cooperate with them (Street, 2001: 172; Hutchison, 
1999: 34-35). In the post-Deng years, Murdoch built up a close relationship with President 
Jiang Zemin, the top figure of the third generation leadership. The following facts 
illustrate the close connections between Murdoch and Chinese authorities. 
" On December 10,1998, Murdoch met Jiang Zemin, along with Ding 
Guangen, the director of Chinese propaganda and ideology (People ý Daily, 
Dec. 11,199 8, p 1). 
" On September 5,2000, he had breakfast with Jiang Zemin when Jiang 
off icially visited the USA (Xinhua News, Sep. 5,2000). 
" In January 2001, Jiang invited Murdoch to visit China annually as they met 
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in Beijing (21st Century Economic Herald, Mar. 24,2002, p. 3). Murdoch also 
had a warm welcome from Tian Chongming, the President of Xinhua News 
Agency. Tian relaxed the restriction on film exports in 1998, allowing 10 
foreign films to be showed in Chinese cinemas annually. 
do In October 2003, Murdoch met Li Changchun, the new director of 
propaganda and ideology in the CCP. He also visited local governors like 
Guangdong's Zhang Dejiang and Shanghai's Chen Liangyu, trying to 
persuade them to open the Chinese media market in terms of programme 
producing, digital television, and expansion of his STAR TV (Interviewees I 
and 2). 
To consolidate the public relations with the Chinese authorities, Murdoch employed 
sponsorship in meaningful ways. In 1998, he donated one million US dollars to the 
flooded areas in the south of China. In the years 1995 and 1999, The Times, a paper of 
Murdoch's News Corp., sponsored exhibitions of ancient Chinese art in London. In 2003, 
Murdoch funded a chair in communications at the University of Qinghua. According to 
an insider, Murdoch's sponsorship depends on the influence of the sponsored 
organization in China's politics (Interviewee 22). 
Second, Murdoch, together with his family members, has never taken ideology 
seriously, though he identifies himself as a conservative. The standing point of his 
activities, even his marriage with a Chinese woman Wendi Deng, mainly stems from his 
business interests (Interviewee 22). His youngest son, James Murdoch, described the 
outlawed Falun Gong movement, for the suppression of which China has been 
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condemned as seriously infringing human rights, as 'dangerous' and an 'apocalyptic cult' 
in February 2001 (Interviewee 23; Fazhi ribao, 2001). These important ties to the 
government may have a positive effect in making Murdoch a 'friendly partner' for the 
Chinese authorities. Moreover, Murdoch harnesses his media outlets as a useful 
instrument appealing to the Chinese authorities. He can abandon the troublesome media 
outlets that infringe Chinese authorities. Both the BBC World Service and MTV, which 
often screen unflattering documentaries about China or feature Western-style content, 
were discarded from his 24-hour news service. He also sold out the anglophile South 
China Morning Post, which often attacks the Chinese regime on democracy. Furthermore, 
Murdoch placed heavy pressure on his media outlets worldwide, preventing them from 
criticism of the CCP. In 1998 NewsCorp. 's subsidiary, HaperCollins cancelled the 
lucrative contract for the book East and West by former Hong Kong Governor Chris 
Patten, in which Mr. Patten criticised the Chinese leadership (Lam, 2000: 48). As some 
commentators point out, 'this was evidence that The Times was being used to improve 
relations with the Chinese authorities, as News Corporation sought to expand its business 
in the Far East. '(Street, 2001: 129) In order to satisfy the Chinese government, Murdoch 
employed a new strategy of content localization, having some channels translated and 
adapted to Chinese languages, or mainly promoting Chinese programmes. All the 
programmes are entertainment-oriented. There is no room for the content being 
controversial for the Chinese government. 
Thirdly, cooperating with the Chinese media, Murdoch employs various means to 
penetrate into China. This cooperation, to some degree, undermines and even dismantles 
the monopoly of the CCP's national propaganda media like CCTV (this issue will be 
139 
ChapterFour Deregulation and Re-regulation: the Bargains Between Media Actors 
discussed in details in Chapters Five and Six). Murdoch primarily prefers to establish his 
broadcasting networks in China. After the acquisition of Star TV in 1994, Murdoch holds 
40% of the stock of Phoenix TV. All these channels have been permitted to enter the 
cable networks in Guangdong province in late 2001. Meanwhile, a new Chinese channel, 
Xingkongweishi, was allowed to broadcast in southern China. Murdoch also invested in a 
Chinese media distribution system. He set up Chinabyte in 1994 with the People's Daily 
(Renmin Ribao). On Feburary 17,2001, News Corp. became a shareholder of Wangtong, 
one of the biggest broadband companies in China. Cooperating with Tianjin Broadcasting 
Bureau, News Corp. invested 20 million US dollars to establish Tianjin Golden Ltd., in 
which it holds 60% of the stock. The joint venture mainly provides broadcasting 
equipment and produces television programmes. Murdoch also runs a company with 
CCTV and the Chinese Broadcasting Science Institute. The new company soon 
successfully made a deal with Sichuan Broadcasting and Television Group, one of the 
four authorities conducting digital television experiments (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Sichuan). 
It is worth pointing out that the partners Murdoch selected are the ones with a strong 
political background. Wangtong, for example, is controlled by Jiang Mianheng, the son of 
Jiang Zemin. The media mogul always seeks to establish connections with the Chinese 
authorities. On October 8,2003, he gave a speech at the Central Communist School, 
rather than other media institutes, because it is a stronghold of training officials at 
provincial level, potential Chinese leaders in recent years. Murdoch maintains that 
cooperating with foreign media in flexible ways has rich implications for Chinese 
political, social and economic reforms and development, 
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'To open up the media market and develop its potential doesn't mean the 
government lost its authority. By contrast, as a successful shift of governmental 
functions from owner and manager of the media industry to supervisor and 
regulator, both the leaders and the citizen will gain a lot of benefits. China will be 
one of the media centres if the market becomes more open and liberal. '(Murdoch, 
2003: 5) 
As John Street suggests, 'while media organizations exist to make money, this is not 
necessarily their only motivation, and their behaviour cannot be reduced to the cash 
nexus. '(2001: 126) In the case of Murdoch, the influence of TNMCs on the media 
decision-making can be at times a progressive force, especially as it enters a nation like 
China, which had been tightly controlled by a corrupt crony-based media system. As an 
interviewee in the SARFT admits: 
'Of course we know the importance of fairness, equality, and transparency 
in administration. However, we could not resist the pressures from the key figures 
[of the CCP]. When it comes to deciding which TNMCs can have the right to 
enter the Chinese media market, we have to take into account the figures' 
preferences. We know it is unfair that we prohibit Chinese private media players 
from owning a television channel, while we allowed Murdoch to establish a new 
channel [in the Chinese media market]. However ...... we have to follow the 
phone-call order from the Jiang's office. '(Interviewee 24) 
The other media giants, such as Viacom's Redstone (Li Xi, 2004: 8), share goals in 
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common with Murdoch in negotiating with the government to gain so-called 'mutual 
benefits' (Zhou Wei, 2002: 114-155). Their strategies, primarily based on business 
incentives, attempt to blur the distinctions between 'foreign' and 'local'. At the current 
stage, they make concessions to the authoritarian government. Gerald M. Levin, 
Chairman and CEO of Time Warner Inc., put it clearly at Fudan University in January 
1998, 
'I am a realist. The differences among cultures and nations that arise from 
varying economic circumstances, belief systems and historical experience aren't 
about to disappear. To some extent, they are inevitable. What isn't inevitable, 
however, is that these differences become distorted and embittered by caricatures 
or simplifications... as I see it, global media and entertainment companies have 
an indispensable role in allowing us to see one another not as stereotypes or 
faceless adversaries, but as people who, for all their differences, share the same 
planet and the same destiny. '(Quoted by Demers, 2002: 58) 
This realist standing point has contributed to their media prosperity. For instance, 
Time Warner has become the first official licensed foreign broadcaster in China, with 
Viacom negotiating a big deal selling MTV to 37 Chinese cable channels (Interviewee 
25). In contrast, any action bypassing the party-control may generate serious results. The 
reason for the abortion of AOL-Legend co-operation in 2001 was that AOL tried to 
negotiate with Chinese partners bypassing the media authorities (Interviewee 25). For the 
media players who lack flexible diplomacy skills, they may have no opportunity in this 
market. AO1: s CETV won the right to broadcast in Guangdong in late 200 1, but it lacked 
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skillful political appeal. CETV was not willing to localize its programming and it was not 
allowed to broadcast on as many cable stations as News Corp's Xingkongweishi. As a 
result, CETV ran into financial problems not only because of lack of subscriptions but 
also because of political disputes with local governors. Finally, AOL sold its controlling 
stake in 2003 (Leahy and Dickie, 2003: 18). 
4 THREE GROUPS TOWARD MARKET OPENNESS 
4.1, The Party: Establishing a Virtual 'Great Wall' 
When it began to import foreign programmes, the CCP was concerned about the 
long-term political implications. The influence of Western media products, which 
embody some Western conceptions of freedom and democracy, was recognized as a 
threat to the CCP's hegemony. Hence, the logic of media governance is summarized by 
an interviewee in the CPD as a phrase of Chen Yun, 'free the birds in an iron-cage' 
(Interviewee 1). The logic is now to explore ways to ensure the political correctness and 
economic dynamism of media organizations under the new circumstances. The 
authorities give more places for media practitioners in terms of managerial operation, but 
they are not allowed to challenge the party's bottom line, though that bottom line is often 
vague or even contradictory. In general, there are two aims in redesigning the media 
regulations. The primary one is to defend the hegemony of the CCP's ruling power. The 
other is to protect the national interest. 
The introduction of direct broadcast satellite delivery of television programmes 
was a key technological and industrial development that Chinese media governance 
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encountered in the 1990s. The CCP has paid much attention to it. Like Malaysia, the 
Chinese government has been critical of satellite TV, regarding it as a cultural invasion 
(Ian, 1994: 74). Before STAR-TV was launched, China had begun to prevent the import 
of external television signals. In May 1990, the MRFT, Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS), and Ministry of State Security (MSS) jointly issued an 'order' that banned the use 
of dish antennas to receive any signals other than those originating within China, unless 
official permission had been granted. In late January 1992, one month after STAR-TV's 
first broadcast, the MRFT and Beijing Public Security Bureau ordered at least 50 hotels 
in Beijing receiving STAR-TV to pull the plug. After STAR-TV rapidly penetrated 
Chinese society, the government took a more restrictive stance on foreign satellite 
television services. Regarding the control of satellite reception as a 'struggle against 
subversion' and a 'struggle to defend national sovereignty', China banned 'unauthorized 
reception and redistribution by individuals or institutions, including cable networks, 
broadcast television, and video centers. '(Chan, 1994a: 69-88) On August 20, the State 
Council adopted Decree No. 129 of 1993, 'Provisions on the Management of Ground 
Receiving Equipmentfor Satellite Television Broadcasting. It laid down strict conditions 
for the production, sale, and use of satellite receivers. In Article 4, production of satellite 
dishes would be restricted to 'enterprises designated by State Council Administrative 
departments in charge of the electronics industry'. In terms of the sale of satellite dishes, 
Article 5 restricts it to 'units designated by the industrial and commercial administrative 
departments of provincial, autonomous regional, and municipal people's governments in 
conjunction with administrative departments in charge of internal trade, radio, television, 
and electronics'. In Article 6, it clarifies that to import preassembled satellite dishes 
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would require a certificate from the MARFT and that to import electronic components 
would require a certificate from the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI). According to 
Article 8, units wishing to install satellite dishes would have to first apply to the relevant 
radio and television bureau, and their application would have to be approved by the 
provincial-level bureau. Concerning the individual usage, Article 9 lays down that 
individuals would be banned completely from importing, installing, or using satellite 
dishes unless they could cite 'exceptional circumstances'. In 1999, the SARFT and other 
relevant institutes promulgated 28 administrative provisions and rules, in an effort to 
regulate the media sector and sectors related to the media. In April 1999, the SARFT, the 
Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of National Security jointly promulgated a 
decree to regulate the private reception of foreign satellite television. The authorities 
banned 61 factories producing satellite broadcasting receivers and 29,500 sets of 
receivers (Xu Guangchun, 2000: 546). 
The State Council Decree No. 129 of 1993 banned TNMCs from the Chinese 
media market. The CCP may have learnt some lessons from the Tiananmen Incident and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Interviewee 1). They argue that the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was partly generated by the penetration of 
Western media in the late 1980s. Thus, the CCP exerted more strict control on foreign 
media. The well-known policy, namely, 'Six Nos', was circulated in 1994 by the CPD. It 
refers to no joint ventures ownership; no shareholding in media organizations; no 
discussion of a press law; no discussion of the commodity nature of news; no joint 
ventures with foreign companies; and no openness for foreign satellite television 
(Interviewee 1; Chadha and Kavoori, 2000: 415-432). On August 11,1997, the 
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government adopted 'Provisions on the Management of Television Broadcasting', which 
places emphasis on a clear definition of television ownership, production, distribution, 
and promotion. In Article 5 1, it focuses on strict control of satellite broadcasting. 2 
After China entered the WTO in 2001, the Chinese authorities insisted on 
restrictions on foreign broadcasting, but the tone became more moderate. Liu Bingjie, 
deputy director of the SAPP, argued, 'A few of the 140 WTO members have pledged only 
limited access to overseas investors in their respective editing sectors. '(quoted by Xinhua 
News, Jan. 23,2003) On January 10,2004, the SARFT updated a new regulation on 
satellite broadcasting, Decree on the Localising of Foreign Satellite Broadcasting. 
According to this decree, the SARFT is the institution regulating foreign satellite 
broadcasting and it approves applications annually from July to September. It also 
expands the scope of foreign satellite broadcasting in three-, four-, and five-star hotels 
and foreigners' residences. Moreover, the decree defines the conditions of market entry 
for a foreign satellite channel, which include the following: 1) the content cannot infringe 
Chinese laws, regulations, and decrees; 2) it owns the capacity and promises to provide 
localized services for Chinese broadcasting and television programmes in other countries 
or regions; 3) the channel and its owner(s) are friendly to China and they aim to develop 
long-term cooperation with China; 4) it must be distributed by a given governmental 
cable institution. Article 7 defines the preferred TNMC arrangement as 'only one channel 
in a foreign satellite broadcasting institution can be in principal permitted to localise in a 
given area; a news satellite broadcasting channel is in principle not permitted; the 
channels should cooperate with Chinese partners. ' Therefore, this clause is much more 
2 Not only these provisions but also a few hand-outs by the CCP and government take the ownership of media 
seriously. T'he major reason is probably that some domestic media players make claims for media privatization. 
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negotiable. 
For the domestic media, the government has made efforts to consolidate media 
outlets, and even cracks down on some media units. The media industries in China have 
been moving in the direction of media decentralization since the early 1980s. In the 
broadcasting sector, the Director of the SARFT Sun Jiazheng declared at the 1995 
National Broadcasting Conference that, 'The central leaders require us to establish 
systems to regulate the media sector. '(quoted by Xu Guangchun, 2002: 537) In that year, 
the SARFT restructured 8 television stations because they broadcast some content 
infringing regulations. The SARFT promulgated 10 decrees, most of which were related 
to programme imports, cooperation with TNMCs, and the reception of foreign satellite 
channels. The General Off ices of the CCP and the State Council jointly promulgated '7he 
Opinions on Strengthening Press, Publication, Broadcasting, and Television' (No. 37 
Document) in February 1996. It set an agenda to restructure broadcasting institutions at 
the county level. It was the first symbol for the broadcasting sector to move back toward 
centralization. On August 11,1997, the State Council promulgated 'The Provision of 
Broadcasting Television Management'. It is the first administrative rule from the Chinese 
central government to regulate the broadcasting sector. By April 1998, the total number 
of broadcasting and television stations decreased to 2218 (including 70 education stations) 
from 6937. The autonomy of media decision-making in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Fujian, and Sichuan was withdrawn by the SARFT (Xu Guangchun, 2002: 640-546) The 
main purposes of these regulations are to develop Chinese media industries, promote 
economic development, and consolidate party control. 
In the newspaper and publication sectors, the SAPP asserts the importance of 
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strengthening domestic media under the pressures of international competition. To avoid 
the loss of control resulting from media fragmentation, the SAPP attempted to cut down 
the numbers of media outlets. From 1995, the SAPP stopped issuing licenses for new 
newspapers, and publishing houses. The same principle for radio and TV was employed 
by the SARFT in mid-1996. In order to solve the problems which emerged from media 
fragmentation, media authorities conducted three reforms on newspapers for the sake of 
'overcoming barriers of the planned media industry system' (Interviewee 1). From 1997, 
the CPD launched a three-year press restructuring programme, mainly focusing on the 
specialized press and legal press, which have a huge number of media outlets and also 
overlap in terms of social functions. Dozens of newspapers sponsored by the state 
banking system were closed (Lam, 2000: 48). However, the protection from some press 
organizations' host ministries and local institutes handicapped the reform. Most of them 
survived. 
The second reform began in August 1998. The General Office of the CCP and the 
General Office of the State Council promulgated a joint decree called 'The Decree on 
adjusting the press structure of central national institutions andprovinces, municipalities 
and autonomous regions' (zhongban [99] 30 hao). Later, the SAPP detailed it as 'The 
Principlesfor Adjusting Press Structure with No. 30 Decree. The main directions are: 1) 
in principle the institutions of the party and the government no longer operate their own 
press. The existing press should be merged with some media conglomerates such as the 
People ý Daily, Economic Daily and Guangming Daily. When content overlaps, they 
should be combined into one paper; 2) no ministries should operate any newspapers. The 
existing ones should merge with the party press, or cease; 3) after adjustment, all papers 
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should be financially self-sufficient, and they are no longer marked by their institutions as 
'institutional press'; 4) each unit under the Central Party and the State Council can only 
keep one periodical for the sake of supervision of its administration, others should be 
stopped or merged. The second reform involves all specialized papers, calling for those 
papers to be financially independent. However, this reform was ineffective. By 2001, 
only 7 of 39 specialized papers have merged into the party's media groups. Most papers 
cannot merge with the local party's media groups because of their poor financial 
performance. Some private investors are interested in purchasing these media, but the 
regulations set barriers for such media investment. 
The third reform is the most effective one so far. In June 2003, three regulatory 
institutions, the SAPP, CPD, and GASP promulgated a joint order called 'Provisional 
Rules for Stopping Newspaper and Magazine Recruiting'. After generating ministry 
consensus, a decree from the General Offices of the CCP and the State Council was 
promulgated, regulating the ministry press, stopping circulation based upon 
administrative pressure, thereby reducing the financial burden for low-level 
administrative officials and farmers. There are 1452 newspapers involved nationwide. By 
March 2004,677 were stopped, 302 were merged into other media groups, 289 were 
separated from original administrative institutions, and 87 were changed to free 
publications. 3 
Some interviewees argue that the CCP reformed newspapers under pressure from 
the global community and the WTO. Others point out that there is no commitment under 
the agreements of the WTO in the media sector. The media reform implies that the ruling 
3 These figures come from a news message by Qu Zhihong, Weiti Qingli Zhengdun qude minpian chenpido', 
Xinhua News, March 14 2004. 
149 
ChapteTFour Deregulation and Re-regulation: the Bargains Between Media Actors 
CCP was shamed by the 2003 SARS epidemic and it unleashed the media to help spread 
public awareness of SARS as well as to chase up officials who had been slow to take 
action. After that, however, the CCP has reverted to its old routine and preferences. It is 
still the only master when it comes to deciding how to feed politically sensitive 
information to the masses. Having been attacked by the global community for panic at 
the outbreak of SARS, which resulted from the lack of administrative transparency, 
Chinese media regulators ended the hesitation and launched a pure news TV 
channel --- CCTV News--on May 12003 (Interviewees I and 7). The establishment is to 
prevent losing the lion's share of domestic audiences to the TNMC news channels, such 
as News Corp. 's Phoenix News. It is also intended to build up a flagship TV news 
provider in the global Chinese community, and to launch a new wave of media reforms 
that call for more commercialization (Interviewees 7). 
In brief, the party-oriented policyrnaking functions primarily as a constraint on 
TNMCs and independent media for the sake of consolidating party control over the 
Chinese media. As Jiang Zemin stated at the Sixteenth Party Congress in late 2002: 'The 
press, publishing, radio, film and television must give correct guidance to the public, and 
Internet web sites should serve as important fronts for spreading advanced culture. ' (Jiang 
Zemin, 2002) Therefore, media control is still a key theme for the communist 
government. 
4.2 The Cultural Nationalists: Resisting the 'Cultural Invasion' 
Will the proliferation of TNMC products damage Chinese traditional culture? This 
question at times provokes nationalist reactions. Media policy is a crucial issue with 
150 
ChapterFour Deregulation and Re-regulation: the Bargains Between Media Actors 
regard to nationalism, concentrating on cultural identity. Therefore, cultural protection in 
media policy has received a lot of concern in European countries such as France and the 
UK (McQuail et al., 1998). 
According to Chinese nationalists, media policy should have a more cultural 
approach and it should remain an exclusively national competence (Song Jiang et al, 
1996; Zeng Huaguo, 1998). In 1990, Li Ruihuan, member of the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo, suggested that a funding system should be created to guarantee the correct 
political ideology in Chinese cultural production. Following Li's speech, the National 
Film Development Special Fund was established in 1991. The crucial mission of this 
institution is to promote films of the so called 'Mainstream melody (zuxuanlu), which 
uphold patriotism, socialism, and the party line. The number of such films increased from 
eight in 1991 to nineteen in 1992 and 1994. During the 1990s, the policy of 'political 
orientation of art for socialism and for the people (wei shehui zhuyifuwu, wei renmin 
fuwu)' and the 'double hundred (shuanghai)' policy ('let a hundred flowers blossom and a 
hundred schools of thought contend' (baihuaqifang, baylazhengming) were promoted. 
One fifth of domestic film production (30 of 150) must be from the 'Mainstream 
Melody' (MRFT No. 3,1993). In 1995, a regulation held that no less than 15 per cent of 
total film distribution and screen time should be reserved for such films. In 1996, the 
MRFT proposed a '9550 Project' (9550 gongcheng) for the purpose of producing ten 
films of 'High Quality Yingpin dianying)' between 1996 and 2000. In order to fulfill this 
task, the MRFT established five subsidiary measures, including a requirement that no less 
than 3 per cent of the revenue from television advertising should be contributed to 
'Mainstream Melody' films (MRFT No. 125,1996)(Chu, 2002: 47). At the Sixteenth 
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Party Congress in late 2002, President Jiang Zemin reiterated the importance of 
defending national culture, 
'During our practice of reform, opening up and modernization and keeping 
abreast of the latest developments in world culture, we must carry forward the 
good traditions of our national culture, learn good experience from other nations 
and make innovations in content and form so as to enhance the attraction and 
appeal of socialist culture with Chinese characteristics. ' (Jiang Zemin, 2002) 
That imports of cultural production heavily exceed exports is called a 'cultural 
deficit (wenhuachizi)' by the Chinese media authorities. Although China has most TV 
stations in the world, its exports of TV programmes in 1999 only reached 10 million US 
dollars (Xinhua News, Nov. 6,2002). Therefore, China has undertaken an effort to 
increase its domestic cultural production in the 1990s, and it also tried to increase 
international media sales and exports. The government has been wary of allowing 
foreigners access to the media market, as it needs to keep a balance between industry 
development and the rising influence of foreign culture. Worrying about the influence of 
multi-national media tycoons in major developed countries, Zhao Qizheng, Director of 
Information Office of the State Council, urged in the 2002 Bo'ao Forum, 
'The voice of Asia is far smaller than it deserves to be.... Asia cannot 
depend solely on foreign media to speak for it, because its own media are more 
connected with the region's interests, values, cultural traditions and beliefs... 
Asian countries should set up their own strong media for the sake of speaking for 
themselves, reporting the facts about their countries and speaking out to safeguard 
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their national interests. '(quoted by China Daily, April 15,2002) 
Nationalists fear that global forces are so strong that all Chinese walls that sought to 
block their entrance would be battered down (Interviewee 51). One of SARFT's 
statements maintains that a major task for Chinese television is to 'protect our own turf 
by resisting the invasion of foreign television and the infiltration of decadent western 
culture into our own high quality programmes' (Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Nianjian, 
1997: 53). The media authorities have made regulations about the ratio between the 
domestic and foreign programmes on screens. For example, imported programmes on 
CCTV cannot account for over 30 percent of total airtime. Similarly, the cable television 
must not broadcast more than the same percentage of imported programmes, and less 
than 20 per cent in prime time (7pm-9pm). All imported programmes must be politically 
cleared by the SARFT, and they must be imported through a single agency, the Chinese 
International Television Service Company (Hong, 1996: 135). 
In the power bargaining process, the TNMCs responded nimbly. Murdoch 
maintained on the CCTV's screen, 'I wish to bring good entertainment to them [Chinese 
audiences], making their lives happier and more wonderful. Of course, I respect Chinese 
culture and their tastes. '(Interviewee 26) Sumner Redstone, Chairman and CEO of 
Viacom, claims, 'We are not cultural imperialists. A major goal of Viacom's work in 
China is to help promote Chinese culture in the rest of the world. '(Zeng Huaguo, 
2004: 203) In practice, TNMCs try to play the role of 'cultural ambassadors', signing 
cooperation agreements with Chinese media, helping to broadcast their programmes in 
the USA and Europe (Xinhua News, Nov. 6,2002). The promotion of CCTV in the global 
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market, particularly in North America and Western Europe, enables China to make its 
voice heard worldwide. On the other hand, Chinese domestic media are encouraged to 
operate in overseas media markets. As the largest media group in China, China 
Broadcasting Television Group (CBTG) has an important mission. Its plan is to become a 
I 
transnational media conglomerate within five years (Interviewee 26). Local authorities, 
like those of Guangdong province, also encourage the media as cultural promoters 
beyond national boundaries by exporting cultural and service products. In early 2004, the 
SARIFT promoted its 'Going Abroad (chuhat)' policy, calling for establishing more 
overseas stations, increasing overseas sales, and promoting Chinese programmes 
(Interviewee 24; Dickie, 2004: 10). As President Jiang Zemin stated at the Sixteenth Party 
Congress, in response to the new situation of economic globalization and China's entry 
into the WTO, China 'should make the best use of both international and domestic 
markets, optimize the allocation of resources, expand the space for development and 
accelerate reform and development by opening up. '(Jiang Zemin, 2002) However, for the 
media sector, this task could not be fulfilled because of the low quality of programming 
and outdated values of communism and socialism. In the digital era, the TNMCs have 
abundant resources and a higher capacity to transmit a small number of Chinese channels. 
In return, they may penetrate the Chinese media market under the so-called 
mutual-benefit contract. The 'Going Abroad' policy paradoxically may provide more 
opportunities for the TNMCs. 
The policies of media modernisation have been promoted for economic reforms 
and for the protection of national culture. Governments mainly consider three economic 
factors when they make decisions to pursue deregulation. They will see whether the 
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policy can promote the information technology revolution, attract other industries to 
invest in the media, and boost the advertising industry (Humphreys, 1996). In the 
Chinese tradition, the news media are regarded as a powerful tool for publicizing reform 
policies. In order to compete with the powerful TNMCs, the domestic media practitioners 
are eager to develop a more efficient communication infrastructure so that they can 
provide more timely information for their audience. Huge investments, thus, were made 
in the past decades. After the first satellite broadcasting (CCTV) was launched in 1984, 
another 18 TV channels were transmitted via satellite in the early 1990s, and nearly 40 
transponders appeared in the late 1990s (Interviewee 7). The debate on establishing a 
pure news channel in the CCTV has lasted for several years, but only when audiences 
shifted overwhelmingly to News Corp. 's Phoenix Channel on September 11,2001 did the 
Chinese media authorities make the final decision on May 1,2003 (Interviewee 7). The 
incentive is straightforward, that is resisting the foreign 'cultural invasion'. As Xti 
Guangchun, Director of SARFT, stated on March 18,2004, 
'There are many western cultural products, particularly American ones, in 
our media market. What do we employ to resist against them? What can we do to 
get a share in the marketplace? The direct and effective path is to develop our 
media industry in general and TV drama in particular, because nowadays 
audiences spend most of their television time watching TV drama. If our TV 
drama attracts more audiences, we can take advantages over others in the media 
battlefield. Currently, there are many channels for TNMCs to infiltrate into our 
society, such as TV, Internet, film, and even mobile phones. Therefore, we must 
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,4 produce excellent TV drama in order to compete with TNMCs. 
The increasing number of television stations results in fierce market competition, 
imposing heavy pressure on the media players. In order to survive in the marketplace, 
they have to appeal to audiences with so-called popular entertainment programming. For 
CCTV, 44 percent of its total programming in 1984 was devoted to culture and 
entertainment, compared to 35 percent of the total devoted to educational programming. 
In 1990, the educational programming on CCTV had declined to only 5 percent, while 
entertainment reached nearly 60 percent (Hong, 1998: 79). The public service function 
was almost ignored. If the media authorities neglect the diversity of media content, 
measures to protect national culture may not have any effect. 
4.3 The Media Players: Free Birds in the Iron-cage 
Chinese media players maintain that restrictions have deterred further development 
in the media industry. They desire a freer market, arguing that if the media cannot satisfy 
the fast-growing appetites of audiences and readers, they may shift to foreign media. This 
argument put heavy pressure on media regulators to reconsider their propaganda 
strategies. The director of the Information Network of SARFT, Chen Xiaoning, warned, 
'We can't wait anymore, otherwise we will lose the chance for development, and we will 
be kicked out of the market. '(Li, 2001: 4) 
The shift from communism to commercialism can be attributed to some complex 
4 This quotation is from a speech of Xu Guangchun, posed on the official website of the SARFT, 
<http: //www. sarft. gov. cn/manage/publishfile/10/1686. html>, accessed on April 24 2004. 
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factors, such as structural political change, artistic innovation, financial improvement, 
and audience preference. All these factors lead to changes in institutional arrangements to 
free the media industries, which are regarded as an important component of the national 
economy. Media reforms were pushed from a planned economy to a market economy. In 
the 1980s, some media theorists claimed the Chinese media system should be made more 
compatible with the economic base. The role of the media should be changed from 
'propaganda instruments' to 'an industry', from 'leading the masses' to 'serving the 
consumers', from 'tools' to 'service providers' (Qian Wei, 2002: chap. 3). These media 
theories led to at least two unprecedented results, i. e. accelerating commercialization and 
the emergence of cable television, new magazines, local newspapers and web sites 
(Hewitt, 2001). Others argue that under global competition the domestic media can learn 
a lot from them and then grow to be regional or global media giants (Zeng Huaguo, 2004). 
Claims for media reform are based on some western concepts. The reformists argue that, 
the more firms there are in a market, the less the likelihood of collusion, anti-competitive 
strategies and other inefficiencies (Sun Xupei, 1994). The market structure (the number 
of firms, barriers to entry, etc. ) can drive the behaviour of the firms in an industry (e. g. 
their policies on pricing and advertising). In turn, the conduct would determine the 
performance of the industry and its productive efficiency. In the Chinese practice, media 
governance has shifted to the promotion of entrepreneurship, risk-taking and 
profit-seeking activities since 1992. In this way, the monopoly of the state-owned media 
has been gradually broken. 
A significant step in market logic is media commercialization. It happened at the 
beginning of media reforms. First and foremost, the funds of the media are diversified 
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dramatically and thereby the contents of media are pluralized. Press subsidies in China 
have been in effect since 1949. The state provided nearly full financial support to the 
press through subscriptions and direct financial assistance. The government annually 
made a detailed budget plan that specified the items on which newspapers should spend. 
In the mid-1980s, some papers were allowed to operate on a profit-seeking basis. The 
funds that the media received from the government shrank sharply from complete state 
subsidy in 1978 to 50 percent subsidy in the 1980s. Some Party organs, including the 
People ý Daily, became financially independent. Advertising, which was reintroduced in 
the late 1970s, has become the new lifeblood for the four major media-television, 
newspapers, radio, and magazines (Zhao, 1998: 52-55). 
In 1992, the SAPP announced a new policy of cutting subsidies to the press 
(Interviewee 19), allowing the media to undertake media-related businesses such as 
printing, advertising, and photographic services. Media organizations also moved into 
other areas, such as real estate, hotels, and restaurants. Consequently, the press 
distribution system has been changed to follow suit. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the 
post off ice completely dominated the press distribution business. Initiated by the Luoyang 
Daily in 1984, many metropolitan papers organized their own distribution systems 
instead of relying on the postal service. By 1995, newspapers with their own distribution 
accounted for 40 per cent of the national total, while 60 per cent of newspapers still rely 
on the postal one. Thus a two-track system appeared (Zhao, 1998: 136). Papers were also 
encouraged to cultivate their own revenues by keeping some profits. The mass-appeal 
newspapers, such as Xinmin Evening in Shanghai and the Yangcheng Evening in 
Guangzhou, had to pay higher taxes to the state at a rate of over 30 per cent, which 
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normally applies to profitable business enterprises. The deputy director of the SAPP, Shi 
Feng, contends that the Chinese media industry is 'at the dawn of a great breakthrough', 
where the media have become a new driving force of economic growth in China. The 
revenues of the press and publication in 2002 reached 150 billion Yuan (19 billion US 
dollars) and they have kept on growing at a rapid rate (Shi Feng, 2004). 
The changes in film policy in the 1990s mirrored these economic incentives. 
Although the CCP, through its Propaganda Department, retained control over script 
selection, production, quantity and censorship, the government withdrew its financial 
subsidies in the state-owned film studios in 1984. Film studios were required to be 
responsible for their profits and losses. By the early 1990s, a financial crisis emerged in 
the film industry. Box-office revenue in 1992 totaled 1.99 billion Yuan (US$0.25 billion), 
a decrease of 470 million yuan (US$58.75 million) from the previous year. Audiences 
dropped from 14.39 billion in 1991 to 10.55 billion in 1992 (Chu, 2002: 45). In 1993, the 
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT, now SARFT) issued the first proposal for 
film commercialization (MRFT policy document No. 3,1993), encouraging studios to 
sell their products to distribution agencies at the provincial level. Regulation of ticket 
prices was devolved to local government. In 1995, ten big-budget Hollywood films were 
imported through the revenue-sharing system arrangement. A similar profit-sharing 
system was encouraged to operate in provincial and city film corporations. In the same 
year, the Film Bureau issued another regulation (MRFT No. 1,1995) to allow thirteen 
film studios at province and city level other than the original sixteen feature film studios 
to produce feature films. Individual and non-state investment was encouraged. If their 
investment was over 70 percent, investors have the right to be co-producers after being 
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approved by the Film Bureau. In 1997, the government agreed to grant feature film 
production licenses to television stations and film studios at the district level. After China 
joined the WTO, the cinema sector became a more open field for private and foreign 
investors. Decrees No. 18 to 21 in 2003 deregulate the centralized approval system, 
enabling all media players to enjoy the same status in film production, and allowing 
foreign media companies to own a greater share in the cinema sector. 
The case of the cinema sector demonstrates that Chinese media regulators regard 
the media as a kind of force to boost economic growth. This transformation may reflect 
the dramatic changes in the political-social base after two decades of economic reforms. 
If the TNMCs are no longer poison for Chinese audiences, the media industries could 
contribute to economic growth. Following this logic, Chinese media authorities carefully 
shifted the functions of mass media from the propaganda model to the industry model. In 
August 2001, the CPD, the SARFT, and the SAPP jointly proclaimed 'Decree on 
Furthering Reforms in News, Publication, Broadcasting, and the Audio-visual Industry'. 
This policy package was transferred to the General Office of the CPC, and was 
proclaimed by an order issued as a final formulation of Document No. 17 of 2001. It 
includes 24 clauses with three main focuses, which are encouragement for organizing 
media groups, allowance of cross-media and cross-regional media operations, and 
permission for commercial media companies to be listed on stock markets. According to 
Document 17, the media administrative institutions jointly detailed some executive 
principles: 
1) A broadcasting and television network distribution company can receive investment 
from the same industry system (audio-visual industry) or from other industries. This 
160 
ChapterFour Deregulation and Re-regulation: the Bargains Between Media Actors 
capital should account for no more than 50 percent stock-share in the broadcasting 
company; 
2) After being approved by the CPD and SARFT, a company in a broadcasting and 
television network may be listed on domestic stock markets; 
3) Some media industries can receive private investment regardless of their nationality 
in areas including production of drama and television programmes, publication and 
distribution of broadcasting, film, television, newspaper, and periodicals, film 
production, distribution and exhibition, and cinema restructuring; 
4) A film company can be listed on stock markets after reforms; 
5) Newspaper groups, publication groups, and film groups can produce broadcasting and 
television programmes; holding more than 51 percent shares in a state-owned media 
company; these groups can be merged with other investors. 
The interviewees regard Document 17 as a landmark in Chinese media deregulation, 
which has rich implications for media reforms in terms of investment allowance, market 
entry, and media convergence. Unlike companies in other industries, a media company to 
be listed on the stock markets has to apply for permission from the CPD and State 
Council's administrative institutions. After having been listed, the media outlets become 
more independent, not only serving the CCP, but also public investors. The deregulation 
and regulation produces a transformation of media ownership from completely 
state-owned into public-owned or partly private-owned. Therefore, the 'de-state-owned' 
trend seems to be inevitable. 
There are four models of 'de-state-owned'. First, a media company can be listed on 
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the stock market. Since 1997, nearly 20 media corporations have been listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets. The powerful financial institutions that were 
aligned behind profitable media brought a new dynamism to the media sector. Second, a 
state-owned non-media industry may purchase a media company. For example, the 
Huayuan Group, a giant in textile, medicine, and biology, cooperates with Liaowang 
News Weekly, a subsidiary of Xinhua News Agency. In 2003, they invested 35 million 
Yuan (US$ 4.5 million) to establish a news magazine, mainly focusing on political and 
economic reforms. Third, private capital may invest in and cooperate with the existing 
state-owned media. In 200 1, cooperating with People ý Daily, the flagship of the CCP, a 
private company in Beijing invested 50 million Yuan (US$ 60 million) and established a 
newspaper, Beying Times. A company from Shandong province forged a financial 
newspaper, Economic Observer, allying with an existing newspaper with US$ 50 million 
(Interviewee 27). Fourth, the private sector may establish independent media outlets. 
Currently, the audiovisual sector has a large number of private studios, as well as news 
photo providers. Photocom, an on-line news photo provider set up by several young 
photographers in the late 1990s, has become one of the largest photographic news 
providers in China. Their influence can even match traditional Xinhua. In short, the stable 
investment by large commercial companies helped to offset the fact that media revenues 
were notoriously vulnerable to the periodic ups and downs of the advertising market. Its 
aim is to take some long-term advantages in terms of making profits and forging brands. 
However, as some interviewees point out, there is a great incompatibility between 
regulation and practice, particularly since 2001 when the TNMCs have been officially 
allowed to completely own television channels in the Chinese market. Some private 
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media practitioners complain that there is a kind of discrimination and inequality. An 
interviewee argues, 'The foreigners have money, but we have money as well. Why did 
the government give licenses to them, not us? '(Interviewee 40) They argue that this 
policy-preference down-grades the functions of the domestic private media, while it 
up-grades the foreigners. An interviewee argues, 'If the regulations allow [us to have a 
channel], we can do as well as them [the TNMCs], even better than them. The reason is 
that we are familiar with Chinese culture, and we have a good educational background in 
the USA and UK. '(Interviewee 40) 
The second complaint is relevant to the financial policies. According to the existing 
regulations, it is difficult for the private media to apply for large loans from the Chinese 
banking system. However, when the state stopped financial subsidies, the state-owned 
media could easily apply for loans from the state-owned banking institutes. The private 
media also cannot list their companies on the capital markets, even if the investors prefer 
to hold such stock. The investment barriers slow down the development of private 
independent media (Interviewees 40 and 43). 
The third dissatisfaction is related to the strict control on media access. Reception of 
satellite broadcasting is a sensitive issue in China. The tight control over individual 
reception is challenged by Chinese domestic demands. According to a survey, 14.30% of 
Chinese people expect they could receive any satellite channels directly, the vast majority 
of respondents (66.66%) wish to do that with some conditions; only 2.38% believe that 
they 'must not receive' (Lu Di, 1999: 84). 
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5 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE POWER GROUPS 
Neo-liberal commentators regard the rule of business as the best of all possible 
worlds. But in the Chinese context, globalization and economic reforms produced the 
current amalgam of Party, cultural nationalist, and market logics. The change toward 
media deregulation, commercialization, and liberalization is certainly significant, but it 
does not signify an 'end of ideology' (Zhao, 1998: 5). When it comes to permission for 
TNMCs to enter the market, there is a common sentiment within the domestic media and 
government agencies, 
'For developing countries, the multinationals are too powerful to compete. But, 
they have to get licenses from official departments before they enter the Chinese 
market. Actually, many multinationals such as Bertelsmann, IDQ Newsgroup Corp., 
are arranging negotiations with my department [the CPD], which has the final 
decision authority. We can choose those multinationals which are friendly to China, 
which have a good business record, and [are] helpful to expand China's impact on the 
world, as our co-operation partners. '(Interviewee 1) 
This statement by an official in the CPD indicates that the presence and consequence 
of TNMCs in China are a combination of individual rationality (agency) and institutional 
forms (structure). The CCP still plays a key role in the relationship with the TNMCs by 
utilizing them to realise its political goals. In order to become a standard 'friendly' 
partner, both News Corp. 's Murdoch and Viacom's Stone have developed a good public 
relationship with Chinese decision-makers. The reason for that, as Robert McChesney 
maintains, is that billionaire right-wingers establish global media primarily to 'propagate 
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pro-business politics and to push the range of political debate ever rightward' 
(McChesney, 1999: 294). On the screen of CCTV, Murdoch maintained, 'I wish to bring 
good entertainment to them [the Chinese audiences], making their lives happier and more 
wonderful. Of course, I respect Chinese culture and their tastes. ' When the audiences 
asked whether the Chinese market is a gold mine, Murdoch replied, 'I come here not for 
robbing Chinese resources, but for contributing to China. Although some argue that our 
arrival brings more market competition, we participate in this market for the sake of 
building up a more brilliant media market. '(Interviewee 34) 
Like Rupert Murdoch, the TNMCs harness their media outlets to set an agenda of 
pro-China policies in order to get a market ticket. In this sense, the marriage of global 
commercial media and communism is largely ignored. The Chinese government may 
coexist with the media giants. President Jiang Zemin even praised the US film 771tanic, in 
a speech before the NPC in 1997, 'Let us not assume we can't learn from 
capital ism. '(Intervi ewee I) The Chinese communists and the global media capitalists, to a 
greater degree, have made a good deal. For instance, China immediately cancelled 127 
regulations in the audio-visual sector after it entered WTO. 5 
Therefore, as Robert McCheney asserts, 'the relationship of the media giants to 
China is highly instructive about their commitment to democracy as well. '(1999: 115) In 
1997, after Disney had produced a film biography of the Dalai Lama, Kundun, its series 
of media projects in China were frozen. In order to ride out the controversy, Disney soon 
employed a team of public relations to resolve this dispute. The case of Disney may 
demonstrate that the global media giants would bow to the authoritarian government with 
5 Information from SARFT official wcbsite, at <www. sarft. gov. cn/manaRgýýý/publishfile/21/1566. html>t access April 28 
2004. 
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its powerful public relations plus some investment projects. As long as TNMCs are 
attempting to maximize profits in a target market like China, they would not insist upon 
western principles of press freedom or democracy in front of the communist authorities. 
The bargains between participants on the Chinese political stage are more 
complicated than those in other democratic countries. When it comes to the political 
environment, the bargaining process is involved in factionalism (zhongpai zhuyi), 
bureaucratism (guanliao zhuyi), and, localism (difang zhuyi). If Chinese government 
agencies do not make a compromise, they normally repeat a nationalist slogan of 
4protecting national culture and industries (baohu minzu wenhua he minzu gongye)'. This 
slogan has a big influence on media policy. Therefore, the political lobbyists employed by 
TNMCs may not have the same influence in China as they do in the western countries. 
Fearing the erosion of Chinese traditional culture, the authorities deliberately selected 
some non-American TNMCs. From the early 1990s, Bertelsmann, a German media giant, 
has been allowed to establish its book distribution networks and other business. As a 
senior representative in its Beijing office points out: 
'The Chinese government tries to break up the dominance of American 
TNMCs and balance TNMCs according to origin. They would like some TNMCs 
from Europe or somewhere else. ... Although our company holds a conservative 
attitude in the Chinese market, which wouldn't like to invest and expand as fast as 
News Corp., we still have a good performance. At least, we got the first license in 
the publication distribution. '(Interviewee 20) 
Power balance is a crucial factor in Chinese policy-making. The policyrnaking 
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actors represent different power groups. Regulators and domestic media responded to the 
TNMCs on behalf of their benefits. Even in the same group, there are also different 
focuses. For example, within the regulator group, the CCP focuses on centralizing its 
complete information control, while local governments support limited liberalization to 
boost economic development (Interviewee 1). The domestic media call for lifting strict 
controls but they would like to be regarded as 'an infant industry' for the sake of more 
subsidiaries. At the practical level, these media policy actors have made alliances for and 
against the transformation of media regulation. A vast range of new investment 
opportunities has resulted from media deregulation in China. These opportunities 
attracted the eyes of the electronics and advertising industries, along with the publishers 
of the press, the cable television, independent producers, broadcasting facilities 
companies and financial institutions. Their conjunction of economic actors gave them an 
uncommonly powerful weight. To a great extent, it is similar to European countries 
(Humphreys, 1996: 174-197). In short, the Chinese media, including the international 
media, seem to just speak for the ever more powerful interests, commercially and 
politically. The case of Murdoch demonstrates that there is no obvious difference between 
commercial and political power in China, though the commercial power-- executive 
decisions on what to operate, what product to provide-is not translated directly or 
simply into politics. The most important area of political activities for media institutions 
is organised to change media policies. The core issue is media ownership, its profit 
motivation, and its reliance on advertising or subsidy. The interactions and conflicts 
between different power groups determine the directions of media policy-making. 
In China, the bargaining powers are embedded in globalization, not isolated from 
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domestic issues, are not stable but changeable. Tony Saich calls it a 'negotiated state', 
in which the ministries, local governments and individual institutions vary in nature 
depending on the relationship they have negotiated with other parts of the apparatus 
(Saich, 2000; Saich, 2002: chap. 8). It is true that the regulators hold unassailable decisive 
power, but the corporate power from both domestic and foreign media corporations has 
been increasing. Concerning the flooding of the TNMCs, there are four policy 
implications in media governance, including embracing protectionism, industrially 
supporting co-productions and co-financing, supporting the independent production 
sector, and expanding public-service provision. In 1997 the Fifteenth Party Congress 
reformulated the debate between public and private ownership, and the debate on Chinese 
national industry versus foreign industry was underway. 
The flexibility of media regulation provides more space for the practitioners. Take 
satellite television, for example. China banned satellite reception of foreign programmes 
among its citizens, but Chinese officials have been willing to allow CCTV to receive 
Time-Wamer's programmes and selectively redistribute them within the country. 
According to Joe Hogan, senior vice president for network distribution in Turner 
Interhational, 
'We fully understand that they do not want CNN International on a 24-hour 
basis to be distributed to every household in China. We respect that and will 
operate accordingly.... We don't have the view that we will rain down on a 
country via satellite television whether we are welcome or unwelcome. We will 
work with the powers that be, the state broadcasters, the ministers of 
communication, and we will abide by the rules of their country.... We do not 
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want to force our products on them. We want them to look at our portfolio... and 
then go from there. ' (Quoted by Flournoy and Stewart, 1997: 7) 
It seems that both the commercial-oriented media and the party monopoly would 
enable private power or party power to hinder the emergence of a democratic society. If 
the party monopoly is anti-democratic, the domination by several commercial media 
corporations also results in the decline of diversity. 
Alternatively, the emerging civil society has developed into a real basis for 
political pluralism and contributed to political changes. In the Chinese context, media 
civil society scarcely reversed the authoritarian regime in 1989 (He, 1997). After that, the 
Party has kept vigilant eyes on civil institution building. Although state organs are 
traditionally supreme over the civil society, a few non-governmental media associations 
with some degree of governance power within the industry appeared after 1992. All 
Chinese reporters and editors are members of the All China Journalists' Association 
(ACJA), which is theoretically an independent social organization outside the official 
hierarchy. ACJA formulated a Statement of Ethics for Chinese Journalists in 1991 and it 
endorsed it several times, when there has been increasing paid-news in media outlets 
since the 1990s. In theory, as the mass media are owned by the government, all reporters 
and editors should become government employees. In reality, an increasing number of 
media staff is not government employees. For instance, most staff in Xinhua's Oriental 
Outlook signed contracts with the media company, like a commercial unit. Under this 
complicated arrangement, the ACJA plays an increasingly important role in dealing with 
disputes between media staff and the employers together with other social activities. 
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However, it lacks the authority to impose any penalties or provide any protection for its 
members. As a dispute happens, the ACJA plays a role as auditor, mediator, and 
supporter. 
Moreover, the number of professional associations within the media industry has 
gone up since the 1990s. Sectors of newspapers, evening newspapers, local newspapers, 
periodicals, publication, Internet, audiovisual, and so on, have established their own 
non-government associations. These associations may not have enough strength to 
oppose the government, but they have begun to build up a link between the government 
and the market. In recent years, the government even encouraged this trend (Peqpleý 
Press, 2003: 30) Liu Binjie, deputy of the SAPP, argues, 'the government cannot govern 
details in individual industries. Instead, the industry associations can deal with most 
issues within their own industry. These associations could self-regulate. '(Liu Binjie, 
2004: 156) 
Media civil society in China is not yet at the grass-roots level and they cannot 
reach the whole Chinese nation to impose a powerful check on the power of the state. 
However, if the present favourable economic climate continues, the recent future may see 
civil society as a major player in Chinese media politics. The case of deregulation of 
cross-media and cross-region mergers shows the increasing significance of the media in 
civil society. In the mid- I 990s, one of the main themes of media reforms was the demand 
for deregulation of media conglomeration. But the SAPP crushed this demand with a 
provision on May 18,1994, which bans the self-establishment of press conglomerates. A 
month later, ten newspapers with considerable economic strength organised a national 
conference in Hangzhou, debating the issues raised by the SAPP's provision. It imposed 
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heavy pressures on the regulatory institutions and led to the birth of Guangzhou Daily 
Conglomerate in January 1996 (Liu, 1998: 31-41). In order to contribute solutions to the 
increasing disputes within the newspaper industry, the Association of China's 
Newspapers organised a treaty, China's Newspaper Self-formulated Treaty (Zhongguo 
baoye zilu gongvue) on December 12,1999. Most of the newspapers signed up for this 
treaty, which provides self-regulations on market competition in terms of readership, 
content, advertising, human resources, and so on. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have examined media commercialization, led by globalization, 
constraints on the state's ability to sustain the monopoly of mass media, opening many 
more opportunities for both national and transnational actors. There are three internal and 
external factors, party logic, cultural logic, and media logic, having driven the change of 
the Chinese media system. These factors have broken down a few existing barriers in the 
media marketplace. As a result, China's media governance experienced a great 
institutional transformation in terms of regulation. This process can be articulated in 
Nye's words, 'to establish standards and strategies that strongly affect public policies that 
were once the domain of central govemments. '(Nye, 1999: 6) In China, the CCP faces a 
dilemma. It is that during the process of media reforms, the CCP could not easily persist 
with the principle of 'Party-completely-control-media (dangguan meiti)', but it has to 
gradually open the media market under global and domestic pressures. 
This chapter has also explored the complex correlations between numerous actors. 
Along with integrating in global society, Chinese media authorities adjusted their 
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governing models, attempting to control the media industry not at the micro level but at 
the macro level. The recent changes in this direction are a positive step in making the 
process of regulation more participatory and accountable. The increase of bargaining 
within different parties, though it still lacks stability, shows the model of policy creation 
has been transformed from a 'leader-determined 'model to a 'consensus-building' model. 
Since the ruling CCP employed many effective measures to manage the 
ideology-oriented media, dialogues between regulators, TNMCs, and domestic players 
were initiated during the 1990s. Therefore, rather than only being determined by the 
leaders of the party or the government in the past, media policy-making has been 
increasingly formulated by bargaining between different participating media institutions. 
China still focuses on structural adjustment. The governmental interventions and 
institutional arrangements have called for promoting market competition. Many media 
players believe that as competition develops in the media market, the only type of 
relevant regulation should be general competition policy. 
But, in China, as in many other Asian countries (McCargo, 2003), media 
practitioners and media organizations have an ambiguous relationship with political 
power holders. Ownership restrictions are set not for the possibility of diversity of media 
content, but for the effectiveness of information control. China's media deregulation 
seems to be a triumph of the neo-liberalism and global media market. However, the 
actual track record is quite dubious, because the power of the CCP did not allow the 'end 
of history'. The bargains may be seen as setting rules and constraints among actors, with 
different resources and capacities, acting to realize their commercial and political goals. 
All are relevant to the individual and structural arrangements, which prioritize a few 
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alternatives and possibilities for media governance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION: 
RESTRUCTURING THE MEDIA INDUSTRY IN CHINA 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The profound influence of globalization and TNMCs on China's media governance 
has driven an obvious tendency toward differentiation and functional specialization of 
media institutions, deregulation and re-regulation of media policy, de-monopolization of 
media structure, and de-propagandization of media culture. Chapter Three has examined 
the increase of differentiation and functional specialization of media institutions; Chapter 
Four has explored some regulatory responses to globalization and governing 
transformation. With the case of News Corp., I have also examined the complexity and 
incompatibility of co-relations between regulators, domestic media players, and 
transnational media players. There are three factors, media diplomacy; economic growth; 
and, cultural protection, inducing the authorities to adjust media regulation. The 
penetration of foreign media has imposed heavy pressures on the authorities. In this 
chapter, I will further explore de-monopolization of media structure, that is relevant to 
structural changes in the media market from the perspectives of party logic, cultural logic, 
and media logic. 
During the process of de-monopolization in the course of globalization, there is a 
dualistic system of mass media in China. For instance, a businessman, who invested a 
million Yuan in the China Commercial Paper via its host institution China's Social 
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Academic Association (CSAA), in the early 1990s, got nothing after the paper became 
profitable with annual advertising revenue of over 10 million Yuan ($ 1.2 million) in the 
late 1990s. In October 1999, over a dispute of ownership on China Commercial Paper 
and Shopping Guide, a joint letter to CSAA by the General Office of the State, the 
Ministry of Financial Affairs, and the State Administration of Publication and Press gave 
a clear judgement on its ownership. It said, 'the owner of a newspaper is the only investor 
in the newspaper. There is no policy allowing private or social institutions to create or 
own any press. ' According to Article 22 of the Constitution, the state is the only legal 
body entitled to develop the media industry. Ironically, two years later, the State Council 
promulgated Document 17, strongly encouraging media industrialization (meiti 
chanyehua) and allowing the private sector to participate in media industries. 
This contradiction, a result of institutional arrangements balancing interests of the 
party, economic, and media forces, reflects a considerable concern about the increasing 
penetration of TNMCs in the media market, and an unchanging reality that there is still a 
dualistic system of mass media. However, in this market, the monopoly of party-media 
has been broken and the strength of public and private media is on the rise. The Chinese 
authorities call for deepening cultural restructuring and the private media have become a 
challenge and threat to the party counterpart. The primary motivation of the government 
is to push forward cultural restructuring in the light of the characteristics of the 
development of socialist spiritual civilization and laws governing it. The government also 
wants to restructure the cultural industry in response to the needs of the growing socialist 
market economy. Jiang Zemin argued, 'We must lose no time in working out overall 
planning for cultural restructuring. '(Jiang Zemin, 2004: 1) The direction of media reforms 
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in recent years is deepening media transformation by structural adjustment and promotion 
of development, and clarifying the relationship between the government and cultural 
enterprises and institutions. In doing so, the media authorities attempt to deepen the 
internal reform of media enterprises and institutions. The reform aims at establishing a 
management system and operational mechanism that allows media practitioners to show 
more initiative and be innovative, and brings more high-quality work and more 
outstanding personnel. 
This chapter also argues that there are rich political implications of the structural 
changes in the media market for the Chinese media politics. Although some scholars still 
regard media changes as a process within the 'Party's orbit' (Zhao, 2000: 3-22) or 'Party 
Inc. '(Liu, 1998), 1 argue that media restructuring may have enabled the Chinese media to 
become a limited independent institution in the Chinese polity. As Nicholas Granham 
suggests, 'it is cultural distribution, not cultural production, that is the key locus of power 
and profit. '(Granham, 1990: 161-162) In China, the diffusion of media business models, 
particularly media organizations dependent on advertising revenues has given rise to a 
commercial culture that 'is often apolitical but which may nonetheless undermine the 
traditional relationship between political authorities and the public. '(McCormick and Liu, 
2003: 139) The diversifying media investment, the increasingly weakened monopoly of 
the party-media, incrementally spinning off from the party and government, facilitated 
the rise of more open and reasonable media spaces which undermine the hegemony of the 
CCP's over the mass media. It is incremental accessibility to diverse information and the 
capacity to employ that information that is re-configuring media power relations in 
China. 
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This chapter firstly presents media liberalisation in China. Then, I will present the 
reconstruction in the television sector. Thirdly, I examine media conglomeration in which 
the central party-dominated newspapers and television have their strengths diminished. 
Fourthly, I re-classify four kinds of mass media in China. Particularly, I examine the role 
of independent media with the case study of an influential magazine 'Finance' (Caying). 
2 THE MORE MARKET DYNAMISM, THE LESS PARTY 
DOMINANCE 
Media commercialization in China is a process of state intervention to expand the 
number of media outlets in the marketplace, in which new providers of mass media are 
allowed to be created. Its main aim is to increase the number of market participants and 
then to open up former monopoly areas to competition. The preconditions for media 
commercialization do not primarily result from governmental intentions, but are the 
unintended consequences of market-oriented reforms. Minxin Pei calls it 
'self-liberalization' (1994: 150). It reflects the fact that the economic reforms and 
open-door policies led to liberalization and self-liberalization both at the regulatory and 
operational level. 
2.1 Commercialism as an Engine of Change 
Since 1979, especially since 1992, commercialism within the party and the 
government has become an engine of communication liberalization and the functions of 
propaganda have been weakened. It also provided limited opportunities for TNMCs to 
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penetrate the Chinese market. The presence and the weight of TNMCs, in turn, stimulated 
more media restructuring in China. 
Commercialization of mass communication was initially a governmental and 
institutional decision as a means to stop subsidiaries for media institutions. The CCP's 
Central Committee and the State Council jointly propagated a decree 'About the 
Decision to Speed up the Development of the Tertiary Industry' in October 1992, 
regarding the mass media as part of the service industry (Xu Guangchun, 2002: 474). In 
August 1994, Sun Jiazheng, the Ministry of Broadcasting, Television and Radio, 
maintained that broadcasting and television should rely on self-development, rather than 
operate on government subsidy (Xu Guangchun, 2002: 437). It was reiterated by President 
Jiang Zemin when he visited the People ý Daily in 1996. He suggested, 'the People ý 
Daily should pay attention to the content on the one hand and try its best to improve its 
industrial business on the other. ' (Xu Guangchun, 2002: 517) In March 1998, the NPC 
suggested that the government should reduce the budget for public organizations 
including media outlets annually and after three years, all organizations should become 
financially independent. A year later, Document No. 82 of the State Council asserted that 
cable television networks should be commercialized and separated from television 
stations. China's mass media have to move towards independent units with a push from 
the government. As a result of these institutional arrangements, the governmental subsidy 
to media institutions shrank dramatically from 100 percent in 1978 to 50 percent in the 
1980s and to nearly zero in the late 1990s. Some Party organs, including People ý Daily, 
became financially independent. Depending on multiple channels of financing income, 
especially from the booming advertising business, the media industry in 2002 has 
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surpassed the tobacco industry with annual profits of over 100 billion Yuan (US$12 
billion), employing over one million people (Zhang Guihong, 2002). It has become the 
fourth largest profit industry in China, following electronic information, manufacturing, 
and tourism. There is still great potential for media development due to the current low 
level of consumption of media products. 
Advertising, which was reintroduced in early 1979, has become an attraction in the 
Chinese media market. For instance, as Table 5.1 demonstrates, the advertising revenue 
of CCTV in 2003 was 800 million Yuan (US$ 97 million), forty times that in 1990. A 
study by AC Nielsen Media Research suggests that China has maintained an increase of 
16 percent in advertising revenue, despite the influence of the global economic slowdown 
(Zhang Guihong, 2002). The bulky media market offers huge spaces for local media and 
definitely attracts overseas investors. The year 1992 saw a turning point. Foreign 
advertising agencies were allowed to set up joint ventures, and state-owned enterprises 
had their freedom to choose advertising agencies without interference from different 
levels of government. The deregulation of the advertising market generated increasing 
competition among agencies and a marked improvement in the quality of advertisements 
on the one hand, and dramatic increases in advertising spending (100 per cent average 
annual increase from 1992 to 1993) as well as in the number of advertising agencies (90 
percent average annual increases) on the other. But soon the government reset the rules of 
market entry in 1994. Only qualified agencies were permitted to operate their business in 
China (Zhou, 2002: 75). The regulation reflects great concern about the cultural 
consequences of foreign advertisements. As Liu Renwei argues, it could 
'become a strong force in the cultural invasion. Ordinary people may think that 
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advertising is nothing but promotion of merchandise, but in fact the issue is far from 
being so simple. On the one hand, people blow their own trumpets by means of 
advertisement, but on the other hand, [ads. ] are comprehensive manifestations of a 
consumption concept, a way of life, and value-orientation of the countries where such 
merchandise is produced. '(quoted by Lynch, 1999: 57) 
Table 5.1 Revenue of CCTV 
Year Revenue (million YMB) 
1980 2.43 
1982 7.87 
1990 197 
1992 560 
1993 760 
1994 1,000 
1995 2,000 
1996 3,500 
1997 4,100 
1998 4,400 
1999 5,100 
2000 5,700 
2001 6,100 
2002 7,000 
2003 8,000 
Source: Yang Weiguang, Dianshi Wenji (Selected Papers on Television) (Beijing: China Wenlian Press, 2000), p. 256; 
Wu KcyUI Diansh! Jingfixue (Television Economics) (Beijing: Huaxia Press, 2004), p. 54. 
To meet the demands of audiences and advertisers, the genres of newspapers have 
been diversified and helped break the monopoly of the Party's papers. Among 2509 titles 
of newspapers in 1988, the ones owned by party organs decreased to 16% of the total, 
metropolitan papers account for 10%, evening papers 1%, special-subject papers 23%, 
enterprise papers 25% (Lee, 1990: 16). Although there are no concrete updated data for 
2004, interviewees maintain that the party-media continued to decline and metropolitan 
media rose dramatically. The divergent networks of national and local newspapers serve 
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specialised markets based on age, occupation, interest and work-unit constituencies. 
Table 5.2 Tax and Profit of CCTV (million RMB) 
Year Tax Profit for SARFT 
1998 400 640 
1999 460 790 
2000 480 850 
2001 500 910 
2002 550 940 
Source: Wu Keyu, Dianshi Jinglime (Idevision bconomics) (Beijing: Huaxia Fress, ZUU4), p. 34. 
Therefore, the popular papers beat the party's mouthpieces (Wang Jianmin, 2003). In 
the post-WTO years, Chinese media are forced to further commercialize or face closure. 
According to a decree issued by the SAPP in July 2003, some party and government 
papers were closed down, annexed or transferred to other newspaper groups, while others 
became free information circulars. As a result of the planned economy, a number of 
newspapers and magazines run by party branches and government departments were 
financially supported by administrative orders that increase their circulation. State 
administration statistics show there were 2,137 newspapers in 2002. But newspapers 
relying on administrative orders for subscription accounted for 40 per cent of the total 
(China Daily, August 5,2003, p. 4). The decree by the SAPP aims to solve the economic 
ineffectiveness and administrative burden of newspapers. According to this bold plan, 
publications would be free to operate in the marketplace rather than continue to serve as 
cultural units under government departments or social organizations. In this way, the 
number of party and government media units has declined dramatically in recent years. 
The legitimating of private investment in 2004 is driven by the needs of 
commercialization, which encourages the media to grow independent from state subsidies, 
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respond to consumers' demands, and become an engine of economic growth and 
employment. A reform package released by the State Council in 2004 allows that private 
investment can involve itself in the business of newspapers, broadcasters, television and 
other media outlets. It states, the operation of the mass media can be split off and ... 
absorb capital from society, but the state must retain 'an absolute controlling stake 
Yueduikonggu)' in any such business (Interviewee 1; McGregor, 2004: 9). Eliminating 
government support while improving market efficiency might increase market 
competition as well as force the closure of some propaganda-oriented publications. 
2.2 The Increasing Strength of Private Firms in the Publication Sector 
The erosion of the state-owned publishing industry by private entrepreneurs has 
taken place since the 1980s, but it reached its peak in the 1990s. It has split into what 
have been called the 'red route (hongdao)', 'white route (baidao)', and 'black route 
(heidao)'. The 'red route' consists of official publications, the 'white route' represents 
private entrepreneurs and distributors who have government permission to produce and 
distribute certain media products under restricted conditions in given areas, and the 
'black route' includes illegal, unlicensed operators who produce pornography, politically 
sensitive and racy works. (Interviewee 28; Heiko, 2002: 28-38) Operating outside the 
official, state-owned channels, the white and black routes, known as the second channel 
(er'qudao), have been tolerated by the government because of their popularity since the 
late 1990s. 
The significance of the private publishing business is its vertical concentration on 
the whole process of publication. Due to the regulatory restrictions, according to which 
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the private media have no right to own a publishing house, the private sector initially took 
part in publication in selected topics. In 1984, the government promulgated a 
deregulatory policy called cooperative publishing arrangements, which were initially a 
response to the tendency of the profit-oriented publishing houses to shun scholarly books 
and court bestsellers. Accordingly, individual authors and publishing houses can share the 
costs of production. The private entrepreneurs capitalized on this arrangement by taking 
over virtually all the functions of the publishing houses, becoming unlicensed publishers. 
According to interviewees, some publishing houses, especially the small and medium 
scale local or ministerial publishing houses, would like to sell their issue serial numbers 
(a kind of publishing licence approved by the SAPP) to a private publisher, because they 
have these free resources from the government agencies overseeing the publishing 
business. For the appearance of the legitimate product of the publisher, private 
entrepreneurs also pay the publisher to use its name. With flexible operations both in 
investment, distribution, and publishing, the private sector has become a powerful arm in 
the publication sector in the 1990s. Some have grown up to become publishing giants 
with the whole chain in production, distribution, and promotion. They produced 50 to 100 
books every year, the same as a medium-sized official publishing house (Interviewee 28). 
The private firms produced half of the best-selling publications since the 1990s, such as 
Poor Father, Rich Father (qiong baba, fu baba) (Interviewee 28). Over the years, the 
number of private publication firms is over 40,000, with a market share of about 50 
percent, excluding textbooks from the state-owned sector's business (Xinhua News, Feb. 2, 
2003). Some of them, for instance, Beijing's Xishu Book, have the strength to compete 
with state-owned Xinhua Book Store. Cooperating with a Hong Kong-based company, 
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the number of Xishu book stores reached 489 in 300 cities, imposing heavy pressures on 
Xinhua Book Store (Bo Mei, 2005: 19). 
There are fluctuations in time and space for the publishing business. The first period 
of growth was from late 1992 to early 1993. During this time publication 
commercialization reached its peak, Guangdong Province and its neighbour, Hunan 
province, became the centres of private publication. The second was the period from 
1996 to 1998, during which the business was based on Beijing and Chengdu, focusing on 
political reforms. The third was from late 2001 to 2002, with the publications orbiting the 
issues raised from the WTO (Interviewee 28). According to the interviewees, there are 
rich implications in differences between the localities. Guangdong is one of the most 
market-oriented areas. Deng Xiaoping called for further reforms and more opening-up 
there in 1992. It is no surprise that the commercialization of publications was first 
launched from Guangdong. The challenges and opportunities of China's membership of 
the WTO urged the leaders to have global awareness in terms of understanding 
international norms, rules, and operative models. In this context, the popularity of private 
publications reflected the political trajectory in China since 1992. 
The fluctuations of self-liberalization mainly depend on the political climate. It 
sometimes could become an instrument in the power struggle, in which one faction fights 
against another, either conservatives or liberals. For rebellious book merchants, who 
launched effective guerrilla warfare underground against the censors since the mid 1990s, 
they did that to make profits, not to fight for political freedom. Some owners 
re-emphasised when being interviewed, 'We don't care about anything but money. ' 
(Interviewee 28) But they experienced horrible tribulations if they angered the core 
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authorities. After Li Shenzhi published his lengthy National Day cri de coeur article, 
which attacked the CCP's hegemony and challenged the Party's control over information, 
Jiang Zemin angrily responded, 
'Some Party members and cadres are openly expressing opposition in 
newspapers, books, and speeches to the Party line and general and specific policies.... 
I do not believe that our Party cannot manage the publishing houses well; I do not 
believe that our Party cannot manage book numbers [issue serial numbers] 
well. '(Quoted by Fewsmith, 2001: 227) 
Soon after this incident, restrictions on censored publishing were stressed, 15 to 20 
publishing houses were suspended, reorganized, or closed (Fewsmith, 2001: 227). 
As Chapter Four explored, publication distribution has also been liberalized and the 
monopolized systems, the Post Office and Xinhua Bookstore, have been eroded in recent 
years. Chinese media have long complained that the post office is inefficient, and that it 
charges too much. From the early 1990s, many publishing houses and newspapers, for 
instance, Nanfang Daily Group (Zhong Guangming, 2002: 6-10), began to establish their 
own distribution networks, rather than depending on Xinhua Bookstore and the Post 
Office. At the end of 1992, there were more than 500 newspapers running their own 
distribution networks (Lee, 1994). In the late 1990s, most of the profitable local media 
have their own circulation and distribution networks. Some rely on private dealers, even 
though the SAPP frowns on the practice. In the publication sector, there were already 
40,000 private book sellers by the late 1980s, twice as many as the combination of 
collectively owned bookstores and state-owned (11,000 and 9,000, respectively). Private 
and collective stores controlled nearly two thirds of the book retail market in 1988, while 
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the state-owned had accounted for 95 percent in 1979. Private newsstand operators 
gained market dominance over the distribution of newspapers and magazines in 1988 as 
the state-owned postal system's share fell to 42 percent (Pei, 1994: 155). Private 
publication holds a half share in the publishing business in the late 1990s. In Shanghai, 
the private sector has become outstanding in the publishing retail market with 7000 
bookstores in 2003 (Zhang Xiaoning, 2004: 2). After a decade's underground operation, 
private publication businessmen achieved equal status with state-owned counterparts at 
Beijing's Publication Book Fair in 2004. According to Liu Binjie, general governor of the 
SAPP, with 20 policies promulgated in 2003, the unequal status between the state-owned 
and private would never happen again (see Chen Guilong, 2004: 18-20). 
In accordance with its commitments to the WTO, China should partly open up its 
publishing industry in some cities, during its first year of WTO membership. It should 
fully open up the advertising market and its entire book, newspaper and magazine 
wholesale and retail sector to overseas investment within three years. After a year-long 
trial operation allowing overseas investment in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, 
Dalian, Qingdao, and five special economic zones in the southern part of the country, the 
SAPP promulgated the 'Regulation Concerning the Management of the Publication 
Market' on May 1,2003. It allows the operations of publication distribution enterprises to 
have diversified capital investments. Accordingly, China has formally opened up the 
book, newspaper and magazine distribution sectors in Chongqing, Ningbo, and all 
provincial capitals to domestic private investors and foreigners. Distribution groups could 
assimilate overseas investment. By early 2004, over 60 overseas companies have set up 
offices in Mainland China with the intention of investing in the publication distribution 
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business. Those who have cooperated closely with their Chinese counterparts and who 
are familiar with this market are likely to be the first to have their applications approved 
(Xinhua News, Jan. 23,2003). 
The SAPP finally liberalized the private firms. Private dealers were prohibited 
from wholesaling publications before 2003, though they operated successfully in an 
underground market. In August 2003, according to the new circular from the SAPP, 
private firms with at least 20 million Yuan (US$2.41 million) in registered capital can 
apply for wholesale circulation of books, magazines and newspapers. Applications must 
be approved by the SAPP. It is the first time that the private sector has won the same 
impartial and equal status as state-owned firms. By early 2004, private firms were 
operating in the major cities, such as Beijing's Red Cap, Shanghai's Eastern Book, and 
Guangzhou's Yangcheng. All demonstrate their potential and strength in market 
competition. With the development of liberalizing distribution, both the state-owned 
Xinhua Bookstore and the Post Office lost their monopoly status as private and foreign 
firms flood into book wholesale and retail market. In some regions, they operate on the 
margins of the market because they lack flexibility in comparison with their private 
counterparts. 
Concerning the market strengths of foreign firms, Chinese media have been 
establishing a number of state-owned distribution groups with chain operations and 
modem logistics services, in a bid to improve the market competitiveness of 
state-owned news and publication businesses. On April 2,2004, Liu Binjie, deputy 
president of the SAPP asserts, 
'After the Circulation of Management of the Publishing Market [in 2003], 
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private publishers won equal status in market entry and became an important 
player in the Chinese publishing industry. However, our strengths could not 
compete with international publishing giants. We should speed up our reforms. " 
Regulating 'gateways' and potential bottlenecks (e. g. book numbers, censorship, 
un institutional i sed policies, and so on) become pivotal to the objective of ensuring open 
and divergent systems of media governance. Although the government has revised laws 
and regulations on copyright and publication, and rectified irregularities in distribution of 
the publications in recent years, many regulatory barriers needed to be removed and a 
new one should be reconstructed to provide better governance based on justice, fairness, 
and pluralism. 
3 DE-CENTRALIZATION AND DE-MONOPOLIZATION IN THE 
TELEVISION SECTOR 
The structural changes in television are generally considered as a natural 
evolution process of television commercialization (Zhao, 1998). However, without the 
external influences of television globalization, for instance, News Corporation's Phoenix 
TV, Star TV, and Xingkongweishi, the reforms in the old structure and the reshaping of a 
new structure could not have happened so rapidly and dramatically. When a nation like 
China, which has unique economic and political systems, opens its door to the world it 
can hardly keep the market monopoly through political power as before. The pressure 
I See the Chinese goverrunent official website, 
httl2: //www. chinabook. &al2l2. Rov. WO/Article. aspx! ArtlD=045614&CateID--1010404, accessed on April 24,2004. 
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from the global market has virtually strengthened the power of commercial rules in a 
global context, and effectively shaped the Chinese television industry. During this process, 
decentralization plays a role as 'the mother of adaptation, innovation and experimentation 
in political communication. '(Lewis, 2002: 145) Although the emerging competitive media 
market is profit-oriented and the Party monopoly has not been seriously challenged, the 
weakened CCTV and the new channels offer alternative information to audiences. Some 
of this information helps stimulate political awareness, create public spheres, and 
establish different opinions. 
3.1 The Rapid Growth of Local Television 
The Chinese television market is described as a 'gold mine'. Figures show that 
television and broadcasting systems have audiences of one billion, and Community 
Antenna Television (CATV) covers three million square kilometers with 100 million 
users (Xinhua News, Nov. 6,2002). In 2003, China broadcasting and television covered 
93.34 per cent and 94.62 per cent of its population. The television household audience 
reached 306 million with a TV coverage ratio of 85.88 per cent (Yin and Li, 2003: 6). The 
annual revenue of the broadcasting, television and film industry amounted to some 43 
billion Yuan (US$5.2 billion) in 2001 (China Daily, Dec. 7,2001). In this huge market, 
the TNMCs do not have the power to determine the reform agenda for Chinese media 
industries, but they have the capacity to gradually reshape the structure of Chinese 
television through related influences. 
The structural change defines what happens to Chinese television in the age of 
economic reform. The structure of television in China had been firmly shaped as a 
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'four-tier system' until the early 1990s (Huang, 1994: 222). These four levels of television 
stations constituted different layers of monopoly 'at the national, provincial, municipal 
and county levels' (Wei, 2000: 327). Among all stations, the CCTV was in the dominant 
position across China. The whole Chinese television industry could be described as a 
placid lake. Each station clung to its regional market. They had neither the ambition to 
occupy new markets, nor faced challenges from other stations. The system had a fatal 
disadvantage, in that it separated the media markets by administrative areas. Thus it only 
produced low quality TV programmes and small outputs of TV products. From 2001, the 
SARFT recreated the system. Every municipal station may keep its institution and brand 
but only be allowed to carry one channel. By July 1,2002, every province should have at 
least one public channel. The broadcasting system was transformed from a four-tier 
system to a three-tier one. All channels at the county level should rebroadcast the 
programming from the central, provincial and municipal levels, rather than air their own 
(Wang and Zhou, 2003: 46). 
In the 1990s, along with the loosening of broadcasting regulations, the number of 
television stations increased and satellite and cable television were further developed. 
The previous structure of the television industry tended to be broken down (table 5.3). 
With more media outlets, a blooming media industry, providing divergent accessibility 
under decentralization results in a more dynamic Chinese mediascape. 
Table 5.3 Television Channels in China 
Television stations (number) 651 
Cable subscribers (number) 90 million 
Cable television channels (number) 663 
Satellite television channels (number) 38 
Television penetration (per cent ) 92 
Source: Access Asia Limited, 2003, Quoted by FT, FebruarylO 2004 
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Cable television offers more opportunities for foreign programme providers. In the 
1990s the cable networks increased at an astonishing speed all over China, which can be 
illustrated by the number in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. The households installed with cable 
soared to 90 million by 2000, seven times the figure of 1990. It grows steadily. By 2001, 
China had the largest cable networks in the world. The households installed with cable 
surpass the USA to reach more than 117 million. It covers 70 percent of the urban areas 
and extends to rural areas with an annual increase of five million households. The 
backbone of the network consists of three components. The national networks extend to 
30,000 kilometres of cable; the provincial networks have 110,000 kilometres; and the 
country networks are composed of 300,000 kilometres. 
Table 5.4 Increase in Cable Households in China 
Year Number of cable households (million) 
1990 13 
1994 31 
1997 70 
1998 77 
1999 80 
2000 90 
Sources: From the governmental website of State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), 
www. sarft. com, accessed on February 4 2004. 
The provincial broadcasters are keen to air their own programming via satellite. By 
the end of the 1990s, there were a total of 38 domestic satellite channels in China, 
including one CETV channel, eight CCTV channels and 29 provincial channels. 2 It is a 
typical 'Chinese characteristic' since SARIFT allocated each province a satellite channel, 
the television signal of which can reach the audience of other provinces (Wei, 2000: 342). 
2 'The Introduction to Satellite Broadcasting in China', www. ctvro. com accessed on April 7,2002. 
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The original intention of SARFT was to encourage competition among the provincial 
television stations so as to enhance their strengths in resisting the invasion of foreign 
television. Nevertheless, an unexpected result of the competition is the prevalence of 
global programme formats on the Chinese television screen. Among all the domestic 
satellite channels, CCTV has an absolute advantage in the areas of funds, intelligence, 
authority and reputation. The average programme-production cost per minute of CCTV is 
often ten times as much as that of provincial stations. It seems that few opportunities are 
left for provincial stations in the national market unless they have particular skills. The 
provincial stations, like cable television, search for assistance from global television. 
Because the governmental control over the provincial stations is much stricter than cable, 
the global programme formats, rather than the programmes themselves, are the most 
important resource being utilized by provincial stations. 
Along with the increase of cable channels and provincial satellite broadcasting, more 
programmes are needed to fill in the broadcasting time of the Chinese television. The 
insufficient domestic production is shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Total Broadcasting Time and the Total Time of Self-produced Programmes of 
Chinese Television ( in Hours) 
Year Total broadcasting time self-produced programmes The percentage of self-produced 
programmes 
1992 1,374,464 148,143 10.8 
1993 --- -- --- 
1994 2,073,656 280,841 13.5 
1995 2,439,632 383,513 15.7 
1996 2,886,978 550,738 19.1 
1997 3,114,384 616,437 19.8 
1998 3,481,920 725,699 20.8 
1999 3,976,336 790,874 19.9 
2000 
- - 
4,335,396 871,081 201 r2 
0 0ý J , 9,561,708 1,578,755 16ý5 
Source: Wu Keyu, Dianshijingfixue (Television Economics) (Beijing: Huaxia Press, 2004), p. 116 
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The newly set-up cable channels, digital channels, and satellite television stations 
were definitely considered as commercial institutions by the SARFT (Zhongguo guangbo 
dianshi nianbao, 1992). They could not survive and compete with the terrestrial channels 
without foreign programmes. The large number also makes it extremely difficult for the 
governments to supervise and control. Thus, they have more freedom to purchase the 
trans-border television programmes. Chinese regulations require cable stations to limit 
foreign programmes to no more than one-third of their total programming. In practice, the 
local cable networks can import as many foreign programmes as they can afford (Chan, 
1996: 143). 
The reasonable price of TNMC products is the external reason that the cable 
channels and satellite broadcasting depend heavily on foreign programming. Most 
municipal cable stations have a sports channel, which rebroadcasts the entire sports 
programming packages purchased from ESPN. According to an interviewee in Tianjin 
Cable Station, the sports channel is cost-effective since it only takes them RMB700,000 
(GBP60,000) per year to purchase the satellite signals from ESPN. In fact, 'to occupy 
Chinese markets, ESPN sold its program package to cable stations of 31 large cities in 
China and the prices of all the one-year contract are all lower than USD 
200,000. '(Interviewee 9) Therefore, foreign programmes are the favourite of new 
television channels and become the most important factor in the rapid growth of 
television. 
3.2 CCTV. the Weakened Monopoly 
The influence of globalization tends to set up a new rule of 'fair play' in the Chinese 
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television industry after global television programs and formats enable cable television 
and provincial satellite television to challenge the monopoly of the CCTV. While CCTV 
is still the only national network in China (China Education is national TV but it is still 
fledgling), its channels are no longer the most popular in many areas. An audience survey 
in the three largest cities - Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou -- shows that the influence 
of the CCTV channels is fading. Its previous dominant position is being replaced by the 
local cable channels or the transnational channels. For instance, the cross-border channels 
from Hong Kong dominate the Guangdong television market, accounting for a total of 
54.4 per cent of audience share (Wu Lanzhu, 2003: 28). 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 demonstrate that CCTV has had a dramatic loss in audience share 
since the late 1990s. CCTV-I used to have the lion's share but it only gained 9.3 per cent 
in 2003. This loss of popularity among the audiences also leads to a fall in advertising 
income. Since 1998 the advertising revenue of CCTV began to drop (Zhongguo guangbo 
diansh! nianbao, 1992-1999). According to the data from CCTV-SUOFU Media 
(Yangshl-suqfu meitiyanjiu), there are 50 channels covering the national audience market, 
including 12 of CCTV, 2 of CETV, and 36 of provincial TV stations. Although CCTV is 
still dominant at the national level, where it has 68.3 per cent of the market share, its 
monopoly has been weakened at provincial level (Wang Lanzhu, 2003: 16-17). For 
instance, CCTV only had 20 per cent of the market share in Anhui province in 2002,32.3 
per cent in Beijing, 15.6 percent in Shanghai, and nearly zero in Guangzhou. By contrast, 
the provincial TV has consolidated its dominant position in the local market. Anhui TV 
has 73.6 per cent of the local audience, Beijing TV has 41.3 per cent, Shanghai TV has 
70.4 per cent. It is worth pointing out that Hong Kong's TV dominates the Guangdong 
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TV market (with a 54.4 per cent market share) over local TV (24.1 per cent) and CCTV 
(8.4 per cent) (Wang Lanzhu: 19-29). 
Table5.6 Most Watched Channels in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 
Rank Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 
1998 2002 
I BJ Cable I BTV-1 
2 CCTV-l BTV-2 
3 BTV-l BTV4 
4 CCTV-6 CCTV-l 
5 CCTV-5 CCTV-6 
6 CCTV-2 CCTV-5 
7 BTV-2 BTV-3 
8 BJ Cable 3 CCTV-8 
9 Hunan TV CCTV-3 
10 Phoenix CCTV-2 
1998 2002 1998 2002 
SOTV20 STV Drama HKTVB Jade HKTVB Jade 
STV8 STVNews HKATV HKATV 
Home Home 
SHCM SOTV News GZTV ZhujiangTV 
CCTV-I SOTV HKTVB Pearl GZTV 
Entertainment 
SHCS SHCS ZhujiangTV NF Movie 
SOTV33 CCTV-I CCTV-I HKTVB 
Pearl 
STV14 CCTV-6 GD Sports CCTV-5 
SC Music SH Fiancial Phoenix CCTV-I 
SC News SOTV Drama HKATV GD TV 
World 
SHC Drama STV Life NF Movie GDTV Sport 
Note: BTV' Beijing TV; SOTV' Shanghai Oriental TV; STV' Shanghai TV; HKTVB' Hong Kong Television 
Broadcasting Ltd.; IIKATV'Uong Kong Asia TV; GZTV' Guangzhou TV-, GDTV' Guangdong TV; NFrV' Nanfang 
TV. 
Source: Data for 1998: Ran Wei, 'China's television in the era of Marketization', Television in Contemporary Asia 
(New Delhi: Sage, 325-346), p. 328. 
Data for 2002: Wang Lanzhu (ed. ), 2003'Zhongguo dianshi nianbao2003 (Yearbook of China k TV in 2003 
Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press, 2003), pp. 25,28,3 1. 
Table 5.7 Leading Channels in China Ranked by Audience Share 
Channels Audience Share (per cent) 
CCTV-I 9.3 
Shandong Satellite 6.0 
CCTV-6 5.1 
Liaoning Satellite 3.1 
Guizhou Satellite 2.9 
Others 73.6 
Source: Access Asia Limited, 2003, quoted by FT, February 10 2004 
During the competition with other domestic and foreign TV companies, CCTV 
experienced self-demonopolization with economic logic from 2003, when it began 
moving quickly toward the programme-group system (Interviewee 7). The triple arms of 
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CCTV's backbone, party shows, drama, and news, have been partly privatised except for 
news and current affairs. In the drama sector, it selected four prominent producers and 
established four independent studios under its subsidiary company International TV Ltd.. 
The producers hold small stakes in the studios and they manage the whole chains in 
drama production. The goal of their productions is to gain the biggest profits from sales. 
CCTV also welcomes the participation of private and social institutions (Ling Ling 2004). 
It spun off production units and non-broadcasting departments, some of which may later 
be listed on overseas markets. CCTV's sports channel may be an early target for 
restructuring due to the popularity of its content and the fact that it is a straightforward 
business (Dickie and Guerrera, 2004: 22). This reform in fact allows private domestic and 
foreign companies to participate in the business of the state-owned media. Of course, 
CCTV still keeps control of key broadcasting operations and politically sensitive parts of 
the television business such as news and current affairs programming. 
4 THE MIX OF GOVERNMENTAL DELAY AND MARKET 
DETERMINATION: MEDIA CONGLOMERATION, CROSS-MEDIA 
CONCENTRATION, AND CROSS-PROVINCE INTEGRATION 
There are two major types of media concentration- vertical integration and 
horizontal concentration (Sterling, 2000). The former implies control of the ways of 
production, distribution, and exhibition; the latter stands for control of multiple outlets of 
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the same type and 'level', such as commercial television stations or local cable systems. 
The motivations for the Chinese government to promote the policies of media 
conglomeration are straightforward. At the economic level, large media firms are needed 
in order to ensure the most cost-effective possible use of resources because of the 
availability of economies of scale. Li Yuanjiang, former president of the Chinese first 
press conglomerate Guangzhou Daily Group, declared, 
'The most efficient way to boost circulation is to form a press group according 
to the practice of the international media. In the media sector, economies of scale 
occur when the total cost of production within one company is less than the sum 
of the costs of producing various goods in separate companies. Economies of 
scale occur if the average cost of producing one particular commodity is lower for 
firms with higher levels of output. If mergers and acquisitions lessen effective 
competition, the greater monopoly power can be exploited to increase profits.... 
After joining the WTO, international media giants will penetrate China with their 
powerful economic strength and mature managerial models. Thus, the Chinese 
media should focus on competition with the TNMCs. They should be developed 
following the global media trends. ' 3 
The economic logic has an effective impact on the media regulators. As Gillian 
Doyle argues, a claim emerges like this: 'if promoting cost-efficiency in the media 
industry is regarded as the dominant policy objective, then encouraging greater 
concentration of media ownership may be consistent with the public interest. '(Doyle, 
3 Quoted by Liang Ye and Zhang Bailing, 'Guangzhou baoye luxian he fang (WheTe does Guangzhou's NewspapeTS 
Go? )', at<httl2: H-www, cddc. neVshownews. asRLnewsid=2718 accessed on May 7,2004. 
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2002: 167) Unlike European regulatory systems, which keep a close eye on whether the 
media moguls with accumulation of media power would disrupt the diversity of public 
opinion, Chinese media authorities called for both kinds of media conglomeration in the 
face of international media giants. Li Tieying, former State Councillor in the 1990s, 
clearly advocated that China should strive to build up a batch of large media groups 
capable of entering the international market by combining their respective strengths (See 
Zhao, 2000: 3-22). The desire for media conglomerates can be presented in a provision of 
SAPP, 'Approval for the Establishment of Press Conglomerate in Guangzhou Daily'. It 
claims, 
'The rapid development of newspapers with more than 2000 titles 
stimulates fierce market competition under the establishment of a socialist market 
economic system. It is necessary to set up some socialist modem press 
conglomerates headed by the party's newspapers. '(Sun Yuanjun, 2002: 307) 
The same is the cause in the audiovisual sector. Xu Guangchun, Director of the 
SARFT, maintains: 
'There are about 2,300 broadcast TV stations at national, provincial, 
municipal and county levels in China. They are too weak because of a lack of 
industrial consolidation among them. This fragmentation handicaps the whole 
industry and the domestic players fail to compete with the TNMCs. Therefore, 
they need to join forces to become more competitive. Speeding up the process to 
establish large-scale radio, television and film groups would be the first task of 
the State's reform in these industries. '(Quoted by China Daily, Dec. 7,200 1, p2) 
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Since the experiment of the Guangzhou Daily Group in January 1996, there have 
been some common features in all media industries by 2004. The seventh study seminar 
by the CCP's Politburo in July 2003 produced key guidelines for media conglomeration. 
They include 1) Chinese media must become stronger and larger; 2) they can conduct 
cross-media operations in publication, newspaper, television, radio, printing, distribution, 
and so on, to establish some media giants; 3) they can operate across administrative 
boundaries; 4) they can absorb some social capital to accelerate media expansion 
(Interviewee 6). This consensus shows that the demand for forming conglomerates from 
domestic media players in the 1990s was finally met after market forces grew to 
substantial strength. An increase of cross-geography mergers in the media sector has 
taken place (Wang Jiangmin, 2003: 30-31). 
4.1 Guangzhou Daily Group 
The establishment of the Guangzhou Daily Group in January 1996 was a typical 
compromise between the state and the market. The demand for deregulation of media 
concentration became a main theme of media reforms in the mid-1990s. But the SAPP 
crushed the bottom-up demands. Under the pressure from media civil society discussed in 
Chapter Three, the SAPP officially allowed Guangzhou Daily to experiment with press 
conglomeration. According to an insider, there are two factors determining the final 
approval of press conglomeration: economic strength and party paper. The Guangzhou 
Dai ly Group met all preconditions (Chao Peng, 1999: 109-138). It is under the 
supervision of the Guangzhou Municipal Communist Party Committee and it was among 
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the top ten newspapers in terms of advertising revenue during the 1990s. The circulation 
of Guangzhou Daily in 1996 was 610,000 and its advertising revenue was 530 million 
Yuan (49 million US dollars), much more than the key national party papers, such as the 
Peopleý Daily (80 million Yuan, 10 million US dollars), Economic Daily (70 million 
Yuan, 8.8 million US dollars), and Guangming Daily (30 million Yuan, 3.5 million US 
dollars). It also had six papers and one periodical, with total revenue of 1.2 billion Yuan 
(150 million US dollars), 15 times the revenue of People ý Daily (9.9 million US dollars) 
(Sun Yuanjun, 2002: 307-8). In 2003, Guangzhou Daily became the third biggest tax 
payer in Guangzhou, accounting for 200 million Yuan (25 million US dollars) 
(Interviewee 29). The creation of this press conglomerate was also attributed to the 
governmental arrangement. In order to reduce the risk of the trial press reform, the SAPP 
deliberately chose a local party-paper, rather than a national one. In this case, the party 
and the government were the decisive driving forces to create press groups, rather than 
the market itself. 
However, the increasing market force and the influence of TNMCs cannot be 
neglected for the creation of Guangzhou Daily Group. On the one hand, its heads often 
visited the foreign press groups. These eye-opening activities resulted in the awareness of 
media managerial and operative models. On the other hand, with the dramatic growth in 
terms of circulation and revenue, the domestic players have to adjust their developmental 
strategies in the face of fierce market competition. In the case of the Guangzhou Daily 
Group, the TNMCs have a certain degree of influence in this creation. What Li Yuanjiang 
and other media players demand is the allowance for more management freedom and 
independent editorials. In this sense, the market injects some flesh blood and muscle into 
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the dying party organs. The Guangzhou Daily Group also learned a lot on journalism 
from the TNMC papers. When official party papers still carry eight to 12 pages daily 
being sent in batches to state agencies, hotels, and factories, the Guangzhou Daily is full 
of advertising, running to 40 pages on weekdays and up to 70 pages at weekends. At the 
practical level, media integration provides considerable freedom for media players to 
operate according to their interests, rather than the propagandists. The Guangzhou Daily 
hired 10 professors in 2001 from journalism programmes at universities in Denver and 
Missouri, to conduct training sessions for its editorial staff. An interviewee in the group 
maintains, 'we were printing propaganda in the early 1990s, but have been trying to 
provide the general readers with what they want. '(Interviewee 29) 
After the success of Guangzhou Daily Group, the government issued documents 
relevant to media financing, overseas cooperation and trans-media development, in order 
to carry out reforms and establish large media groups (Xinhua News, Nov. 6,2002). The 
SAPP approved a grand plan in February 1998. According to 'The Developmental Plan of 
Press and Publication in 2000 and 2001', newspaper mergers are encouraged between 
the party newspapers; by 2000, the number of press conglomerates was intended to 
increase to 5 or 10; by 2010, the number of press conglomerates with revenue over 100 
million Yuan (12 million US dollars) should account for 10 per cent of the total number 
of newspapers. By August 2003, there were 39 press conglomerates in China, including 
the Guangming Daily Group, the Southern Daily Group (Nanfang Daily group), the 
Yangcheng Evening Post Group, and the Economic Daily Group. All have a series of 
secondary publications, realizing the benefits of sharing resources and operations on a 
large scale (Chao Peng, 1999; Sun Yuangjun, 2002). 
201 
Chapter Five De-Monopolization and Privatization: Restructuring the Media Industry in China 
4.2 China Radio, Film and Television Group (CRFTG) 
The SARFT encourages media outlets to increase 'horizontal' diversity (more 
choice at the same time) and 'vertical diversity' ('the overall range of content') (Zhao, 
1998). Table 5 illustrates the fragmentation in the broadcasting and television industry. It 
makes the regulators nervous when it comes to competition with TNMCs (Meng Ban, 
2003: 223-232). On December 4,2002, Xu Guangchun, Director of SARFT, argued, 
'[China] should cultivate several media groups with economic strength, market 
competitiveness, and promising potential. With the development of media 
conglomeration, there will be a new framework of national broadcasting television being 
established within several years. Nowadays, the municipal media groups and radio 
stations, television stations, and network companies at the municipal level are encouraged 
to merge with the groups at the provincial level. We should transform the governmental 
functions of broadcasting institutions at municipal and country levels, creating more 
opportunities for media acquisitions at the provincial level in order to establish more 
audiovisual groups. 4 
4 see the official website of the SARFT, at <http: //www. sarft. jzov. cn/manage/ýublishfile/10/812. html>, accessed on 
April 24 2004 
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Table 5.8 Television institutions and channels in China 
Year TV Stations Broadcasting Institution 
(above county level) 
TV Channels 
2002 358 1412 2080 
2001 357 1289 2194 
2000 354 1446 1206 
1999 352 1562 1108 
1998 347 1304 1065 
1997 923 2055 1032 
1996 880 983 
Source: Wu Keyu, Television Economics (Dianshl meftijingfixue), (Beijing: Huaxia Publishing 
House, 2004), p. 123 
A state-owned audiovisual group, the China Radio, Film and Television Group 
(CRFTG), was launched on December 7,2001, bringing together the country's top 
broadcasting, film and TV enterprises in a bid to meet greater competition. The new 
media giant puts together the country's flagship TV channel - China Central Television, 
two state radio stations -- China National Radio (CNR) and China Radio International 
(CRI) and some state film and network organs. It has total fixed assets of 21.4 billion 
Yuan (US$2.6 billion), it expects annual revenues to exceed 11 billion Yuan (US$1.3 
billion), and its employees to reach more than 20,000. Interviewees point out that this 
merger, ratified by the central government, is a key step forward for the country's state 
media to survive in the international competition. It aims to provide better service to its 
'billions of audience' and to let 'the voice of China' be more widely heard throughout the 
world. This reform is also 'to explore the chain of the cinema system, to break regional 
barriers and unreasonable market monopolies, and to establish a framework of multiple 
distribution channels. '(Interviewee 7) 
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Before the emergence of the national 'flagship', there had already been four such 
radio-TV groups in Mainland China. By late 2002, there were 12 broadcasting and 
television groups. They are China Broadcasting and Television Group and Broadcasting 
and Television Group of Hunan, Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, 
Sichuan, Fujian, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Nanjing, and Changsha. In the film sector, there 
are five groups, including China Film Group and the Film Group of Shanghai, 
Changchun, Xibu, and Xiaoxian. 5 The reform provides more opportunities for increasing 
participants in the marketplace. In late 2003, the state-owned China Film Group (CFG), 
established inl999, was selected to be a cultural enterprise to be partly privatised as an 
experiment. In late 2003, it signed an agreement with Jiahe Group, a Hong Kong based 
audio-visual producer, cooperating with its overseas distribution and exhibition network. 
The deal was an effort to try erasing China's embarrassment at having only I million 
Yuan (12,000 US dollars) in film exports. The cooperation with Time Warner, Sony, 
Kadoka, and CDM in 2004 even covered the whole process of production, distribution, 
exhibition, rent of equipment, and production base. In addition, it also allied with private 
studios, which invested 150 million Yuan in movie production, 75% of the total in 2003 
(Qiu Hongiie, 2004). This transformation of corporation governance resulted in an 
obvious outcome, in that 50 movies were produced in 2003, half of them by Chinese film 
producers. It also generated increasing revenues amounting to 200 million Yuan (25 
million US dollars) in 2003. Mobile, directed by Feng Xiaogang, generated 50 million 
yuan (6.4 million US dollars) box office revenue nationwide, the same as Harry Potter in 
China (Qiu Hongjie, 2004). 
3 Sources are from the official website of SARFT, at <httv: //www. sarft. jzov. cn/manap, U/ublishfile/10/812. htm> 
accessed on April 24,2004. 
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4.3 Cross-province Integration 
The Chinese media, because of their small size, could be easily destroyed or 
swallowed up by foreign media giants. In order to avoid this, Chinese media are uniting 
and expanding their size before the arrival of international counterparts. The prohibition 
against cross-regional mergers and acquisitions was lifted in the early 2000s. An 
interviewee states: 
'The establishment of several vigorous publishing corporations was a 
turning point. The media industry was urged to activate their capital and achieve 
openness and union. The experimental units of those corporations must make 
some breakthrough in their cross-regional and cross-media operation, and they 
should also improve their competitiveness in the market. '(Interviewee 30) 
Along with the foundation of a few newspaper groups, several Chinese 
cross-regional and cross-media corporations are emerging. Horizontal concentration is 
the first step in this move. The Southern Daily Group started the preliminary operation in 
2001. In cooperation with an IT firm Qingniao, its popular tabloid, the Southern 
Metropolis Papers (Nanfang Dushibao), merged with a paper under the People ý Daily in 
2001. Borrowing the operative model from Nanfang and capital from Qingliao, the 
renewed Beying Times (Jinghua shibao) has become one of the four most popular 
tabloids in the capital city. In November 2003, the Southem Metropolis News acquired 
Life Times (shenghuo shibao), a subsidiary of Guangming Daily, and renamed it as New 
Capital Paper (Xinjingbao). After changing its editorial style from popular to quality, the 
205 
Chapter Five De-Monopolization and Privatization: Restructuring the Media Industry in China 
New Capital Paper has become an elite paper in Beijing, taking the place of the 
Guangming Daily, People ý Daily, and Economy Daily. Beyond establishing local papers, 
the Southern Daily Group attempted to establish new nationwide papers, though the 
authorities often frown on its aggressive expansionism. After dominating in the weekly 
newspaper market with the Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), several key staff 
members split off and set up a new economic paper, 21st Century Economy Herald in 
early 2001. This elite paper was a weekly after its debut and soon became a 
two-issue-weekly to meet the market demands. The success stimulated bolder expansion. 
It spun off the 21st Century Global Herald in late 2002, though it was purged in March 
2003 because of its political challenge to the ruling CCP (this event will be further 
discussed in Chapter Six). In July 2003, it cooperated with Renguang Media Group in 
Shanghai, and launched a quality daily, Oriental Morning Post (Dong/ang Zhaobao). 
However, it withdrew in later 2003 because of intervention from Shanghai's government. 
The other media also have ambitions to expand their scope and scale across 
administrative and geographic boundaries. Oriental Outlook, a news weekly launched in 
August 2003, is an arm of Xinhua News Agency. But its headquarters are located at 
Shanghai, rather than Beijing, where its parent organization is headquartered. According 
to insiders, the reason for choosing Shanghai as its headquarters was straightforward: 
'The local media authorities could not regulate it effectively, although they are 
dissatisfied with our liberal, independent editorial style, which is completely 
different from the traditional Xinhua mouthpiece style. For instance, we selected 
Taiwan's issues as the cover story in the third issue in 2003 and put up Chen 
Shuibian as a cover person. It is a bold trial that the Chinese media have never 
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experienced. The Shanghai propaganda authorities are angry with us. However, 
they have no effective measures to regulate us, because we belong to Beijing's 
Xinhua News Agency. '(Interviewee 3) 
In this perspective, cross-provincial integration in the name of strengthening 
domestic media units empowers the Chinese media to enjoy more liberal operations. The 
more market power they have, the more press freedom they may claim. Some media 
outlets within the cross-regional and cross-media integration, for instance, the Beying 
271mes (Jinghua Shibao), enjoy limited editorial and financial independence. It makes it 
difficult for local propagandists to supervise such media due to the lack of regulatory 
systems. 
The same as in the newspaper and publication sectors, the climate of the television 
industry in 2003 improved and local satellite television began to operate on a 
cross-provincial basis (Shi Yan, 2003; Ma Li, 2003). As Director of Guizhou TV Station 
Li Xinmin asserts, 'it is a new trend of China's television industry. '( Li Xinmin, 2003: 146) 
On October 23,2003, Shanghai Oriental Satellite TV made its debut with the English 
named 'Dragon TV', which presents its ambition to establish 'a worldwide Chinese 
television channel'. Oriental Satellite TV covers the whole Chinese market, taking the 
monopoly CCTV as its major rival. Meanwhile, Hunan Satellite TV was renamed 
'Chinese Hunan Satellite TV' with the intention to win a nationwide market beyond the 
provincial boundary. It has gained access to 329 cities with a high reception ratio of 
99-1% (Yin and Li, 2004: 1). 
Cross-media operations or media convergence is an intention that the media 
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practitioners attempt to expand their market power and the regulators expect to create 
strong media units against the TNMCs. Some media players argue that, 
'in the face of the competition with international film and television, the 
reforms of China's film and television should boldly restructure media groups and 
transform the whole media system in production, distribution and promotion. The 
convergence between print, television, and film will benefit each other. '(Xu 
Guangchun, 2000: 440) 
According to a survey by the Beijing Broadcasting Institute in 2000,65 per cent of 
the presidents of provincial television agree with horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
across geographic areas; 53.6 per cent of them agree with cross-media expansion within 
the same location; and 66.1 per cent of them agree with cross-media and cross-areas 
expansion. Only 11.9 per cent are against it (Wang and Zhou, 2003: 25). After its 
establishment in 2001, the China Broadcasting Television Group became a cross-media 
conglomerate owning television stations, radio stations, publishing houses, newspapers, 
and magazines. It is worth pointing out that the toleration of cross-regional and 
cross-media operations depends on the local social-political climate. Under the 
supervision of some liberal local governments such as Guangdong Province, the media 
have more freedom in accordance with the rules of the market economy. But in other 
conservative areas, local governments are still the decisive factor determining the ways 
the media operate and even the editorial styles. 
The vertical integration provides more space for political liberation, though all of 
them seem to pursue cautious economic market reforms. The vertical integration between 
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various media organizations provides more space for political liberation, though all of 
them seem to pursue cautious economic market reforms. It can be seen as an cffort from 
below to affect institutional arrangcments, as some claim. 
hlcdia conglomeration concentrates media owncrship. It is often conducted through 
internal growth, mergers and takeovers. The main bcncrits for firms to expand their size 
arc to increase cfficiency and market po%%, cr, to rc-usc the same product in a different 
form and spread production costs across a wider product and markets, to diversify their 
interests, and to dilute their risks. llo%%, cvcr, media conglomeration in China has rich 
implications beyond media economics. It is a mix of party logic, economic logic, and 
media logic. The party have learned a lesson from the student movement in 1989, and 
hastened to modcrnisc its media operations through high-tech and organizational 
expansion to better compete with the Westerri TNNICs. Media conglomeration has been 
justificd under the international competition and the pressure from globalization. %Vith the 
abandonment of low-budgct propaganda, the party tries to increase the capitalization of 
its mass media to 'ensure widcr circulation, higher production values, faster delivery, and 
better packaging of content' (Zhao, 2000: 17). It is a kind or Party Inc., which enables the 
party and the government to take easier control of the media industry (I luang, 1994). The 
organizational transformation of the mass media from commercialization to 
conglomeration is a transition within the orbit of the one Party state (Zhao, 2000). The 
regulators like SAR17 played the role of administrator before media rcrorms but they 
tried to act as practitioners during the creation of media conglomerates. Tlicy arc not only 
the rcfercc but also playcrs who step on to the playing ficld for the sake of IcSitimising 
their monopolies (Wang and Zhou, 2003: 25). If the media industry gains stronger 
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independence from the government politically, it will intuitively seek greater interest 
according to modem economic and media logic. 
5 OWNERSHIP OF THE AIULTI-STRUCTURED AND 
AIULTI-TIERED MASS MEDIA IN CHINA 
Somc scholars classiry Chime mcdia into two t)pcs: commcrcialised mcdia and 
non-commcrcialiscd (Yu Guoming, 2002: 2). Some categorize them as the organ media, 
uno(Ticial innucntial media, and pop media (%Vhitc, 1990: 88-110). Ilesc classifications 
are straight forward, but they arc ambiguous due to the fact that all media including the 
Peoplek Daily have more or less commcrcialiscd revenues from advertising or other 
operations. It is necessary to reclassify the media t)pcs. According to the divcrsification 
of media o%%mcrship, there arc four categories of media outlets. 17licy arc transitional 
state-owned media, public-o%%mcd media, privatc-o%vned indcpcndcnt media, and 
forcign-o%%mcd media. Although the Party has not allowed any independent media, 
Chinese media systcms became multi-structurcd and multi-ticrcd in the new century. It 
can be called 'one body, many heads', in which the government still claims all media arc 
statc-o%kmcd but media o%%mcrship has become divcrsificd. 
5.1 Parly Media In Transition 
The transformation or the state-owned media was and still is the main theme in 
Chinese media politics. The unchangeable transitional direction is to transform from a 
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complete propaganda instrument under the planned economic systcm, into 
markct-oricntcd media with limited financial and political independence. During the 
period from 1992 to 2004, Chinese state-owned media experienced three pcriods of 
transformation, which are commercialization, conglomeration, and convergence. 
Some new trends in media commercialization have appeared since the 1990s. First, 
media revenues became diverse, replacing the previous model of sole governmental 
subsidies. Now revenues can be generated out of advertising, inrormation provision, 
printing, and so on. There arc more than 20 media groups %%hose advertising incomes 
were over 100 million Yuan (12 million US dollars) in the latter part of the 1990s. Second, 
the media content became more appealing to the masses. From the mass appeal-driven 
'weekend sector' in newspapers and the dancing-and-singing panics on TV screens in the 
early 1990s to the blooming metropolitan papers and game shows on TV screens in the 
late 1990s, the state-owned media changed their editorial direction from boring, simple 
propaganda messages to relaxing, entertaining, and informative content. Third, the 
content providcrs arc from multi-channcls. Media content does not only depend on 
state-owned units but also on other units including private media and TNNICs. Fourth, 
the distribution nctwork became diverse. Even the Peoplek Daily had to seek more 
circulation on the streets from May 2004. 
Conglomeration and convergence arc results of the new administrative institutional 
arrangement and the self-improvement of party media players for the sake of reallocating 
media resources. For instance, the Shanghai Broadcasting Bureau became the first 
institution in June 1997 to manage the entire state-owned media outlets in Shanghai's 
audiovisual sector. It was transformed into a media conglomerate, the *nViangAtedid 
211 
Chaptcf Five DcAlonqmlization and Privatization: Restructuring the Nfedis Industry in China 
Group, consisting of several television broadcasting stations and a few print outlets. With 
the institutional arrangement, the statc-o%%mcd media have the majority of the market 
share. In the television sector, CCTV owns 40 per cent of total television advertising. In 
the newspaper sector, the top ten state-owned newspapers o%vn 42.15 per cent of 
newspaper advertising in 1999, which is 470 million Yuan (58 million US dollars), and 
the top 33 account for 71.48 per cent or advertising revenues (Yu Guoming, 2001: 13). 
Ilic domination of stitc-o%%mcd media is attributed to institutional arrangements. The 
government's measures aim to retain its economic strength and ideological hegemony. As 
some local television stations arc unwilling to rebroadcast CCTV's programming, they 
insert their own advertising in bct%%-ccn the CCTV programmes. 'Me CPD and the SARFT 
then endorsed a few documentaries and ordered the local stations to rebroadcast CCTVs 
programming and advertising without any preconditions (December 1993, August 1995, 
June 1996, and July 1998) (Qian Wei, 2002: 175). In this perspective, the media reforms 
arc dominated by the party (Zhao, 2000), or restructured as 'Party Inc'. As table 5. 
shows, in terms of political importance for CPD and CCP, the most influential media in 
China arc still state-owncd (intcrvicwcc I and 2). The statc-o%%mcd media firms have 
achieved more positive productivity in terms of technical performance. The growth in 
capital, labour, and other productivity elements has been positive, at least according to 
some estimation. But their financial performance is poor. While many institutional 
impediments constrain the growth of private media firms, the cffcctivcncss of Chinese 
state-owned nlcdi3 is also abnormally low, leading to much loss of market share after the 
late 1990S. 
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Table5.9 Alost Influential Slate-owned National bledia In China 
Nledis Ownership 
cm, SARFT 
PfOpIs ý Dady CPC 
ffinhua Kirws. 4sency The State Council 
ECOM)MY Wily Pie State Council 
Olushl Abga: Inf CPC 
M Cintral Peopk I Wio SARFT 
If iWer k Daity ACFTU 
)'omth Daily CCYL 
Liberation Army Daily CCPC 
Note: The inlerviewecs In the CPD took 'political importance' for the CCP and CPD to 
measure mwia innucnce ortiv stai"%%wd national media. 
Source: Interviewce I and 2. Zhou Wel led. L Aleirl Qianyan Sapgoo (M Frontier Report 
ofChina) Aledia Wustry) (IlcijinS: Guangmint Daily Press. 2002L p5. 
ncrc arc some fresh debates on the Party media in the early 2000s. In the academic 
field, some suggest that only the Party media arc necessary to propagate Party policies, 
and other media should be allowed to report and comment independently within the 
boundaries or the law (Sun Xupci, 1998). Some argue that together with the People k 
Daily there could be one party-papcr at the provincial level and the others could be 
completely commcrcialiscd (Interviewec 51). For the regulators, although it is widely 
recognized that the party should tightly control all media, an impressive objective 
emerges in the third press reform in 2003. The central government plans to end its direct 
financial support to, and mandatory subscription requirement or, all but three ncwspapcrs 
and two journals. ne government will continue funding the People's Daily, official 
newspaper of the Party's central committee, and the committee's journal, Qiushl. Each 
provincial Party committee can continue operating one nc%%, spapcr and one journal. Each 
municipal Party committee will be allowed to operate one newspaper. County-level 
governments and Party committees will not be allowed to opcratc publications. 
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Government departments will be punished if they are discovered trying to force people to 
subscribe to newspapers under their control. Ile implementation of the detailed rules 
caused more than 387 newspapers to be shut down in late 2003 (China Daily, Aug. 5,2003, 
p4). The authority in Ilunan Province of Central China closed 56 unprofitable 
newspapers and magazines (China Daily, Aug. 5,2003, p. 4). Of course, resistance by some 
media outlets - especially heavily subsidized publications - impeded the reform. A young 
official suggests: 
'%N'c should consider the possibility that the party only o%kms the People ý Daily, 
in which all party and government policies are promulgated. It could be 
non-commcrcialiscd. It could be funded by full subsidy and it could even be given 
away. If the local governments or other institutions want to know our policies, the 
People ý Dail), should satisfy them. Without any mediators, the party and government 
policies can be cffectively diffused from top-to-bottom. It can save a lot of subsidies, 
reduce the %%holc administrative cost, and increase administrative 
transparcncy. '(Intcrvic%%-cc 1) 
5.2 Public I%Icdla 
After the closure of the Ilbrid Economic Herald in spring of 1989 by the 
Shanghai Party Committee. the Chinese scmi-official press kept silent for several years. 6 
1 lo%vcvcr, the calls for further reforms and more openness in 1992 stimulated a wave of 
establishing scmi-official media, including specialized newspapers outside the party 
departments at different levels. Beyond that, the amazing thing is that some media 
6 Ile semi-*Mcial press Is " pqvn %hich am not controlled dirwly by the party's Organs. Ilwy can enjoy more freedom In terms of editorial and management operations. 
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corporations have been listed on the stock markets in recent years. According to a survey 
of the key members of national television stations conducted by Dr. Lu Di, more than half 
of respondents (54.7%) suggest that television stations could be 'public-owned' 
(gufenzhi), only 23.8% of respondents like 'state-run' Cgongying), 19% of respondents 
favour 'commercial television', and 4.76% suggest 'privatization' (siying) (Lu Di, 
1999: 85). Table 5.9 demonstrated some of the most influential public media in China in 
terms of subscription and advertising revenue. 
In practice, by allying with financial institutions, some state-owned media 
organizations become public media corporations. It was in 2001 that the State 
Commission of Securities enacted a prospectus for investment, regarding the mass media 
as its main potential listed industry. Before that, there were some experiments. Shanghai 
Pearl Limited Company (Shanghai mingzhu), was established and listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Market in August 1992. The first listed media company sold 40 million shares to 
the public and collected 204 million Yuan (25 million US dollars). It has its independent 
institution, independent management, and economic autonomy. The listed media 
launched Shanghai Oriental Radio Station in October and Shanghai Oriental Television in 
the following spring. Its Oriental Radio soon became the most popular station in the 
Shanghai area with fresh programming formats such as phone-ins, creating some kind of 
public sphere (Interviewee 31; Zhao, 1998: chap. 4). Following Shanghai Pearl Ltd., the 
CCTV spun off one of its programming production companies, Zhongshi Media, which 
was listed on the Shanghai Stock Market on June 16,1996. A big step was taken on 
March 25,1999, when Dianguang Media Ltd. was listed on Shenzhen Stock Market. It 
was the first public corporation that engages in the whole media chain of programme 
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production, distribution, promotion, and advertising with television stations, newspapers, 
and magazines. It was said that Dianguang was permitted to be listed on the stock market 
by Premier Zhu Rongji (Interviewee 33). In 2002, Dianguang signed a contract with 
Murdoch's News Corp to establish a strategic international alliance. 
Moreover, together with nearly 20 listed companies involved in cable television 
(Caying Shibao, March, 15,2003, p. 5), the newspaper sector has become an attractive 
field for listed companies since 200 1. Cooperating with The People ý Daily, the flagship 
of the CCP, a commercial company based in Beijing, Beidaqingniao, invested 50 million 
Yuan (6 million US dollars) to establish a newspaper, Beying T"mes. Meanwhile, Sanlian, 
a retailing giant in Shandong Province forged a financial newspaper, Y77e Economic 
Observer, allying with an existing newspaper at a cost of 5 million US dollars. Together 
with the Southern Daily Group, Fuxing, a listed high-tech corporation in Shanghai Stock 
Market, invested nearly 150 million Yuan (19 million US dollars) to establish the 21' 
Century Economic Herald in 2001 (Interviewee 27). Both the Economic Observer and 
21s' Century Economic Herald became well-known elite papers. According to the 
governmental arrangements, some media groups, such as Xinhua Book Store, are 
expected to be listed on stock markets (Zhou Weihua, 2004: 15-16). Some of them even 
have been and continue to be listed on oversees markets. For instance, Beying Media, 
based on Beying Youth Daily, was listed on Hong Kong Stock Market in December 2004. 
216 
Chapter Five De-Monopolization and Privatization: Restructuring the Media Industry in China 
Table5.10 Most Influent Public Media in China 
Media Corporation Ownership Media outlets Annual Annual 
revenue in revenue in 
2004 (RMB, 2003 
million) (RMB, 
million) 
Beidaqingniao, List on Shanghai Stock Beijing Times 2,425 3,154 
Market 
Fuxing Listed on Shanghai 21" Century 2,291 1,782 
Stock Market Economic Herald 
Sanlian Listed on Shanghai The Economic 1,186 747 
Stock Market Observer, 
Shanghai Pearl listed on the Shanghai Oriental TV, 1,089 780 
Limited Company Stock Market Oriental Radio 
Dianguang Media Listed on Shenzhen Hunan Sallite TV, 987 968 
Ltd. Stock Market. Hunan Economic 
TV 
Beiqing Media Listed on HK Stock Beying Youth 790 720 
Market Daily; First 
Financial Daily 
Gehua Cable Listed on Shanghai Beying Cable 722 669 
Stock Market Television; TPTV 
Borui Listed on Shanghai Chendu Business 398 346 
Communication Stock Market Paper; IPTV 
Zhongshi Media listed on the Shanghai Programmes 359 310 
Stock Market provider for the 
CCTV, 
Advertising 
agency 
Source: Corporation Annual Report posed at various companies' official websites. 
Although the state owns the majority (no less than 51 per cent) of the company 
shares, the listed media at least moved the first step toward media privatization according 
to Company Law. Private property is protected by the new Constitution in 2004. Yu 
Guorning, a scholar in the People's University, argues that the decision to turn 
newspapers and magazines into businesses means the law will recognize capital invested 
in the media (2004: 69-74). Accordingly, the state is not the only owner of media 
companies. Any non-state investor can partly own these companies via the stock markets. 
Document No. 17 issued in 2001 lifted the previous restrictions on media investment, 
though foreign and private investment is excluded from media content production. The 
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powerful financial institutions that were aligned behind the profitable press industry 
introduced a new dynamism into China's media sector. The stable investment by large 
commercial companies helped to offset the fact that media revenues were notoriously 
vulnerable to the periodic ups and downs of the advertising market. The financial 
independence provides preconditions for independent journalists. They enjoy an unusual 
degree of autonomy compared to other party media, enjoying freedom to recruit a group 
of young, well-educated, experienced, dedicated, and reform-minded media workers. As 
some commentators point out, the proportion of shares held by domestic individual 
shareholders and large institutional investors is negatively related to the party's level of 
decision-making power (Wong et al, 2004: 29-66). Moreover, the influx of capital brings 
about more commercial resources and brand new management concepts to the media, 
giving the whole media industry, a great impetus. 
5.3 Independent Media 
Caying, a business magazine based in Beijing, was launched in April 1998. It 
monthly distributed 80,000 copies nationwide from 2001. It is owned and published by 
the Beijing-based Stock Exchange Executive Council, which was set up by a group of 
private investors despite its official name. Adhering to the principle of 'Independent 
Standpoint, Exclusive Coverage and Unique Perspective', Caying has become an 
authoritative title delivering thorough and in-depth analysis on China's current economic 
issues and events, uncovering rarely known facts that the official media never discovered. 
Many of its articles have a profound impact on China's economic reforms. Its cover 
stories are usually unique, authoritative, sophisticated and detailed stories or analysis of 
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the hottest topics or people of the time. For its professional excellence in journalism, 
especially for its bravery and objectivity, Caying's editor-in-chief, Hu Shuli, was named 
as one of the Stars of Asia by Business in July 200 1. She states: 
'In this country, all media are guided by the government in one way or 
another. But we have no direct or indirect relations with the government.... With 
the rationalization of independent intellectuals, Caying attempts to pose 
influences on political institutional choices with media logic. It may be said that 
China could not establish a good market-oriented economy, but we try our best to 
objectively record the difficult national transition. ' (Interviewee 35) 
Table 5.11 Most Influential Independent Media in China 
Media Corporation Ownersbip Media Outlet Annual revenue in 2003 
Xlngmel Media 
Guangxian 
Communication 
Zhongxin Culture 
(RMB, million) 
Qin Hui Movie, TV programme, 320 
Entertainment 
Wang TV programme producer and 205 
Changtian provider for 200 channels 
Li Bolun Movie, cinema, Travel TV 203 
Oriental Chtwen MaZhongjun, Film, drama, television 200 
(dongfang chiwen), Tie Fo, and Hu programmes, audiovisual 
Ximin distribution 
Hai Ren Liu Yanming Film, drama, advertising 190 
Dragon International Lu Xingdong Viacom programme 150 
distributor; programme 
producer and provider for 100 
channels 
Modern Media Group Shao Zhong Modern Weekly, The Outlook 102 
Magazine, City Magazine 
Source: Beying Entertainment Paper, May 17,2004, p. 2; Interviewee 8; Corporation Annual Report of 
posed at their official websites. 
Like Caying, some new elite newspapers and magazines such as the Southern 
Weekend, 21st Century Economic Herald, the Economic Observer, New Capital Post, 
Oriental Morning Post, and oriental Outlook; have a strong and clear brief to be 
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independent media. With freedom granted by the authorities, their in-depth reporting is 
about business, social issues, and maladministration at a low level, rather than politics or 
international relations or human rights. 
The market forces have become so strong that the government could not retain the 
initial regulations blocking the independent media (Table 5.11). In recent years, private 
investment rushed into film, television programming, advertising agencies, cable 
networks, publication, and periodicals (Song and Zhou, 2003). The number of audio 
studios outside television stations in 2001 reached I 100. Two-thirds of them produce TV 
drama and the rest produce feature programming. 43 per cent of these so-called social 
studios are invested in by private individuals. 26 per cent of them are owned by public 
companies, 15 per cent of them belong to state-owned units, and foreigners own 6 per 
cent. In 2001, they provided 21.6 per cent of the whole programming in China, including 
soap operas, drama, entertainment, financial information, life style and fashion (Wu Keyu, 
2004: 118). In other words, the independent audio studios win a large share of television 
programming production. Some of them, such as 'Guangxian Communication', 'Dragon 
International' and 'Zhongxin Culture', have great market strength equal to 
medium-sized state-owned media institutions (Xie Jiu, 2003: 28-31). Guangxian 
Communication, for instance, has daily three-hours production, nationally feeding 230 
TV stations. Its advertising revenue in 2002 was more than 100 million Yuan (12 million 
7 US dollars). In 2003, the most successful feature films were produced by Chinese 
private companies. For instance, New Image (xinhuamian)'s Hero had box office-revenue 
of 250 million yuan (30 million US Dollars), accounting for 25 per cent of the whole box 
7 see official website of Guangxian Communication, at< http: //www. a. com. cn/cn/rcxx/gvzpZ200204/020408zl2Ol. htm. >. 
accessed on Jan. 23 2003. 
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office-revenue in Chinese cinema (Cui Li, 2003: 70). Private companies become dynamic 
agents to introduce TNMCs into China's media market. Dragon International is the 
biggest agent of Viacom with 100 television clients nationwide. In September 2003, the 
SARFT offered licences to 8 private audio-video studios, allowing them to produce 
television drama. The vice president of SARFT explained that it was a landmark in 
China's media industry because it was the first time that the government allowed 
non-state-owned studios to take part in 'mainstream' media production (People ý Daily, 
Feb. 9,2004, p. 5). The purpose of this institutional arrangement is to create more market 
competition and help restructure the outdated media systems. The governmental decision 
to separate programming, broadcasting and distribution networks from the late 1990s, 
provides more opportunities for the independent media and private investors. If the 
private sector moves legally into all media fields, the state-owned units may not be 
capable of competing with them. In operation, the private sector has begun to consolidate 
their strength via conglomeration. In May 2003, three private media companies in Beijing 
merged into a media group. The new company, Oriental Chiwen (dong/ang chiwen), has 
more than 10 studios with annual revenues of 200 million Yuan (25 million US dollars). 
Its business covers film, drama, television programmes, audiovisual distribution, 
entertainment, and advertising (Beying Entertainment Paper, May 17,2004, p. 2). The 
merger, combining a group of experts in media production, distribution, and promotion, 
poses heavy pressures on the state-owned companies in the same sector. After a long 
negotiation between the private sector and the regulatory authorities, local private 
companies were finally allowed to develop pay-channels jointly with state-owned 
companies. It is a reform aimed at helping attract investment needed to fund China's 
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ambitious plans for the expansion of pay- television and digital TV services. An 
interviewee worried that, 'If state-owned media enterprises cannot perform well in the 
marketplace and there is no viable domestic private sector, the media industries will by 
default become mostly foreign-owned. '(Interviewee 8) Therefore, the media authorities 
expect that a dramatic increase of television business in the private sector would raise the 
quality and quantity of the content produced for the local market. 
5.4 Foreign Media 
The WTO entry poses a heavy impact on the future of the Chinese media industry. 
The institutional arrangements have made and continue to provide more opportunities for 
TNMCs in China (Zeng Huaguo, 2004). To some degree, they have already become 
involved in the business of direct satellite television, television programme, publication, 
periodicals, film, and so on (Wang Yibao, 2003: 84-86; Shi Yan, 2003: 32). Table 5.11 
demonstrates some of the most influential foreign media in China in terms of their 
popularity in the Chinese media domain. By early 2004, there were three models for 
foreign media to filter into the Chinese market. They are: direct broadcasting, cooperation 
with domestic television channels, and selling programmes to domestic TV and hotels. 
The first model, of course, is the priority for all TNMCs, but it is strictly regulated. Until 
now, there are no foreign-owned channels directly broadcasting in China except STAR 
and CETV. The second model is structural alliance. After a year-long negotiation, News 
Corp. made a deal with Hunan Broadcasting and Television Group on December 19,2002, 
to build up a strategic alliance for cooperating in programme production. The latest 
model is the sale of television programmes. In short, the increasing number of export 
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films from 20 to 50, permission for foreign investment in cinema, programming 
production, media sales, and so on, and the permission for 31 foreign satellite channels 
(discussed in Chapter 3) in limited locations demonstrates the trend that foreign media 
would increase their strength. Meanwhile, TNMCs are allowed to control a majority of 
shares of cinema joint ventures. For instance, Warner got permission to invest ten 
cinemas in China (Shi Yan, 2003: 32. ). From 2004, China relaxed the ban on inflows of 
overseas capital into the country's shares as the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
scheme (QFII), whereby licences are given to some international investment banks like 
Merrill Lynch. Accordingly, overseas institutions can invest their own funds and their 
clients' funds in China's A-shares, including listed media companies (Guerrera, 2004: 30). 
The TNMCs accumulate powerful market strength in some media fields. As Chapter 
Four has mentioned, Computer World, an information technology newspaper under the 
joint company of American-based International Digital Group (IDG), was the first 
newspaper to get official licences from the SAPP (Huang Shengmin, 2003: 238). By 2004, 
the joint venture has 16 magazines and six of them have become top-ten firms with the 
highest advertising revenues in the periodical market. Bertelsmann Intel established a 
joint venture with official China's Technology Publishing Company in the early 1990s, 
becoming the first TNMC involved in the publication sale market. It will bring its 100 
titles of press and magazines issued worldwide into China as the country lifts its entry 
restrictions. The reasons that TNMCs easily succeed in China's market are 
straightforward, as an interviewee points out: 
'They [TNMCs] have completely succeeded in the magazine market except news 
and current affairs. By 2004, most of the international magazine giants extended their 
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networks in China. They have many advantages including 1) reliable international brands; 
2) rich information sources; 3) powerful economic strength; and, 4) mature marketing 
skills. '(Interviewee 13) 
Table 5.12 Foreign Media in China 
Media Corporation Ownership Base of Headquarter 
IDG --- USA 
News Corp. Rurpter Murdoch USA 
Time Wamer 
Viacom 
Bertelsmann 
Disney 
flachetle 
Fillipacchi 
Summer M. Redstone 
Bertelsmann, Stiftung, 
Groupe Bruxelles 
Lambert and the 
Mohn family 
Disney family 
USA 
USA 
Geman 
USA 
France 
Media outlets in China 
Computer World 
STAR TV, 
Phoenix TK 
Xinkongweishi 
CETV, Ciname 
Programme provider of 
music, children's 
programmes, and 
entertainment 
Publication, 
Book distribution 
Children's programmes 
20 fashion magazines, e. g. 
Elle. 
Note: It is difficult to get information about TNMCs' annual avenue in China, so, here I select some of 
TNMCs which have outstanding performance in the Chinese media domain. 
Source: Huang Shengmin, 2003: 238; Interviewee 13; Shi Yan, 2003: 32. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the extent to which the monopoly of the party media 
system has been weakened. It argues that the marriage between the globalization and 
commercialization has created dynamic media changes in China, leading to a fragmented 
and decentralized media system that undermines the monopoly of party organs. In other 
words, globalization and TNMCs have profound influence on China's media governance 
directly and indirectly. As a strong catalyst, the TNMCs arouse the awareness of market 
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effectiveness, accelerate the process toward commercialization, and shape the basis of 
media restructuring. The de-regulation generated duopoly, oligopoly, and in a few cases 
potential diverse ownership. The restructuring redistributes and transfers the political 
powers between different actors. The limited media liberalisation precedes the other key 
reforms of socialist transition, which are the reform and/or privatization of the 
state-owned media sector and the development of an indigenous media capitalist class. 
Although the authoritarian government tried to employ media conglomeration to enhance 
its political control and facilitate economic strength in order to compete with TNMCs, 
this process, as Yuezhi Zhao (2000: 3) recognizes, has 'profound implications for 
emerging class and power relations in China'. 
This chapter has also argued the structural changes of the Chinese media market 
from 1990s, which provide much more access diversity than before. Access diversity is a 
key factor for establishing a well-informed citizenry. For attracting audience, the media 
gatekeepers have an incentive to exclude divergent viewpoints. Therefore, it has been 
measured on an underlying dimension of political concerns. The transformation of the 
relationship between the governed and the governors represents a reduction in 
information control, the loosening of conventional Propaganda rules, and the sign of 
evolution toward diversity, in which there are increasing actors participating in media 
governance. It always assumes that the decentralization and de-monopolization tendency 
is the main focus during the restructuring, together with a commitment to the demands of 
the market. 
Therefore, this chapter has opened up a crucial question whether or not the 
relationship between media ownership and media content is intimate. Some scholars 
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argue that the commercialised restructuring is a redefinition of the party for the news 
media, rather than ideological relaxation, liberalization, or democratisation (Zhao, 2000). 
The structural diversity does not 'imply the Western sense of relative autonomy', but 
stands for a division of labour to 'carry out Party-defined goals and tasks' (Lee, 1990: 16). 
However, others assert that the relationship between media ownership and media content 
is intimate. Gillian Doyle (2002: 13) argues, 'it is no easy task to isolate the role played by 
ownership patterns in determining what range of media output is made available to the 
public. 'This assumption will be examined in Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DE-PROPAGANDIZATION OF MEDIA CULTURF, 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Media globalization has a profound influence on the transformation of media 
governance in China. This can be presented as the increase of differentiation and 
functional specialization of institutions, media deregulation and re-regulation, 
de-monopolization of media structure, and de-propagandization of media culture. The 
previous chapters have examined the impact on media institutions, ownership, and 
market structure. This chapter will explore de-propagandization of media culture in China, 
that is how media globalization affects the Chinese media performance and media culture. 
Through examining the changes in media content in television and newspaper, it argues 
that the power relations between regulator, media producer, media carrier, and media 
consumer have institutionally been transformed from the top-down model (the regulator 
decides what the producer products and what the audience consumes) to the bottom-up 
model (the audience determine what the producer products), or at least a mix of the two. 
It includes three dimensions. 
Firstly, in comparison with the previous party organ sector, the impact of 
globalization on the Chinese media would be that after the restructuring the media focus 
mainly on minimizing party propaganda and maximizing audiences. As Chapter Five has 
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showed, with the marriage between globalization and commercialization, the monopoly 
of the party media system has been transformed into a fragmented and decentralized 
media system. Unlike the party media before the 1990s, nowadays there are four kinds of 
media: party media, public media, private media, and foreign media. Cooperating with 
the provincial and local media, TNMCs penetrate into most of the provinces in China. In 
this way, the media structure is transformed from a party-monopoly into dualistic systems. 
This chapter argues that the increasing foreign media have an effect on content of 
Chinese media, the decentralised and demonopolized media system creates a dynamic of 
media culture, and this dynamic becomes institutionalized. Moreover, the increase of 
entertainment-driven media content, which is a result of transformation of the journalistic 
ethic in the course of globalization, has led to a popular political culture where greater 
time and space are devoted to entertainment, rather than news, current affairs, political 
analysis, etc. It can lead to the 'dumbling down' of Chinese society, making people less 
sophisticated in the ways that they think about politics. 
Secondly, the Chinese media practitioners have gradually given up the priority of 
propaganda media styles, and the hegemony of communist media culture has receded. 
Before integrating with the global community and defending the exclusion of TNMCs, 
the media culture in the PRC always sang a monologue as a mouthpiece of the party--- a 
propagandist, an agitator and an organizer --- an instrument to control public opinion 
rather than express it (Qian Wei, 2002: chap. 1). This chapter argues that globalization has 
significant influence on Chinese media culture. After China implemented the open-door 
policy and took economic reforms in the 1980s, some of Chinese media tried to copy 
Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and political reforms. The 1990s witnessed the 
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diversity of social changes, privatization, commercialization, globalization, individualism, 
cynicism, and so on. Recently, the appearance of TNMCs has led the Chinese media to 
experience rationalism, constitutionalism, and pluralism after increasing numbers of 
media practitioners have been trained in western media institutions, universities, and 
media outlets. As a result, Chinese media practitioners gradually gave up the priority no 
propaganda media styles. This process of globalization in Chinese media culture can be 
called 'de-propagandisation' or 'apoliticalisation', where the media practitioners attempt 
to break the direct connection between a popular press and the propaganda institutions, 
and give rise to the provision of neutral, human interest, mass appeal media content in the 
form of accurate, fact-based information presented by professionals. It benefits a lot from 
the introduction and acceptance of the norms of Western journalism-objectivity, 
neutrality, and factuality. But it also suffers from sensational and entertainment-oriented 
approaches associated with the commercial rules of TNMC business. All these may make 
China's media culture more ambiguous, blurred and contradictory. The market logic of 
TNMCs regards pursuing profit as the primary goal, implicitly denying any other 
communication purposes that the media should usually prioritise. Whatever regulatory 
measures are in place, there are a few opportunities for media owners to assert a direct or 
indirect influence upon the content and the agenda of products they own. 
Thirdly, the impact of globalization on Chinese media culture can be reflected in 
changes in journalism. During the transformation of Chinese media, journalists 
sometimes act as Walter Lippmann's 'fourth estate', or 'watchdog' (Lippmann, 1927), or 
Wei Jingsheng's 'fifth modemisation', ' where news media provide checks and balances 
1 Wei Jingsheng is a Chinese democratic activist. In 1979, he claimed that democratization is the fifth modernization in 
China, together with official agriculture, industry, military, and technology modernization. After being sentenced to 14 
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vis-a-vis established political and economic powers. This chapter argues that the 
instituted media deregulation and de-monopolization, which have been discussed in 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five, has led to a 'de-propagandization' and even 
'vulgarization' of media content for the sake of maximizing audiences. The CCP has 
retained editorial control and the cash-strapped government has announced that it wants 
the press to support itself financially and even become an industry contributing to 
national economic building. Led by the TNMCs, Chinese media practitioners have 
attempted to escape from the yoke of ideological control and enjoy the freer market. The 
result of media globalization in China is that cultural and news products are being 
commercialised and professional i sed. It does have complicated and far-reaching 
implications for the future of Chinese society (Qiu Liben, 2003; Zha, 1995). These 
products may become a significant vehicle for transferring power via the mass media 
from the state to society. Chinese media practitioners have struggled and continue to 
struggle to balance their gains and losses. 
This chapter first presents the content of TNMCs in China, which has led to the 
decline of mainstream propaganda and the rise of mass appeal media content, the CCTV 
adjustment and the Hunan TV miracle. After examining performance in the Chinese 
media, particularly in television and newspapers, this chapter probes the changes of 
journalistic ethics, which would affect the media reforms in the future. Furthermore, it 
will ask in the increasingly institutional ised social-political situation, how does China 
make progress in terms of media culture in press freedom and media law. 
years in jail, he was exiled to the USA from the early 1990s. 
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2 THE RISE OF MARGINALIZED CONTENT AND DECLINE OF 
MAINSTREAM MELODY 
This section accesses the impact of globalization and TNMCs on Chinese media 
operation in terms of media content. It will firstly examine the popularity of TNMC 
programmes and then probe how this presence drives China's media authorities and 
practitioners to redesign their own formats and brand their own media both at country 
level and province level. Briefly, there is an institutional change in raising the ratio of 
4relaxation' entertainment (games, drama, fiction, confessional talk shows) against 
'serious' propaganda programming. The proliferation of entertainment programmes and 
reforming media formats implies that people may simply switch off when the propaganda 
messages are sold to them. The responses to entertainment programmes driven by the 
TNMCs, though pragmatic and locally specific (Shoesmith and Wang, 2000), have 
inevitably undermined the propaganda function of the mass media in China. 
The declaration by TNMCs that the broadcaster should satisfy what the audiences 
want may be attributed to consumer sovereignty. It has been defined by the Peacock 
Report as a sophisticated system, in which audiences are the best ultimate judges of their 
own interests, and they can be best satisfied if they have the option of purchasing the 
broadcasting services that they require from as many alternative sources of supply as 
possible (Pratten, 1997: 28). Success in the commercial media largely depends on the 
scope and scale of audiences, which are the most important attraction to advertisers. With 
the increase of participating in global society, Chinese media practitioners put this theory 
into their practice. 
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2.1 The Domination of Entertain men t-oriented Programming 
Chinese media practitioners label entertainment programming as 'Coca-cola 
programming, 2 , distinguishing it from the traditional propaganda messages. From the 
1990s, it is such entertainment-driven programming that has become the primary 
attraction in the fierce market competition. With their global competitive advantages and 
mature marketing skills, TNMCs have powerful brands and seek larger audiences through 
entertainment. They also tend to water down entertainment to avoid some controversial 
programmes that might irritate the Chinese authorities. The popular entertainment 
formats includes soap operas, game shows and 'infotainment' documentaries. As Chapter 
Four examined, the initially China-targeted package of STAR TV with five channels 
became more purely entertainment-oriented after the Chinese government persuaded 
Rupert Murdoch to remove the BBC World Service in 1995. The other TNMCs share this 
principle. Time Warner's CETV holds a slogan of 'no sex, no violence, no news' 
(Green, 1994: 5). The newly established Xinghongweishi, Rupert Murdoch's sheer 
entertainment channel, has won an increasing audience share by offering dance and music 
such as 'Little Emperors Grab the Mike' (a chat show with spoiled kids), 'Women in 
Control' (a game show), 'Operation Theatre' (a prime-time reality show that turns surgery 
into TV melodrama with lots of detailed close-up) (Seno, 2003: 43). It has no coverage of 
Chinese political news and current affairs. Like Xingkongweishi, the proportion of 
entertainment programmes in the TNMC Chinese channels has overwhelmingly 
surpassed the other imported programmes. With large investment, the TNMCs have 
2 This term is often used by some interviewees, such as some senior editors in Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily, 
CCTV, and so on. It seems that the use of 'Coco-cola programmes' in China is not as negative as that in the western 
literature then they compare them with the propaganda messages. 
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developed new kinds of entertainment programming when the old ones become 'normal' 
and lose their singularity. 
The domination of entertainment content in transnational television results from 
audience demands and governmental requirements. On the one hand, after increasing 
experience of global society, Chinese audiences became eager to acquire amusement 
from television, and this demand was intensified by the rapid improvement of Chinese 
living standards since the 1980s. The Chinese audiences spent on average 65,335 minutes 
watching television in 2002, including 6,617 minutes on news and current affairs and 
19,080 minutes on TV drama (Wang Lanzhu, 2003: 68). According to a survey conducted 
by the People's University of China, Beijing's audiences on average spend 112.1 minutes 
on entertainment programming every day, much more than news and current affairs (38.3 
minutes) (Yu Guoming, 2002: 282-3). With the increasing number of channels available 
both from home and abroad, the number of programmes available for audiences has 
increased dramatically, whereas the total time people devote to watching them has 
remained unchanged. Competition for potential audiences, therefore, has been intense, 
and the importance of audience appeal has been self-evident. With growing reactions 
against political indoctrination, Chinese audiences are enthusiastic for entertainment 
content while disparaging the political programmes and other serious content. The 
qualitative and quantitative deficiency of domestic entertainment programmes makes the 
Chinese audiences easily switch to the TNMCs. An audience survey in Guangdong 
Province revealed that 'Hong Kong television is recognized first for its entertainment 
values, which is enhancing the general perception of television as an entertainment 
medium. '(Chan, 2000: 264) Another survey of over ten municipal cable stations showed 
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that more than 90 percent of the programmes were imported (Zhao, 1998: 169). To meet 
the audience demands, so as to realize the commercial goals, the number of imported 
entertainment programmes has kept increasing. 
On the other hand, governmental institutional arrangements produce the domination 
of entertainment content in transnational television. While opening to foreign media, the 
government still tries to prevent Chinese people from getting too much westernized 
political ideologies. The SARFT endeavours to keep a balance between media 
globalization and national political, social, and cultural identity. It prefers entertainment 
programming, which is assumed to have less political implications. This arrangement can 
be seen in a document 'Regulation of SARFT on the Censorship Criterion of Imported 
Programs'. It says, %he imported programming) should have main characteristics of 
entertaining and amusing the audiences. '(1991'Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianbao: 74) 
This criterion set by the SARFT has also been applied to manage transnational satellite 
broadcasting. Among the first 30 transnational satellite channels that were officially 
approved by the SARFT, most were pure entertainment channels and the other six were 
sports channels or music channels. 3 
However, when China participates in media globalization, the foreign-based media 
inevitably become an instrument of wider accessibility of information for Chinese 
audiences. This could be seen after the shocking terrorist attack, the U. S. 9-11 Tragedy. 
Sinaxom ftinlangwang), a popular web-site based on U. S. investment, provided the first 
piece of news of the incident at 8: 55 pm (Beijing time) for Chinese audiences, just 10 
minutes after the first attack on the World Trade Centre. After that, it issued a huge 
number of 9-11 news items, reporting the incident in depth. On the first day it had 100 
3 See Internet Satellite Television Website, wwwtvworld. corn. cn, accessed on June, 6,2002 
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pieces of news within a short period between 8: 55 pm and 11: 59 pm, followed by 720 
pieces of news in 24 hours the next day. Moreover, Sina. com immediately published a 
feature on 9-11, providing an updated timetable of the incident and relative news 
background about terrorism, such as Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and Afghanistan. 
Another foreign-based media outlet Phoenix TV, more than a third of whose shares are 
held by Murdoch's News Corporation, inserted a special news report at 9: 10 pm, 
becoming the first television channel in China to report the attacks live. The report 
continued for 35 hours. In contrast, CCTV, a mouthpiece of the CCP, began to be 
involved in the event reporting at 9: 20 pm. The news appeared at the end of its 
programme Broadcasting Now. Although CCTV reported the incident in nearly every 
news programme, it only offered one or two short pieces, at the end of Network News on 
non-official perspectives where background was provided (Li Yinbo, 2002: 223-29). The 
same happened in the War against Iraq in 2003. Phoenix TV became the first broadcaster 
who reported live. It forced the official CCTV, which withdrew from Baghdad before the 
war broke out, to return to the Iraqi capital two days later. The delay in live reportage was 
fiercely criticised by the audiences, who preferred Phoenix TV, rather than the 
state-owned CCTV (Interviewee 2 1). 
These two cases demonstrate that the TNMCs become an important channel for 
Chinese people to access diversified information. It does place heavy stress on Chinese 
media governors and practitioners to redesign their media content. Both entertainment 
and information programming provided by the TNMCs enable Chinese audiences to 
understand the world outside China and then read Chinese domestic affairs in fresh ways 
(Hull, 1991: Chap. 1). For many Chinese audiences, the news media, particularly 
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television, is their only means to access foreign cultures. The imported programmes have 
been regarded as 'a window on the world, a cultural supplement, and a promotion of 
understanding among people. '(Hong, 1998: 62) In this sense, the adoption of transnational 
television paves the way for cultural exchange and gradually results in the selective 
adoption of foreign cultures. For Chinese media practitioners, they have to adjust their 
operation and management to the logic of consumer sovereignty. This will be further 
discussed in Section 3. 
2.2 Case Study: the Adjustment of CCTV 
As regulatory systems and economic environments have opened up, the Chinese 
state-owned mass media might follow the rules set by others, rather than the state itself. 
Although those opposing TNMC commercialism argued that these shifts could be 
undermining the traditional role of Party's 'throat and mouthpiece' and threatening the 
Party itself, the Chinese authorities reconsider what are audiences' demands, and 
recognize the importance of programming appeal for existing and target audiences. To 
realize commercial goals and meet the demands of state's media reforms, entertainment 
content has kept increasing, and this has quantitatively transformed the original function 
of television from propaganda to entertainment-provider. In this way, the power relations 
between regulator, media producer, media carrier, and media consumer might be 
transformed from the top-down model (the regulator decides what the producer products 
and what the audience consumes) to the bottom-up model (the audience determine what 
the producer products), or a mix of top-down and bottom-up models. The adjustment of 
CCTV is a good example at the national level to explore the influence of TNMCs on 
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Chinese media operation. It also reflects the degree to which the Chinese media 
governance becomes institutional ised under globalization. 
In theory, CCTV, together with other state-owned television networks, acts as a 
benchmark to inform, educate and entertain, accommodating minority audience interests 
by providing propaganda programmes, including those which might be profitless. In 
Western terms, CCTV should provide 'public service broadcasting'. However, 
interviewees in CCTV point out that under more intense global competition, CCTV has 
fresh ideas which it would like to operate with a global popular logic, 'market logic', 
providing more programming that appeals to a vast range of audiences and introducing 
advertising into their revenues, rather than airing boring propaganda messages under 
4party logic'. 
The self-improvement of CCTV made it more intertwined with television 
globalization. In 1987, the first pure entertainment programme of CCTV, 'Zheng Da 
Entertainment' (Zheng Da Zhong YI), was sponsored and initiated by a foreign 
corporation, Zheng Da group of Thailand. In the second half of the 1990s, CCTV began 
to defend itself against the invasion of transnational satellite television and cable 
television by introducing several famous game shows, whose formats were purchased 
from Europe and America. Two top entertainment shows, 'Between the Cities' (Chengli 
zhyian) and 'Lucky 52' (Xingyun 52), were purchased from France and Germany 
(Xinzhoukan, June 16,2002). A game show named 'Happy Dictionary' (Kaixin cidian) is 
the Chinese version of 'Who wants to be a millionaire'. Inspired by NBC's 60 minutes, 
CCTV launched its own 'Focus' programme in 1994. It is broadcast at prime time every 
evening, becoming a well-known official demonstration that China has active media 
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investigation. The nightly programme is described as covering 'the problems of society' 
in a magazine format, with 'in-depth investigative journalism'. Focus exposes various 
social problems involving government organs and officials at different levels. These 
problems cover abuse of power, negligence, corruption in administrative affairs, and so 
on, which are committed by government departments or officials. Former Premier Zhu 
Rongji visited the studios in 1998, maintaining that 'supervision by the media is very 
important' and 'press supervision can correct the mistakes of our work and reflect the 
voice of the masses' (quoted by Interviewee 2 1; Lam, 2000: 37-57). Regional TV stations, 
such as Beijing TV, Shanghai TV, Zhejiang TV and Sichuan TV and many other 
provincial broadcasters, soon copied the Focus format with their own current affairs 
reports (Interviewee 21). 
As table 6.1 illustrates, the most popular programming in CCTV is entertainment, 
and the least is serious programming. From 2000 to 2002, the programming for news, 
children, and education only accounted for 17.1 per cent, 16.4 per cent and 13.3 per cent 
of total air time respectively, while entertainment programming like drama, game shows, 
film, music and sport accounted for 44.9 per cent, 43.0 per cent and 38.0 per cent of the 
total respectively. Due to that CCTV spent more time on international news and 
investigative reports, the audience share of news programming did not jump down though 
its total air time decreased from 9.1% in 2000) to 6.7% in 2002. This means although 
there is less programming time for news, it is still heavily watched (18.3 % in 2002). 
The insiders point out that it is market competition which drives them to change the 
programming component. The market competition is not only from domestic provincial 
TV, but also from TNMC Chinese channels. Under intense pressure, CCTV recently 
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adopted a system of media management, 'listed end out' system (mowei taotal), that is an 
audience receipt ratio, to decide the air-time of different programming. Education and 
children's programming always account for low audience ratios; conversely, 
entertainment (e. g. film, drama, sport, and so on) and news (e. g. Focus, Dongfangshikong, 
News Probe, and so on) occupy the leading position. The insiders' explanation for the 
decline of education and children's programming illustrates that the regulators have less 
influence on media content than before. If mainstream programmes shrank further, the 
propaganda messages would have less places for dissemination to the public. The case of 
CCTV also shows that the role of the media gradually shifts from the party's ideological 
instrument to the audience's amuser. This shift of media culture may have a profound 
influence on the relations between media production, distribution and exhibition. 
Furthermore, it may generate reconstructing of the media market, and, through them, 
media power relationships. 
Table6.1 Air Time and Audience Share of CCTV Programming (2000-2002) 
Programming 2000 2001 2002 
Genre 
Air time Audience Airtime Audience Air Time Audience 
M share M M share M M share M 
Children 5.4 4.1 5.2 4.1 3.6 3.3 
Opera 6.5 1.4 6.2 1.4 6.1 1.3 
Education 2.6 0.4 3.3 0.4 2.9 0.3 
Game Show 3.5 4.8 3.3 4.8 4.2 5.0 
Foreign 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Language 
Film 10.2 9.7 9.8 9.7 7.8 10.9 
Music 2.5 1.7 2.4 1.7 3.4 3.2 
News 9.1 25.2 8.7 25.2 6.7 18.3 
Drama 11.7 14.8 11.2 14.8 8.1 11.3 
Features 14.3 13.5 13.8 13.5 14.4 12.4 
Sport 10.5 8.5 10.1 8.5 8.4 11.5 
Other 23.6 15.9 22.7 15.9 34.4 22.4 
Source: Wang Lanzhu(ed. ) (Zhongguodianshishouzhongnianbao, 2003(YearbookofChinaý Television Audience: 
2003) (Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press, 2003), p. 180. 
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2.3 Case Study: the Miracle of Hunan Satellite Television 
The impact of TNMCs on Chinese media operations may also be identified at 
province level. Different from CCTV with an official record of purchasing foreign 
formats, the Chinese provincial television stations are, in fact, inundated with imitations 
or even plagiarizing of foreign programme formats. The importance of format, as 
Michael Keane addresses, is 'not simply as mass cultural artifacts but as "packages of 
ideas". '(Keane, 2003: 81) Through co-operation, professional visits and trarisnational 
satellite broadcasting, the Chinese TV producers have opportunities to imitate the format 
of global television programmes. Consequently, programme 'cloning' is widely adopted 
by contemporary Chinese television. It also is one of the identifiable impacts of TNMCs 
and globalization on Chinese television. It often happens that several provincial channels 
employ a popular foreign format simultaneously. The producers in the local stations 
confess that the copy of foreign programme formats is irresistible mainly for three 
reasons. They are, (1) The Chinese laws on the protection of the rights of television 
programme format have not yet been established. Hence there is no legal risk of illegal 
action; (2) the foreign programme formats are usually more attractive to the audience 
than the domestic ones; and, (3) copying foreign formats can save much investment on 
products and even earn great profits from selling on the programme. Thanks to their 
abundant resources and lion's share in the global market, the TNMCs are capable of 
providing media production at a much cheaper price than those locally produced. Under 
the shadow of global media, China's local media have little choice but to imitate foreign 
programming for branding their names in the marketplace. Hunan Satellite TV channel is 
no doubt the most successful provincial satellite channel. Although Hunan is only a 
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destitute agricultural province in the middle of China, Hunan Satellite Station became the 
richest and most popular provincial television in 1998 (Zhongguo guangbo dianshi 
nianbao, 1999: 154-155). Experts called it the 'Hunan Miracle'. 
The reason for the 'Huanan Miracle' is not very difficult to find and many would 
consider it is fairly disappointing. An interviewee on Hunan TV stated that 'the most 
important element in the success of Hunan television is to copy foreign 
programmes. '(Interviewee 33) Thanks to the special relationship with television in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and the USA, Hunan TV was the first local station to employ TNMC 
programme formats. Its two top entertainment programmes, 'Happy Base Camp' (Kuaile 
da benying) and 'Dating of Rose'(Meigui zi yue), which annually earn over RMB50 
million (6 million US dollar) from the national market, 4 are copies of formats from 
Taiwan television and Murdoch's Phoenix Chinese Channel. In 2004 and 2005, Hunan 
TV presented a format 'Super Woman Singer (Chaoji nusheng)'. It is an imitation of 
'American Idol' in the USA. However, its audience ratio once surpassed that of the 
CCTV, 
The case of Hunan TV demonstrates that TNMC TV formats have a profound 
influence on Chinese TV. Hunan TV unconsciously plays a role as the introducer of 
foreign formats. Soon after the formats of Hunan TV's popular programmes are shown, 
they appeared on most of the other satellite channels. Hunan TV alleges in its website, 
that 'over 30 provincial stations have imitated the format of "Dating of Rose"'. In order 
to retain and consolidate its leading position, Hunan exerts its advantage of 'learning 
from outside', racing to imitate new global formats. Therefore, among Chinese local 
stations, many of their popular programmes bear the characteristics of foreign formats. 
4 At Hunan Television website, www. hunantv. com/block/rose, accessed on June 4,2002. 
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The relaying of programme formats can be illustrated in Figure 6.1. While this 
phenomenon bears a strong 'Chinese characteristic', the motivation is worldwide 
because 'at the local level media producers increasingly use global popularity to stamp 
their own products as 'professional', 'competitive' and attractive to an audience and, 
more importantly, to the advertisers. '(Thussu, 2000: 16) 
Figure 6.1 Relaying of Global Programme Formats 
USA 
Taiwan/ Hong Kong o Hunan TV-1oother local TV Japan 
Europe 
One aspect of the TNMC influence on Chinese media is that the role of the Chinese 
media is no longer a single instrument of propaganda but to some degree a mass 
entertainer. In the new era when transnational television prevails, 'there is tremendous 
pressure to fashion and schedule programming that will maximize audiences across the 
board. ' (Blumer, 1991: 49) In China, the survey conducted by Chan in Guangdong 
Province shows that the Chinese audience in Guangdong Province has changed their 
attitude to domestic television after long-term access to Hong Kong Television (Table 
6.2). It shows that the continuous exposure to transnational television results in the 
'reduced satisfaction with domestic television' (Chan, 2000: 264) of the Chinese audience 
and their most dissatisfied factor is the 'entertainment values'. 
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Hunan TV is not an isolated case. It is an increasingly pervasive phenomenon. As a 
main partner of Viacom in the Chinese media market, the private-owned Tanglong 
Communication has become one of the key TV programme producers since the late 
1990s. Its CEO Lu Xingdong declared, 
'Chinese TV can learn a lot from transnational media corporations. Firstly, we can 
learn how they manage their branches in more than 100 countries. Secondly, we can 
learn how they control the cost of the whole product chain: production, marketing, 
promotion, and distribution. Thirdly, we can learn how they invest in formats to 
attract audiences and maximize profit. '(Interviewee 40) 
The pressure of television globalization has contributed to a landscape different from 
governmental expectations, which still regard television as an efficient propaganda tool 
within the party line through limited commercialization. Essentially, Chinese television 
has already deviated from the party line and converged with television in most other 
nations. In spite of the internal resistance factors, the changing nature of television is the 
embodiment of television globalization in China. The media authorities hold a blurred 
attitude, that is, in Chinese sayings, 'close one eye, open another'. The reason for this is 
that the 'clone' can contribute to local economic growth with an attraction to advertisers 
without increasing the programme development cost. However, it should be concerned 
about the economic and moral implication of plagiarism, taking copyright infringement 
seriously. 
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Table 6.2 Evaluation of Chinese and Hong Kong TV. Positive Evaluations 
Comparative Dimensions 
Variety 
Production quality 
Entertainment value 
Emotionality 
Reflecting social reality 
Reflecting people's opinions 
Information reliability 
Percentage of satisfied respondents 
Chinese TV(O/o) Hong Kong TV(O/o) 
4.9 86.5 
11.3 74.7 
5.3 86.8 
7.7 83.8 
35.5 50.8 
41.3 50.5 
42.6 41.1 
Sources: Joseph Man Chan, 'When Capitalist and Socialist Television Clash: the impact of Hong Kong television 
on Guangzhou Residents', in Chin-Chuan Lee(ed) Power. Money and Media (Northwestern University Press, 2000), 
pp. 245-270, p. 256 
As the previous two sections show, Chinese TV both at national and provincial 
levels have begun to imitate TNMCs' programme formats. The value of TV formats 
would go beyond the content that the Chinese audiences consume. They could be 
considered as a kind of 'cultural technology', in which the TNMCs add their values to 
Chinese programming menus and drive Chinese television to ideological diversity. It 
produces a self-evident trend of Chinese television since 1992. The proportion of 
entertainment content among all domestic programming has kept increasing and reached 
37% in 1998 (Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianbao, 1991-1999). In terms of media 
management Chinese media has begun to brand themselves. Both Hunan TV and CCTV, 
together with other media players, attempted to detach themselves from being the Party's 
5 
mouthpiece, though there is grave doubt about any possibility of complete detachment. 
It is a reflection of the diversification of Chinese television under intense competition 
pressure in media globalization. Therefore, entertainment programmes, such as fashion 
shows, pop music, foreign dramas, and so on, have become popular on television, in 
contrast to official ideology. 
5 The detachment from the party and government is dilemma in Chinese media cycle. See, for exampic, Sun Min, 
'Zixun shidai dc chuanmei pinpai j ingying' [Branding Operation in the Information Era], Zhongguo jizhe (zhengkan 
2)[Journal ofChinese Journalist (supplement 2)], 1999(2), pp. 81-85. 
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2.4 Tabloidization of Newspapers 
If imitation of entertainment formats is a kind of impact of media globalization and 
TNMCs on Chinese television, 'tabloidization' is an identifiable influence of media 
globalization on Chinese newspapers. Metro-tabloids never appeared before the 1980s. In 
the 1990s, a few newspapers have been transformed from party papers into 
metro-tabloids, which are filled with sensational, sexual, and criminal stories. This 
becomes, in a western term, 'tabloidization' (Sparks, 2000: 1-40; Esser, 1999). In the west, 
it is a shift from hard news, such as news about politics, economics, and society, to 
diversions such as sports, scandal, and celebrities. In the Chinese context, it is a 
transformation from CCP propaganda messages to diverse information, including sports, 
scandal, and celebrities. 
The coverage in Chinese tabloid papers is broad except for politics. There are many 
categories in terms of subjects. Like those of TNMCs, the coverage subjects include 
economic news, social events, criminal news, international affairs, sport and 
entertainment. The market-oriented coverage tries to maximise readership, which is the 
basis of the paper's financial independence. There are two recurring characteristics of 
content in Chinese tabloid papers (Interviewees 8 and 38). 
Firstly, soft news and other readable news and information are overwhelming, 
focusing on news in society from streets, families, schools, hospitals to police stations, 
night clubs, the market, and so on. In their news coverage, political news is rarely 
mentioned (Huang, Davies, and Knight, 2002). Soft news covers a wide range of areas, 
such as accidents, business and low level political corruption, crimes, disasters, human 
interest stories, sex, sinister gangs, violence, and so on. From November 13 to 19,1998, 
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West China Metro-Paper (Huaxidushibao), a prominent tabloid in Sichuan Province, in 
total covered 262 stories relating to these issues, about 37.4 items on average each day 
and 4.6 items on the front page per day. In contrast, stories regarding the Party/state 
apparatus and political elites at either the 'central' or 'local' level were extremely limited. 
Jiang Zemin, Chinese President and Party General Secretary, was simply mentioned three 
times in three short stories published on page four (Huang, Davies, and Knight, 2002). 
Secondly, imitated from TNMCs' content formats, Chinese tabloid papers 
comprehensively and systematically explored and exploited sports news and 
entertainment as main genres which are expected to have huge market potential. They are 
an integral part of their daily reporting plan, as equally important as other categories of 
news. Rather than sensitive political issues, which are always guided by the CPD and 
local propaganda authorities, their reports are mostly from their own correspondents 
(Peng Jian, 2002: 23-35). They report gossip spreading around the romantic lives of pop 
singers and movie and sports stars. Both employ a sensational writing style in order to 
attract readers. Stories are straightforward, readable and informative, and the headlines 
are vivid and eye-catching. They may be attacked for sensationalism, rumour, gossip, 
innuendo, superficiality and inaccuracy, and sometimes, simplification (Interviewee 51). 
But they are completely different from the boring, lengthy, and unreadable propaganda 
messages. 
Like those of TNMCs, most Chinese tabloids emphasize light social commentary 
and lively entertainment features. Learning from London Week, Shanghai Week was 
established on October 12,2000 to introduce the city's everyday life. In 2004, its 
circulation reached 200,000. Likewise, Shanghai Wednesday (Shanghai Xingqisan) and 
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Shanghai Service Paper (Shenjiang fuwu daobao) also focus on entertainment and 
everyday life. All enjoy large circulations and fat revenues. They are becoming even 
more popular than the party-owned papers such as Wenhui Daily (Jvenhui bao) and 
Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao (Huang Shengmin, 2003: 263). To attract readers, many 
rely on the American formulae of sex and crime. 'Sure, they are low-class, ' a journalist at 
a party paper remarks, 'but even gutter news is better than propaganda. '(Interviewee 44) 
Therefore, in terms of financial performance, the most profitable newspapers are 
tabloidised metro-papers. In 2003, the advertising revenues of Chinese metro-papers were 
37.5 billion Yuan (4.5 billion US dollars), accounting for 68.20 per cent of the total 
national newspaper advertising market. It is also five times more than the party and 
government institutional papers (13.45 per cent) (Yao Lin, 2003). Ironically, most of them 
belong to the party and government institutions. The People's Daily, for instance, owns a 
few tabloids such as the Global News Digest, Global Times, Beying Times, Southern 
Times, and so on. 
However, in order to win a large market share, tabloids inevitably tend to expand 
their reporting scope to sensitive realms in order to compete with others. The 21st 
Century World Herald, for instance, always covers a few political issues since it was 
launched in 2002. The fledgling weekly tabloid, published in Guangzhou and distributed 
nationally, is the first paper reporting several sensational stories, like a revenge 
slaughtering of more than 100 persons in Jiangsu. But, after the 21st Century World 
Herald did an interview with Li Rui, the former Secretary of Mao Zedong, about China's 
democracy in March 2003, it was closed down immediately (Interviewee 46). From this 
case, it can be seem that the party still has the decisive strength to play the game in 
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accordance with its preferences. If anyone challenges its bottom line, the party will ban it 
without negotiation. 
The mainstream ideological melody requires that media practitioners are not only 
creative workers, but they must be CCP information workers. The identity of Party 
information workers comes first, followed by the identity of media art workers (Yin, 
2002: 33). The SARFT thus adopted various measures to ensure that the prime time in 
CCTV and provincial stations is spent on the propaganda 'mainstream melody', reducing 
the amount of entertainment-oriented action series. A conflict emerged between the 
mainstream melody works and the commercialization and popularization of television 
drama (Interviewee 46). In 1990, Li Ruihuan, a member of the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo, suggested that a funding mechanism must be established to guarantee 
political correctness in Chinese films. The former president Jiang Zemin reiterated this at 
the 1994 National Propaganda Conference (Xu Guangchun, 2000: 437). On April 12, 
2004, the SARFT banned network game programmes on TV screens. A week later, all 
provincial and municipal stations were required to establish a children's channel 6 
However, these enforced measures do not rescue the 'mainstream melody, because 
taboidization of mass media provides a good alternative to the propaganda ones. 
Inevitably, 'the socialist mainstream melody' (shehui zhuyi zhuxuanlu) declined 
dramatically both in the number of titles and circulation. During the early 1980s peasant 
newspapers grew quickly with the rural reforms adopted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
But the circulation of peasant newspapers in the early 1990s collapsed and some even 
6 See the official website of the SARFT, at http: //www. sarft. gov. cn/mana2e/12ublishfile/35/1656. htm], accessed on 
April 25,2004. 
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went bankrupt. Liaoning Nonginin Bao (Liaoning Peasant News), for instance, had the 
highest daily circulation of 1.3 million copies in the 1980s, but it dropped to 100,000 in 
early 1993 (Lee, 1994: 23). The same thing happened with party-sponsored national titles. 
The daily circulation of Guangming Daily dropped from 1.5 million in 1987 to 800,00 in 
1993 (Zhao, 1998: 167). The People ý Daily declined from a6 million daily circulation at 
its peak time in the 1980s to 2 million in 2003, and most of its subscriptions were made 
under administrative pressure (Interviewee 44). Although the party-state tried to rescue its 
mainstream from declining, the market plays a role in weakening the party's hegemony. 
3 ONE SERVANT, MANY MASTERS: MEDIA PERFORMANCE AND 
MEDIA CULTURE UNDER GLOBALIZATION 
The decline of the mainstream melody and the rise of entertainment are a 
consequence of media globalization in China. It reflects the fact that the traditional 
communist journalism in China has been pushed into the marketplace and rebuilt by 
institutional forces, particularly by external forces. As previous chapters discussed, with 
increasing participation in global society, the Chinese media serve not only one master 
but many. Therefore, the media culture has also changed from the Marxist model toward 
a multi-ideological model. This section explores this change insofar as it is directly and 
indirectly related to globalization and TNMCs. 
The impact of globalization on developing countries like China is complex. As 
Daya Kishan Thussu suggests, 'In many developing countries, western influence is 
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bringing mixed results. '(2000: 203) The external forces have repackaged themselves into 
a Chinese context, leading to a remarkable cultural mixture and contradiction of media 
cultures. The reasons for this are three cultural dynamics. Firstly, a history of five 
thousand years has formed a strong traditional culture, which is rooted in the audience 
and the media staff. Secondly, the government imposes the communist culture on the 
news media by political power. Thirdly, the economic motivation and the global influence 
have induced the Chinese news media to embrace a modernized global culture. The third 
cultural aspect is termed as 'peaceful evolution' (Huang, 1998: 217-41). Briefly, Chinese 
journalism and media culture have changed dramatically under globalization. As 
Chin-Chuan Lee points out, 'China's media have moved from having no freedom to 
having some freedom in non-political areas, although their freedom in political areas 
remains highly restricted. '( 199 8: 25 0) 
3.1 Servant for the People or for the Party: the Influence of Globalization on 
Chinese Media Performance in the Two Wars of 2003 
The relationship between the news media and social changes may reflect the nature 
and progress of change in communist societies, because 'the mass media have a special 
and privileged place with regard to social changes' (Sparks, 1998: 38). Do the Chinese 
media mirror its social changes in the era of globalization? The two 'wars' in media 
coverage in spring 2003 could be good cases to explore the extension to which 
globalization influences on the changing nature of Chinese news media. These cases 
show that the coverage of foreign media on Chinese issues has profound influence on 
Chinese media governance and the western journalistic ethic also affects the Chinese 
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media practitioners. 
The case of coverage of the war in Iraq demonstrates that Chinese media have 
become more attention to market competition driven by the TNMCs. For more audience 
share, Chinese domestic media have to change their operation and management. As 
SARS (the severe acute respiratory syndrome) made global headlines, the Chinese media 
were setting precedents in the coverage of the Iraq war. The surprisingly unprecedented 
coverage of the war in Iraq by the Chinese media created a few breakthroughs in the 
history of the country's news media. However, this improvement is not only a result of 
the self-adjustment of Chinese media but also a result of global competition driven by the 
TNMCs. Before the US-British coalition forces started their strikes, Xinhua News 
Agency recruited a local Iraqi as its correspondent. In this way, Xinhua beat its 
international counterparts by 10 seconds to be the first to report the start of the war on 
March 20. In the following twenty days, Xinhua filed at least 15,000 news reports, 
commentaries, round-ups, and features on the war in several languages, such as Chinese, 
English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, and so on (Interviewee 6). Unlike the 
September 11 Event in 2001, CCTV covered the war in real-time. Three of its 12 
channels, CCTV-I, CCTV-4, and CCTV-9, used sources or footage from foreign TV like 
CNN, FOX TV, and Al-Jazeera, to keep millions of viewers informed as the war 
progressed. CCTV-4 provided 13 hours per day coverage on war-related news, three 
times more than the previous five hours every day before the war. A few scholars on 
military affairs and international relations, including those from the National Defence 
Military Institute, were invited to comment on and analyze military actions and other 
aspects of the war. According to some insiders, the goal of this improvement was to gain 
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more audience share to counteract the increasing number of TNMC channels entering the 
Chinese media market. In other words, this improvement was driven by the TNMCs- 
Phoenix TV (Fenghuang weishi), 48 per cent owned by News Corporation, started a 
continuous live broadcast on March 20 and this lasted for more than 100 hours. When 
senior reporter Lu Qiu returned to Baghdad on March 23 after the war started, Phoenix's 
reputation increased impressively. It put heavy pressure on Chinese state-owned 
television. Two days later, a CCTV reporting team, which had withdrawn from Baghdad 
before the war, had to return to the Iraqi capital. The delay in live reportage was fiercely 
criticised by the Chinese audience, who preferred Phoenix TV, rather than the 
state-owned CCTV (Interviewee 7). 
The coverage of the war against SARS also illustrates the importance of foreign 
media for Chinese media governance. SARS first broke out in South China's Guangdong 
Province in November 2002. However, it did not replace the war in Iraq in the headlines 
until mid-April 2003. Chinese health authorities did not address the issue publicly until 
February 11,2003.7 Instead, they said everything was 'under control'. In early April 
when the disease dramatically spread in Beijing, the dominant message in the Chinese 
media was still that 'the disease had already been brought under control' and 'Beijing 
remained as normal and safe as ever'. But scepticism was growing. When Beijing 
became a 'city of ghosts' because different plausible messages about the fatal disease 
spread all over the city via the Internet and mobile phone messages, Zhang Wenkang, 
Minister of Health, still maintained that there were only 37 cases and 4 deaths in Beijing 
in a national conference on April 3. Only after the American news weekly Time first 
7 Xinkuai Bao (New Express) was the first paper to expose SARS in Guangdong, which offered several pages on 
February 11,2003. Ilen, Nan/ang Dushibao (Southern Metropolis Papers) and others followed. in March, 
Beijing-based Caijing Magazine produced in-depth analysis on SARS, criticizing governmental maladministration. 
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exposed the true situation of SARS did the Chinese government panic. Jiang Tanyong, 
former director of the People's Liberation Army Hospital No. 301, revealed to foreign 
media that the Ministry of Health (MoH) had lied about the disease with his own 
investigative statistics (Pomfret, 2003: A26). The New York Times rebuked Beijing: 
'China has routinely failed to grapple with natural or created disasters, like the 
famine caused by Mao's forced collectivization in the late 1950s, because the sole 
responsibility of officials at every level is to keep their bosses happy. There is no 
direct accountability to the public, and every incentive to cover up bad news. '(Kahn, 
2003: A 1) 
The claims by the international media for isolating the unaccountable government 
from the international community finally forced the Chinese government to take action 
(Interviewee 50). The dramatic loss of credibility in the international community 
prompted Wen Jiabao, the new Premier, to admit that the situation was 'grave' in 
mid-April. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, the highest authority in the ruling party, issued an order to openly disseminate 
information on the spread of SARS and warned that any officials found to be withholding 
or distorting information would be severely punished. Zhang Wenkang and Meng 
Xuenong were then sacked from their respective posts as Minister of Health and Mayor 
of Beijing for 'negligence of duty'. It marked a real turning point in the Chinese media 
coverage of SARS. But China's media still did not dare to create a public discourse to 
criticize the structural weakness of the political system, which lacks governmental 
transparency. Before April 20, most of the domestic media kept silent; after that, they 
focused enormous attention on SARS, thus, the situation turned into a kind of 'chaos' 
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(Xia and Ye, 2003: 56-65). 
Comparing with the performance of Chinese media, it is also safe to argue that the 
extent to what the Chinese media practitioners involved in media globalization 
determines their media performance. Closely examining those media which have 
provided objective, investigative news stories about the two 'wars', most of their 
practitioners are involved in media globlalization and TNMCs. Some of them have 
studied abroad, some of them have trained in TNMCs, and some of them have even 
worked in TNMCs. Take Caying for example. As Chapter 3 discussed, half of its staff 
has been trained abroad. All members of its managing team, Hu Shuli, Lin Libo and 
Wang Suo, have been trained in the USA. Hu Shuli was trained in an American university 
in 1995. Sponsored by international institutions, Lin Libo and Wang Suo have also 
studied in the USA for a year. These educational backgrounds enable media practitioners 
to put western journalistic ethics into practice. In 2003, Caying began to publish in-depth 
reporting on SARS and its causes from February. After March 12, Caying decided to 
assign several reporters to cover SARS, and then dedicated an entire desk of 10 people to 
in-depth reporting. In total, Caying published four special weekly issues on SARS, 
producing a version completely different from the mainstream like the People ý Daily. 
Partly because of the coverage of SARS, Hu Shuli, the managing editor of Caying, was 
named Editor-of-the-Year in 2003 by the New York City-based World Press Review. In a 
personal interview, she argued, 
'I was quite sure at the time that an epidemic like SARS with so many lives 
at stake was more worthwhile to Chinese journalists, as it was 'our war'. It 
involved government transparency. It contains weight we could not afford to 
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ignore. We cannot say that the two wars have drastically changed the nature of the 
Chinese media, which is impossible. But they both have had a profound impact on 
us. After being tested by these two wars, at least the Chinese media have become 
more conscious of their mission to inform the public and keep an eye on 
wrongdoing, which is constructive for China's social progress. ' (Interview) 
The performance of trailblazers like Caying shows the potential of media capacity to 
honour the people's right to know once they are determined. The cases of the War in Iraq 
and SARS show China needs press supervision. When most of state-owned media kept 
silent, a few bold news media expressed their comments and opinions. These institutions 
criticized officials who neglected their responsibilities for the citizens. Such criticism 
would not normally appear in the mainstream media, but it has gained official toleration. 
If the government believed these media would threaten their authority, they would ban 
them. 
The performance of the Chinese media in the two wars demonstrates that the 
TNMCs have a profound influence on Chinese media operations, management, and 
moreover, media culture, stimulating the Chinese media to rethink the paradoxical roles 
they play. Are they a servant of the people or of the party? 
In the reforming years, it has been claimed that the role of the media should change 
from 'throat and tongue' of the party-state to reflect 'people-ness' (Renmin xing) (Gan 
Men, 1988). This means the media should not only be the 'throat and tongue' of the 
party but also of the people. At the beginning of the opening-up policies, a few media 
academics and professionals argued that Chinese journalism should have some 
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innovations. Men Gan, a prominent journalism theorist, stimulated a debate on 
'party-ness' (dangxing) as opposed to 'people-ness' (Renminxing). He argued that a firm 
Party characteristic should be the supreme guideline in running a newspaper, in which 
writing should not be made into a profit-making tool by any individual or collective. It 
should be made part of the proletariat's enterprise, a component of the Party's organised, 
planned, and unified work. However, the Party's leadership, even the Party Central, may 
make mistakes. Newspapers should make the interests of the people paramount and be 
run accordingly (Gan, 1994). 
The case of SARS indicates the obvious inability of the Chinese government in 
terms of information management. If it cares for citizens, the government should keep its 
governmental information more transparent, timely, and objective. A society's autonomy 
and stability depend on its information transparency. If the government provides enough 
access to information, it can gain more trust and support from its citizens. If the 
government monopolizes its information resource, or if the government controls the 
access to information, its administrative ability and effectiveness will be seriously 
undermined. 
In practice, Chinese journalists like those in Caijing have attempted to revive the 
role of watchdog. It is termed 'media supervision' (Yulunfiandu) by Chinese journalists 
themselves. It has been officially, institutionally permitted because the government 
wishes to improve its image in society and it also requires some checks and balances to 
improve its corrupt administration. Since the mid-1990s when China became more open 
to international society, the government has redefined the primary role of media as 
agenda-setting (vulun daoxiang), rather than propaganda (xuanchuan jiaoyu). The 
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'agenda-setting' was made clear by President Jiang Zemin during his visit to the offices 
of Renmin Ribao (People ý Daily) on September 26,1996. The notion that agenda-setting 
is the main task of the media has become standardised in the description of media policy 
since then (Chan, 2002: 47-48). As Chapter Three has discussed, Li Changchun, a 
political star who moved to the Politburo in 2003, suggests that news reportage should 
focus on reality, the truth, and society (2003: 3-10). During his inspection in the studio of 
'Focus' in CCTV on October 7,1998, the former Premier Zhu Rongji reiterated that the 
media are 'the voice of the people' and 'the mirror of the government'. The former 
secretary-general of the CCP Jiang Zemin has stated in both his reports to the 15th and 
16 th CCP congresses that China should strengthen supervision by the press (Interviewee 
These institutionalized arrangements give limited space to media practitioners. The 
traditionally conservative Xinhua News Agency, for instance, launched an in-depth 
reporting team, Xinhua Focus, on April 1,2000, covering serious social and political 
issues. From its debut in April 2000 to early 2004, Xinhua Focus produced more than 
1,500 pieces of investigative reporting, most of those uncovering local official corruption 
(Interviewees 5 and 16). 
From the practice and the viewpoint of the Chinese authorities, the role the news 
media play for the people or for the party is not contradictory but compatible. However, 
when the media escape from or challenge the bottom-line set by the party and the 
government, the Chinese authorities impose heavy pressure on the news media without 
any doubt, even if the media are welcomed by ordinary citizens. The ban on the 21st 
Century Global Herald in March 2003, the purge of Oriental Magazine in mid-2003, the 
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allegations against the crucial figures of the Southern Metropolitan Paper in spring 2004, 
are all products of the party's coercive system. 8 
In this sense, the changes in Xinhua or other media may not imply much 
liberalization in Chinese media politics. But these changes may be a combination of the 
influence of media globalization and market competition. They may reflect the 
self-improvement of mainstream media to avoid losses when the TNMCs have been 
appearing in Chinese media market. The limited media liberalization is institutionalized 
because the party and the government still set the line for the news media. For instance, 
the Propaganda Department set the boundaries of press autonomy in February 1995 with 
the Twelve Principles (shi er tiao). The major concerns of these principles are 
harmonization of the media with the line of the Party, the good use of propaganda on 
every occasion, training of famous journalists, and the need to report on negative aspects 
of life without sensationalism. In October 1996, the CPD promulgated eight new 
regulations prohibiting the media from reporting on anything that might damage the 
image of the Party and the government (Herbert, 2001: 139). The regulators and the 
practitioners inevitably collided with each other. While some journalists see themselves 
as civil servants, an interviewee describes the situation more bluntly: 
'We are like dogs on a leash, a very short leash. The rules of coverage, 
while mostly unwritten, are well understood. We have to portray even negative 
things in a positive light. In China, muckraking reportage and the latest 
government propaganda are ajoint venture. '(Interviewee 10) 
' As Section 2.4 has discussed, the coverage of the interview with Li Rui about Chinese democracy led the CCP to ban 
21"' Century Global Herald in March. The investigation reporting on the corruption of Ma Tianze, the boss of Pingan 
Insurance Company, with some leaders in the Central CCP made the media authorities ban Oriental Magazine 
(Dong/ang); The allegations against managers of the Southern Metropolitan Paper will be discussed in Section 4 of this 
chapter. 
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This contradiction demonstrates that the institutionalization of media governance is 
just at the beginning stage. The model of adjustment of media governance is a mix of 
bottom-up and up-bottom. When the TNMCs have increasing influence on the adjustment 
of media governance, a few domestic media practitioners demand more space and they 
also attempt to escape from the control of the Party and the government. These attempts 
vary in different localities. News media in the south of China are normally bolder in 
reporting controversial issues than their northern counterparts. But that bold performance 
still has its bottom line. Liu Zhouwei, editor-in-chief of the 21st Century Economic 
Herald, argues that they have to refrain themselves from irritating supervisors, 'because 
we want to survive under party-control'. Under such self-censorship, media practitioners 
would not like to 'take the risk for sensitive content that would provoke the government. 
In China's media circles, survival is better than becoming an instant hero. '(Interviewee 
45) 
In other words, the survival principle held by TNMCs stimulates Chinese media 
managers to practise self-censorship. Otherwise, he or she has to face the fate of 
abandonment and purging like the 21st Century World Herald. In mid-March 2003, it 
boldly published a lengthy article interviewing Li Rui, former secretary of Mao Zedong. 
In this interview, Li Rui criticized the current political system, where there is no space to 
express different opinions even within the Party. Li Rui called for a new institution to 
promote intra-party democracy (Interviewee 46). This article was warmly welcomed after 
it was published. And, it was regarded as a sign that the new leadership generation would 
like to monitor political reforms. However, a month later, the 21st Century World Herald 
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was purged. In this way, self-censorship curbs the social role the news media play. There 
is no written law that establishes the precise limits of what journalists are not allowed to 
report and write. They have tried to write strictly in line with Party principles to avoid 
criticism and punishment. Self-censorship has become the most effective instrument for 
controlling journalists. The press tends not to report stories about journalists who are 
harshly criticized. 
3.2 'Zola'-journalism and Paid Journalism 
One aspect of the profound influence of media globalization on Chinese media 
culture relates to the ethic of journalism. In a free society such as there TNMCs 
originated, one of the media tasks is to 'scrutinize those who exercise power' (Pinker, 
1996: 6 1). In other words, the concept of the 'fourth estate' in the West is now acceptable 
for some Chinese media practitioners since media globalization has taken place in China. 
Although there is a confusion over whether the media should choose between serving the 
people or the party, Chinese journalism, like that in Eastern Europe, occasionally adopts a 
Zola-like stance of social responsibility, 'with journalists serving as "analysts" of 
events, people, ideas, and so on, from a normative or ideological perspective. '(Gross, 
2002: 120-121) The ethic ofjournalism and media culture in the West has been introduced 
to students in schools of journalism and mass communications of Chinese universities. It 
is repacked into Chinese Confucianism, which also seeks to restrain its rulers'power. For 
doing that, courageous and bold individuals should criticize repressive rulers, making the 
principled literati regard themselves as intermediaries between the government and the 
people (Goldman, 1994: 5). 
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Although it is difficult to put the westerns concepts of media professional ization into 
Chinese practice, there are some bold journalists criticize the authoritarian regime from a 
normative or ideological perspective. In this way, the western journalistic ethic has still 
developed 'Zola-l ike'journal ism. Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolis Papers) is a 
typical case. 
Nanfang Dush! Bao (Southern Metropolis Papers) was one of the first news media 
to report the case of Sun Zhigang, a college graduate and graphic designer who was 
brutally beaten to death while in police administrative detention in the middle of March 
2003. A month later, Chen Feng, an investigative reporter in the Southern Metropolis 
Papers, revealed it with several pages under the title 'The death of detainee Sun Zhigang'. 
This investigative story was listed on most of the popular news websites such as 
wwwsinaxom www. peopledally. com www. sohu. com, and so on. Readers soon posted 
plenty of bulletins on the web to protest against the maladministration. Following the 
Southern Metropolis Papers, other well-known media, such as China ý News Weekly, the 
Southern Weekend, Beying Youth Daily, and so on, provided further detailed coverage of 
the Sun Zhigang Incident. On May 14 2003, three researchers with legal doctoral degrees, 
submitted a proposal to the NPC, suggesting the Provision ofAdministrative Detention in 
the City (Chengshi liulang qitao renyuan shourong qianshong banfa), which was enacted 
in 1982, should be abolished. With plenty of updated coverage, the Southern Metropolis 
Papers further scolded the detention system under the title 'Six inquiries on the detention 
system (liuwen shourong qianshong zhidu)' on May 27. It enquired into the detention 
system in terms of its legitimacy, the rationale for its existence, its supervision, fines for 
detention, abuse of human rights. It underlined the point that, 'the maladministration and 
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ineffectiveness of the detention system has been discovered, it is time to reform it. '9 On 
June 9,18 persons involved were sentenced to the death penalty, life imprisonment, and 
jail terms, respectively. On June 20, the State Council promulgated a new decree on 
detention issues, replacing the 1982 one. It added in some places rulings on the human 
rights of immigrant farmer workers in the city. 
The Sun Zhigang Incident demonstrated how the leading role of the media may 
stimulate self-awareness of civil rights and the rule of law for their citizens. It may 
formulate a model of interaction between civil institutions and the government, when the 
news media reverts to its role as 'watchdog', in the Chinese saying, 'mouth and tongue of 
the people' (Renminxing), becoming a significant instrument of public supervision. This 
could encourage the educated and well-off middle class to call for more open and 
accountable goverriment. 10 The increasing willingness of Chinese people to express their 
own opinions in newspapers, on the radio, television, and the Internet, make the media 
into public places. Then, driven by the public consensus, the government have to respond 
to the news media and public opinion. The process may be spontaneous in the first stage 
but it could become a push toward institutionalization in the final stage (Zeng Huaguo, 
2006: Chap. 1). 
To a great degree, the case of Sun Zhigang reflects the changing relations between 
the media, society and the state under media globalization. The state no longer 
completely controls society and the news media. The society has opportunities to 
influence the national will (guqjiqyizhi). It implies that political participation among 
9 The Southern Metropolis Papers further castigated the detention system under the title 'Liuwen shourong qiansong 
zhidu' [six questions about the detention system] on May 27,2003. 
10 For more about China's middle class, see Li Chunling, 'Zhongchanjiechun: Zhongguo shehui zide guangzhu de 
renqun [Middle Class in China: a Group Worth Studying]', Zhonggwo shehul xingsh! Jenxi yu yuche [Blue Book of 
Chinak Society: Analysis and Forecast on Chinaý Social Development] (Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation 
Publishing House, 2004), pp. 51-63. 
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Chinese citizens could be enhanced if the news media provided more information rather 
than propaganda messages. It can raise a kind of social force to negotiate with the state. If 
there are freer places for news media, the government has to become more of a servant, 
instead of manager, of its citizens. But if the citizens and news media impose their impact 
on the state gradually and skilfully, the media can return to its role of watchdog. 
The case of the Sun Zhigang Incident shows the positive impact of media 
globalization on Chinese media ethic, however, there is also a negative influence on 
Chinese journalism in the course of globalization and commercialization. The blurred 
media roles, together with money-worship, drive some journalists on another path. Some 
journalists begin to abuse their power. After the Fanshi story cover-up case, the 
professional ethics and standards of Chinese journalism have to be re-examined and 
re-established. In September 2002, the Fanshi gold mine explosion accident in Shanxi 
Province killed 39 people and was followed by a massive cover-up. 11 journalists were 
found to have taken bribes to stay silent about the deadly disaster. They took bribes 
totaling 74,600 Yuan (US$8,987) in cash and gold (Interviewee 16). The journalists 
involved abused their media power. They exchanged the public trust for their private 
benefits. This case is not isolated. In fact, the 'red packet' phenomenon, which refers to 
the traditional custom of offering a gift of money wrapped in red paper, is popular in 
China's media circles. The 'red packet' turns news into advertisement and results in no 
journalistic ethic. A popular ditty sums it up this way, 'the first-rank news workers play 
with the stocks, the second-rank get advertisements; the third-rank take bribes; the 
fourth-rank write for other papers; the fifth write for their own paper. '(Interviewee 55) 
The reasons for paid journalism, or 'envelope culture', have been identified, as: (1) 
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journalists' incomes are comparatively low given their level of education; (2) journalists 
have poor professional awareness of their role as a 'fourth estate'; (3) the profession is 
risky; and, (4) there is no Press law to specify improper behaviour and relative 
punishments (Lynch, 1999: 64; Zhao, 1988: chap. 4). Moreover, there are carrots as well as 
sticks in Chinese media circles. For those who use a journalist's title for the sake of 
personal gain, they may have good performance and promotion both in media circles and 
regulatory circles. For those who act as watchdogs, they may be black listed throughout 
the propaganda system, and even abandoned by their boss. With this confusion, it is 
difficult for the Chinese media to stick to truth and objectivity, which ought to be the 
lifeblood of journalism in the west. The cost in public trust has been immeasurable 
becauscjournalists are regarded as disreputable, untrustworthy and dishonest. 
The regulatory bodies try to keep the negative sides of media globalization and 
media marketization to a minimum. They have issued many measures to curb the 
malpractices of journalism, strictly prohibiting 'paid journalism'. In August 1993, the 
CPD and the SAPP issued a joint circular to campaign against paid journalism. The State 
Council General Office also issued a circular, which asserts that 'No cash gifts or 
negotiable securities should be given to reporters and press units under any condition. ' 
The National Journalists' Association established and continuously improved the code of 
ethics of journalism by drafting many articles to attack paid journalism. In 1994, it 
clarified that a journalist 'should not accept money or negotiable securities in any form 
from units and individuals they report on. ' The Advertising Law of the PRC, which was 
enacted in February 1995, codifies that news-reporting and advertising should be 
separated. The government has even forced journalists to take a test since 2003, mostly 
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focusing on journalism ethics. However, some journalists and media organizations have 
still continued their illegal and unethical practices in all forms. The campaign against 
paid journalism becomes a case of 'loud thunder, small raindrops' (leishengda, 
yudianxiao). In 2003, the amount in a 'red packet' for a news conference in Beijing's real 
estate industry rose to RMB 1000 Yuan and at least RMB 5000 Yuan for a feature report 
(Interviewee 8). The practitioners maintain that paid journalism is not just a moral issue. 
Bribery and corruption are a structural problem in China's political life (Zhao Zhenyu, 
2003: 21-28), rooted in 'the contradictions between the party's old ways of 
conceptualising and organizing journalism and the new commercialised environment 
under which journalism operates' (Zhao, 1998: 84). 
However, Chinese journalists themselves are reluctant to think of themselves in 
those terms. In fact, they work hard to maximize their autonomy. The role of being a 
professional journalist precedes that of being a Communist Party member. A prominent 
editor on the Southern Weekend argues: 
'Some believe that journalistic bribery and corruption is a direct result of 
media globalization and media commercialization. In fact, there is little scandal 
over bribery in the market-oriented media. In contrast, it always happens in the 
Party media. Therefore, the direction of media reforms is to establish more 
market-oriented media institutions, in which there are pools of media workers 
with accountability, detachment, and rational isation. They Dournalists] should 
provide comprehensive, timely, balanced information and opinions. (Interviewee 
10) 
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3.3 An Alternative: Escapism and Hypnotism of Chinese Media Culture 
In the course of globalization, Chinese media practitioners have come to understand 
the basis of the mass media as the 'fourth power' in the society. However, under the strict 
control by the authoritarian regime, they cannot put theory into practice. The widespread 
usage of Western jargon in media criticism and the adoption of Western reporting 
techniques and genres makes it possible for Chinese media practitioners to recognise 
concerns about their own roles. But the dismissal of some bold journalists in 1989 as well 
as the repressive political climate following the Tiananmen Incident frightened outspoken 
journalists (Chen, 1999: 168). If the mass media cannot be accountable to the people, 
Chinese journalists may not do it for the party. They changed their radical attitudes to 
media reform, and they 'keep silent, rather than lie' (Interviewee 10). Therefore, the 
Chinese media culture in terms of journalism has adopted the commercial norms of 
TNMCs directly and indirectly. As Sections 2 in this chapter have examined, under 
intense competition with the TNMCs, most Chinese media practitioners cynically choose 
the 'third way'--- populism --- to provide sensationalized and entertainment stories for 
audiences. Therefore, the media play the role of entertainer. 
Entertainment is one of important roles that TNMCs have proclaimed. It partly 
stems from the idea of consumer sovereignty, which argues that free markets perfectly 
reflect and respond to consumer demands (Pratten, 1997). The tabloid practitioners suggest 
that adherence to the free market needs a lot of media elites who understand economic 
and media principles. The previous press established by politicians should be gradually 
replaced by those set up by media elites. The increasing strength of market forces is 
driving Chinese media professionals away from the conventional Marxist-Leninist model. 
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The market becomes 'the principal means for societal actors to gradually and subtly 
influence the political process and alter the balance of power between the state and 
society' (Pei, 1994: 150). For maximizing media audiences as well as profits in the course 
of global competition, Chinese media adjust their editorial styles, increase diversity of 
information and entertainment, and cut propaganda messages. To some degree, Chinese 
journalism shares issues in common with those of Eastern Europe in the post-communist 
era (Gross, 2002; McNair, 2001), where journalism has been influenced by the 
commercial norms of TNMCs. Ma Wei, editor-in-chief of China Culture News, claims 
that only after newspapers have conquered the market can they talk about guiding the 
market and winning the ideological war (see Zhao, 1998: 140). A media manager in 
Beijing argues that more straightforwardly, 
'Papers in the major cities need to consider first and foremost that they are in 
a business. If they want to make a profit, their newspapers must increase 
circulation. If they want to increase circulation, they must make newspapers more 
readable, provide what readers want, and create more public 
discourse. '(Interviewee 27) 
In operation, both the Chinese domestic media and the TNMCs acknowledge that 
their audiences are far from being gullible. In order to minimize their costs and maximize 
their profits, they attempt to formulate attractions of production, promotion and 
distribution. Chinese media practitioners call it 'industrialization (chanyehua)'. 11 They 
keep 'propaganda' to a minimum and replace it with cultural and entertainment news, or 
11 See, for example, a speech of Wang Chuangtian, CEO of private-owned Guangxian, 'Zhongguo yule dianshi jiemu 
gongyehua shengchan/, Zhongguo chuanme! ziben shichuang yunying [The Operation in Capital markets: China k 
Media] (Guangzhou: Nanfangribaochubanshe, 2004), pp. 320-33 1. 
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so-called 'infotainment' by the TNMCs. To some degree, their works are not simply a 
ýparty service', but the creation of products that compete for audiences against other 
media (Qian Wei, 2002: 99). In the broadcasting television sector, talk shows, game shows, 
fashion shows, and cooking programmes emerged on screens in addition to soap operas. 
Hot topics, dramatic story lines, hidden cameras, street interviews, slick graphics are key 
ingredients which have all contributed to the popularity of Chinese television 
programmes. Imitating American shows like Cops or 48 Hours, television crews ride 
along with the police for the purpose of exposing crime and corruption (for instance, 
CCTV' Fazhi zaixian). The introduction of late-night talk shows with call-in lines saves 
the radio from bankruptcy. The subjects range from dissatisfaction with municipal 
garbage pickup and congested roadways to open-mike poetry recitations. But the hottest 
topics are sex and divorce. The Beying People's Broadcasting Station's evening 
'hotline' receives thirty to fifty calls a night. By remaining anonymous, participants bring 
up subjects they would never discuss with their coworkers or family (Interviewee 47). In 
Shanghai, both the mayor and the vice-mayor have responded to people's questions on 
the radio. The content may not be overtly political, but in a country where voicing 
complaints has always been risky, a direct line to the leadership is a novelty (Jerriow, 
1994). Furthermore, entertainment programming has become increasingly liberated. A 
greater degree of independence is now granted to producers. In order to survive in the 
marketplace, the state-owned broadcasters, traditionally collaborating with 
non-commercial interests, are now beginning to find new ways to recreate their 
operations outside the mainstream public sectors. The alliance with commercial interests 
is no longer a taboo, but a necessity, and also a way to deal with cost-saving pressures. 
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Private-owned Guangxian Ltd. now provides at least seven hours of entertainment 
programmes every week to more than 100 state-owned television stations. 12 
In the newspaper sector, journalists and editors have provided soft news in weekend 
editions of mainstream dailies since 1992. They play double roles, which can be summed 
up in the words of an interviewee, 'during the week, these papers fulfill their Communist 
party obligations; on the weekends, they make money. '(Interviewee 49) In the mid-1990s, 
metropolitan tabloids, which prefer sensational stories, bloomed all over the country. For 
many, the primary goal is to make money. They have also discovered that pushing the 
boundaries of the envelope to get real news-the more sensational the better-is the best 
way to be a winner in the marketplace (Gough, 2004). The typical tabloid story is trivial, 
scurrilous or invented, involving trivialization, sensationalism, obscenity, vulgarity, and 
sexism. Thus, Daniel Lynch argues that Chinese journalism, 
'is being used in China neither to prepare the ground for a liberal democracy nor to 
build a socialist spiritual civilization ....... Politically conscious journalists can 
therefore harmonize their interests with money-minded media outlet managers. The 
only loser is the central party-state. '(Lynch, 1999: 96,98) 
The new media formats, with less hierarchical presentation of subject matter and 
more informal style, are mostly presented with a talk show and phone-in where people 
participate as themselves rather than as representing an institution. It can be interpreted as 
journalist's self-liberalisation and as the Party's loss of media control. Subsequently, 
Chinese journalists give more room for ordinary people to voice their opinions. Human 
12 
see, for example, a speech of Wang Chuangtian, CEO of Guangxian, 'Zhongguo yule dianshi jiemu gongyehua 
shengchan', Zhongguo chuanmel ziben shichuang yunying; Zhou, Wei (ed. ), Meying Qianyan (Media Frontiers in 
China), pp. 46-50. 
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interest stories appeared, squeezing out positive propaganda stories (Burgh, 2003: 40-43). 
The past decade has seen a proliferation of publications beneath the once stifling canopy 
of the propaganda machine, though the Party remains an adamant overlord. As a result, 
the media establish a kind of public sphere, which provides preconditions for developing 
democracy. 
However, like their international counterparts, Chinese media practitioners 
sometimes slip into another extreme. They seriously neglect their role of providing a 
public service. For instance, 44 percent of CCTV's total programming in 1984 was 
cultural and entertainment programming, compared to 35 percent of the total devoted to 
educational programming. In 1990, educational programme on CCTV decreased to only 5 
percent, while entertainment reached nearly 60 percent (Hong, 1998: 79). As China 
continues moving toward international society, it requires diversity of information to 
breed social pluralism and to reduce dependence on the Party and state (Chan, 
1994a: 70-88). Without the basic social responsibility, the media cannot represent the 
4people-ness'. 
The contradictory roles that Chinese journalists play reflect the ups and downs 
during an evolutionary process. Some share the universal democratic ideas of the media 
as watchdog while others hold the hard-line that the media is an instrument for 
party-control. The Zola-type journalism, in which some journalists play a role as 
intellectuals, rather than reporters, tried to sow the seeds of democracy in China 
(Goldman, 1994). 
Whilst the communist cultures are still the mainstream of news media culture 
advocated by the Party, freedom, individualism, materialism, gastronomy and other 
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westernized moral standards as a result of media globalization, which are considered by 
the Party as 'spiritual pollution' and 'bourgeois ideology', have already permeated into 
the Chinese mass media. Although there are many measures to control the rampant 
non-mainstream media content, all lack effectiveness due to the fragmentation of media 
structure, which has been discussed in Chapter Five. Some interviewees maintain that the 
significant difference between central and local organizations make supervisory control 
difficult. The effectiveness of supervisory control depends on the proximity of the unit to 
the Centre and the unit's audience size (Interviewee 1). The key Party organs at national 
level --- major newspapers and broadcast networks-may be kept in the hands of central 
authorities. The provincial news media are supervised not as tightly as the central ones. 
The media outlets at municipal and country levels enjoy more freedom as local 
authorities promote their economic development. As a result, the audiences have 
compared the central media content to 'distilled water'. The provincial media content is 
regarded as 'boiled water'. The municipal and county - filled with sensational stories, 
violence, and action - is 'Coca-cola' (Zhao, 1998: 168). The media as a whole singularly 
failed to engage in any substantive self-criticism. Instead, it always prefers trivialization 
to more constructive and serious analysis. 
Media globalization produces Chinese domestic media institutional transformation 
and media industrialization. They combined synthetically to generate a movement of 
fledgling journalism reform and the emergence of discourse on media democratization in 
the mid-1980s and media diversification in the 1990s. With the continuing openness, 
market forces in the course of globalization began to rapidly penetrate into every aspect 
of news media operations and management. The cloning and adoption of foreign 
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commercial models and programme formats, which is called local-globalization by 
practitioners, partly excludes the political and educational roles of Chinese media. Instead, 
they assume the role of an entertainer to amuse the masses, a tendency toward 
tabloidization ofjoumalism (Qian Wei, 2002: 99). 
Chinese journalists may be aware that the life of journalism lies in courage and 
sincerity that does not bow down to power and does not flatter. They may comprehend 
that good journalism, defined by the Western media, aims at 'discovering and promoting 
the audience's understanding of an event via truth-promoting methods' (Kieran, 1998: 34). 
Hence, impartiality is very important. The internal goal ofjournalism to inform the public 
about significant events requires journalists to strive to be impartial and thus objective. 
Like other transitional and transformational states, the Chinese media need to be 
professional ized. In other words, the journalist's commitment to norms of objectivity and 
impartiality is one of the significant characteristics of the 'liberal broker'. 
However, the worst thing for the Chinese media is that the practitioners stick to 
powerful actors, no matter whether they are political or economic. If they generally 
regard their audiences as consumers, rather than citizens, the possibility of providing 
objective and impartial information would be deliberately reduced. It may shift from out 
extreme of political propaganda to another commercial propaganda. Then, they would 
generate a division of the audience into two parts. One is mostly wealthier and better 
educated, which 'consumes' news of perhaps a higher quality; the other is the poorer, less 
educated, rural, and substantially drawn from minority groups, who embrace a tabloid 
style of local news. This dilemma is also criticised in the West (Hallin, 1994: 179). If the 
media produce such cultural barriers, as well as the knowledge gap, they may not create a 
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new political culture. As in the Chinese saying, it could be like sowing seeds on barren 
ground. 
4 THE STRUGGLE FOR MEDIA FREEDOM: THE CASE OF THE 
SO UTHERN ME TR OPOLIS PA PER 
The previous sections argued that under global competition the Chinese media 
practitioners have been keen to provide entertainment for their audiences, leading the 
institutional transformation of media governance in term of media culture, and driving 
the 'dumbling down' of Chinese society. It may make them less sophisticated in the ways 
that they think about politics. The media performance and media culture have been 
transformed from a uniform style to diversity. Some media still hold the party's hard-line, 
some change to entertainment, and some struggle for more public spaces. The latter 
indicates a trend of Chinese media evolution: when China has become more participative 
in global society, some of its media would act the role as the 'fourth estate' after they 
have obtained enough financial independence. The allegation may be explained as 
Nanfang Dushi Bao (the Southem Metropolis Papers) paid the bitter price for the 
inevitable conflicts between roles being a tool for the government, and also an 
independent media outlet expressing what people care about. The paper, which used to be 
an entertaining tabloid, has gradually won a justified reputation for its aggressive 
in-depth stories on what is truly happening in China. As the previous section has 
discussed, it was one of the first news organization to report the case of Sun Zhigang, a 
college graduate and graphic designer who was brutally beaten to death while in police 
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administrative detention in March 2003. Its call for international attention to investigate 
the SARS outbreak in Guangdong Province in early 2003 received the fiercest criticism 
from the local government, but the follow-up story on a possible SARS patient on 
February 27,2004 was confirmed immediately by the health department in Guangdong 
and the central government. It also attracted attention locally and internationally. 
When the Chinese media assumed they could enjoy more space to exercise their role 
as 'watchdog', the arrest of the senior mangers and editors of the Southern Metropolis 
Papers extinguished their ambition. Yu Huafeng, the associate-chief-editor and general 
manager of the Southern Metropolis Papers, and Li Minying, the former board member 
of the social committee in the Southern Daily Newspaper Group, were both found guilty 
and sentenced to prison for bribery and embezzlement. Cheng Y`izhong, the 
editor-in-chief of the Southern Metropolis Papers and the New Capital Paper under the 
Southern Daily Newspaper Group, was arrested on March 19,2004 (Interviewee 48). 
The allegations against the Southern Metropolis Paper attracted much attention 
nationally and internationally. In China, the commercialized media or semi-independent 
media organised themselves as an ally to defend their own rights; the mainstream media, 
however, stand aside, even with an attitude of schadenfreude. Unlike those party media 
which kept silent, the relatively independent media allied with and defended their 
colleagues with a rational attitude. Rather than using the concept of press freedom which 
would provoke the government, they employed the concept of constitutional governance 
and applied other existing laws to rescue their peers. Caying first reported this case in 
early March. According to Caying, the charge against Yu Huafeng seems unreasonable, 
because there is an 'annual accounting schedule' between the Southern Metropolis Paper 
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and the Southern Daily Newspaper Group. The senior managers have the right to 
distribute their awards and bonuses when they achieve their business goals (Pan 
Xiaohong, 2004). 
Beyond the economic charge, according to some insiders, it has long been known 
that some officials in Guangdong swore revenge for the 'negative' reporting by the 
Southern Metropolis Paper. They did it because the coverage of Sun Zhigang, SARS, and 
other cases enraged the local government. According to the history of the CCP's method 
of governing, the government is keen to unleash the media for free discussion and reports 
for a brief period, and take revenge afterwards based on their previous words and deeds. 
This case, however, is more than 'revenge' from the local government. It is trampling 
on the Constitution (Interviewees 6,8 and 16). The Chinese media and intellectual circles 
care about the progress of Chinese constitutional reform. The current legal system and 
administrative regulations are facing the fundamental challenges of how to switch the 
system smoothly without stirring up more turmoil. The case of the Southern Metropolis 
Paper demonstrates the painful price journalists have to pay for media transformation 
from the central-controlled government-owned management system to the modernized 
market-orientated system. 
The in-depth rational discussion by independent media like Caying and other social 
organizations finally prompted reexamination of the case of the Southern Metropolis 
Paper Some senior politicians such as Ren Zhongyi, a prominent liberal reformer in 
Chinese politics in the 1980s and early 1990s, have participated in this debate (Pan 
Xiaohong, 2004). During this process, the emerging independent media showed their 
strength as a political actor to stimulate the social awareness to defend their own rights. 
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Finally, Cheng Yizhong was freed in late 2004 and the Southern Metropolis Paper still 
covers investigative report. With an acceptable institutional ised way, the Chinese media 
authorities permit the media practitioners to struggle for their freedom. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the extent to which Chinese media culture has 
transformed from the monopoly of Marxist media culture to the de-propagandization of 
media culture, leading to the 'dumbling down' of Chinese society. It argues that when 
increasing TNMCs appear in Chinese media market with audience-appealing 
entertainment, the Chinese media practitioners institutionally adjust their performance 
and operation principles, then making the transformation of media culture from 
communist journalism into a multi-cultural, pluralism style. This change makes it 
possible for Chinese media practitioners to lower the number of propaganda messages 
and increase the entertainment content, and results in making Chinese society less 
sophisticated in the way that it thinks about politics in the globalization era. Therefore, 
the model of media governance in media contents has transformed from the top-down 
model to the bottom-up model, or at least a mix of the two. 
The complicated implications of entertainment have been significantly ignored in 
the literature on media politics in China. For conventional analysis, entertainment does 
not confirm to a classic liberal conception of the rational exchange between the rulers 
and ruled. This assumption is that the purpose of public debate in the media is to 
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influence changes in government policy and exercise democratic control over the state. 
We cannot make simple interpretations of political effects on the news or of the media's 
effect on politics. In the Chinese context, however, entertainment has rich implications 
for democracy. As James Curran points out, 'in fact media entertainment is one means by 
which people engage at an intuitive and expressive level in a public dialogue about the 
direction of society. ' (Curran, 1991: 102) In this sense, entertainment programming is 'an 
integral part of the media's "informational role" (Curran, 1991: 102). ' The presence of 
TNMCs in China generated increasing entertainment and pluralism of journalism, having 
a profound impact on reforming China, providing alternative information different from 
any official bulletin. In the west, the homogenization, commercialization, and 
trivialization of media products are regarded as impinging on their democratization 
capabilities (Sparks, 2000: 2-5). However, in the Chinese context, the western style of 
media content regarded by the Party and government as 'spiritually polluting'; 'vulgar'; 
'pornographic'; and, 'feudal superstitious' materials, acts as an invisible weapon, 
weakens the state's media governance to build a 'socialist spiritual civilization', and 
undermines official vigorous criticism and political campaigns since the 1990s. The rise 
of media culture with consumerism, individualism, cynicism, authority scepticism, and 
human rights, ensuing from globalization and imported programmes and norms, can 
revalidate or adjust social attitudes that shape social relationships. Therefore, 
entertainment programmes may have become a force for political, cultural and social 
changes in China, offering alternatives to uniforrn official ideologies, expectations, and 
lifestyles. These messages may help to disturb authoritarian governments and repressive 
traditional rules, stimulating visions of liberalisation from the suffocating circumstances 
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of everyday life. They have provided more opportunities for Chinese audiences to 
establish their public spheres, to stimulate political awareness, and to cultivate a 
democratic social culture. They put competitive pressure on state-controlled media 
systems, develop rapid dissemination of the popular culture in the dominant commercial 
media, and make for greater linkages among people and the emergence of some kind of 
global culture, whose main theme is democracy. Market-oriented media undermine the 
political control of the Communist party. A non-state controlled public sphere may 
emerge as the party's administrative and ideological control of the media is weakened. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION: DISMANTLING THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters have sought to demonstrate a unique, complex story about 
the influence of globalization and TNMCs on Chinese media governance. This study 
argues that the traditional model of media governance has gradually been dismantled and 
become increasingly institutional ised with the increase in governance participants. This 
study as a whole also argues that Chinese media reforms have not only responded to 
internal dynamics, but have also benefited from external support. This support includes 
mass aspirations for economic and political liberalisation, elite politics that embrace 
economic reforms but block political liberalisation, and transnational connections that 
have favoured a liberalized climate (Lynch, 1999; Zhao, 1998; Hong, 1998; Winckler, 
1999). To some extent, global forces have become the liberal broker for Chinese media 
transformation. The authoritarian government resisted dramatic political changes by 
institutional mechanisms. The presence of TNMCs is a result of institutional 
arrangements, but it goes beyond governmental arrangements. Their appearance 
stimulates the demand for further media reforms, and even political reforms. It is safe to 
argue that there is a substantial impact of globalization and TNMCs upon media 
governance. There is a big transformation of media governance in China in terms of 
media institutions, regulation, market structure, and media culture. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the main arguments in this study. Secondly, 
it argues that the increasing dismantling of the Party's monopoly over the media has rich 
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implications for China's media governance. The relationships between the state, the 
domestic players, and TNMCs, respectively, are considered here. Finally, further 
objectives of possible research on media politics in China are suggested. 
2 RESPONSE TO THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In this study, I set up four primary objectives. All of them have been examined with 
original material. 
Firstly, the roles that TNMCs play in the ongoing changes of China's media 
governance have been identified. TNMCs have become one of the most important power 
brokers. On the one hand, the TNMCs bargain with regulators to build up their own 
platforms of production, promotion, and distribution in terms of publications, television, 
movies and magazines, though the government has sought to minimize their impact upon 
Chinese society through many measures; on the other hand, TNMCs cooperate with 
different Chinese media organizations, such as provincial media channels, ministry 
newspapers, institution magazines, publishing houses, and so on, to penetrate the Chinese 
media market. The monopoly of the party media, for instance, CCTV, has been gradually 
undermined. Therefore, the Chinese media structure has been transformed from 
party-monopoly to a dualistic system, in which state-owned and private-owned media 
compete with each other in the marketplace. 
Secondly, incentives for media governance changes stemming from the TNMCs and 
globalization have been explored. In order to sustain economic growth and integrate into 
the international economy, the Chinese government was forced to open its media market 
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in a limited way, both for TNMCs and private investors. The media have been regarded 
as an industry. This media industry resulted in a freer flow of information in China. 
However, there have been many mishaps during media globalization and 
commercialization. The investment from other industries has given them the right to 
operate the media. The investors, in most cases, are not given actual control and 
authorized property rights of the media they invest in. Such governance may not ensure 
the rights of private capital and may even be more damaging for foreign investors than 
Chinese investors. 
Thirdly, the examination of the existing proposed structures of media regulation 
through the main body of this study, particularly in Chapters Three and Four, 
demonstrates that media-policy making in China has become more institutional ised. The 
increasing bargaining within different parties and more transparency in the process of 
policy-making, though still lacking stability, show that the model of policy creation has 
been gradually transformed from a 'leader-determined ' model to a 'consensus-building' 
model, at least, a mix of the two. Rather than only being determined by the leaders of the 
party or the government in the past, media policy making has increasingly been 
formulated by bargaining between different participating groups. And, this process has 
become more regularized and transparent. To some degree, the increasing participation on 
the part of domestic media, transnational media corporations, and local media regulators, 
rather than the central Party itself, may provide a relatively effective, fair, equal 
regulatory system. The design of these reforms made the authoritarian system work more 
effectively under the new circumstances. 
Fourthly, this study has examined the values and institutional features of China's 
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media governance. These values and features have potential for the future. As Chapter 
Five discusses, ownership of some media has been allowed to transform state-owned to 
public-owned companies. As Eric Kit-wai Ma suggests, 'market forces open up spaces 
and accumulate financial power, which can be translated into bargaining power. '(2000: 24) 
The stable investment by large commercial companies has helped to offset the fact that 
media revenues were notoriously vulnerable to the periodic ups and downs of the 
advertising market. To some extent, this situation is similar to that of the British press in 
the nineteenth century, in which the growth of newspaper profits, mainly from advertising, 
enabled the press to free themselves from state and party subsidies and to develop 
independent organizations for gathering news (Curran, 1997: 64-99). In the Chinese 
context, the strength of market forces could be showed by the demise of the monopoly of 
the national media and the rise of local media. Due to the differences between localities, 
the structural changes of mass media provide more possibilities to promote liberal and 
independent editorials. The pluralism may weaken the party-control over the mass media. 
3 DISMANTLING THE PARTY MONOPOLY 
This study has examined the complexity and flexibility of the transformation of 
China's media governance in the course of globalization. This examination has gone 
beyond the research objectives discussed in the previous sector. This section provides a 
clear understanding of the media transformation by dividing China's media politics since 
1992 into three periods. Later, it will establish five areas of academic originality. 
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The whole picture of media politics in the PRC from 1992 could be described as the 
dismantling of the party's monopoly, though the communist party still dominated the 
ruling positions. The increase in bargaining between different media regulators and 
practitioners, though still lacking stability, showed that the model of media governance, 
particularly policy creation, was transformed from a 'leader-determined' model to a 
'consensus-building' model. Chapter Three argued that the increasing institutional media 
power may gradually dismantle the paramount party leader's determining. Chapter Four 
argued that deregulation and re-regulation may slowly dismantle the domination of the 
CCP's regulatory power from that of a mono-policy-maker to a multi-policy-maker; 
Chapter Five discussed the changes in media structure whereby the monopoly of the 
state-owned media structure was dramatically dismantled; and, Chapter Six examined the 
ways in which de-propagandization also increasingly dismantled the communist media 
culture. 
This transformative dismantlement is a long, maybe never-ending, process. It can 
be divided into three periods: the pre-transitional; transitional; and, the post-transitional 
period. Table 7.1 demonstrates some basic features of these periods in terms of their 
organizational norms, market entry, market structure, and media culture. According to 
this study, media transformation, as a mix of rationalisation and liberalisation, began 
from the late 1970s. In the late 1980s, there were some changes in media governance but 
the Party effectively employed five mechanisms of press control: regulatory, financial, 
managerial, editorial, and self-imposed control, respectively (Polumbaum, 1990). 
However, these mechanisms lost some of their effectiveness in the 1990s, as Chapter 
Three and other chapters discuss. Chapters Four and Five have argued that after 1992 the 
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CCP lifted some controls over private ownership in the media sector, though it insisted on 
the primacy of pan-Chinese solidarity over pluralization, and socialist ideology over 
cultural diversification. Media reforms have been characterized by upholding both 
authoritarian and market principles. The increasingly market-oriented economy has put 
structural pressures on media industries to follow suit. As Chapter Six has discussed, the 
de-propagandization of media culture implies the mass media may dumb down society. 
The media partly shifted from 'propaganda instruments' to 'an industry', from 'leading 
the masses' to 'serving consumers', and from 'ideological tools' to 'information 
providers'. It led to a dramatic change of media content. As Chapter Five and Six have 
discussed, when mass media gain financial independence, those financial and managerial 
controls which used to be employed effectively by the Party and the government to 
govern the mass media lose their importance. Editorial and self-imposed controls have 
decreasing effectiveness in the Party's media, as well as in semi-independent, 
independent, and foreign media, though regulatory mechanisms are powerful. In a word, 
the Party's traditional control machines in the media governance seem to be gradually 
dismantled in the course of globalization and marketization. 
In the process of this transformative dismantlement of party control, globlalization 
and marketization created ethical dilemmas for Chinese journalists. The adjustment of 
media governance has given more space for domestic media to operate. Courageous and 
bold individuals have begun to criticize repressive rulers, regarding themselves as 
intermediaries between the government and the people. However, the media managers 
would like to maintain self-censorship for the sake of political survival. Therefore, bold 
journalists in fact have small space for political reporting outside what the regime wants. 
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On the other hand, under intense market competition, some Chinese media have begun to 
regard their audiences as consumers, rather than citizens. They choose a 'third way'--- 
populism --- to provide sensationalized and entertainment stories for audiences. This may 
significantly reduce the possibility for providing objective and impartial information. 
Then, the Chinese media may shift from the extreme of political propaganda to 
commercial propaganda instead. Furthermore, corruption in media industries has also 
become a serious problem. These dilemmas over media roles, together with 
money-worship, may not drive the Chinese media toward establishing a political 
institution that furthers social development and democratization. 
Table 7.1 Transitional Model of Media Politics in China 
Pre-transitional Model Transitional Model Post-transitional Model 
Media Guideline Media as Mouthpiece and Persuasion-oriented content, Watchdog 
Tone 
- 
profit-oriented management 
Media Institutional I. State-owned and I. State-owned and I. A mix of state-, 
Arrangement governmental advertising revenue public-, and 
subsidiary 2. Conglomeration private-owned; 
2. Central planning 3. Semi-governmental 2. Macro control and 
governmental institute, semi-enterprise micro openness 
management 4. limited non-state-owned 3. Public institution; 
3. One part of media ownership limited privatization of 
administration media ownershi 
Press Norm Political-oriented Realism, Escapism and Objectivity, fairness and I- I 
Hypnotism 
I 
neutrality 
This study makes five main contributions to the academic debate on this subject: 
Firstly, it challenges, or at least qualifies, the 'value-domination' model in the study of 
media politics. Traditional academic literature in the field maintains that the main 
features of a given media system depend on its political system. A media system is 
determined by the value of dominant groups in society. Colin Sparks challenges this 
theory with an examination of Eastern Europe, arguing that media features in such 
transitional countries have significant continuity with the former communist period 
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(Sparks, 1998). This study provides a corrective to the 'value-domination' model, 
illustrating that although China is a communist country, its media system is not 
completely represented by the ruling party in the course of globalization. Therefore, it is 
safe to argue that 'the four theories of the press' (Siebert, et al, 1963) are unable to 
provide useful insights into the past, present or future of the Chinese media system. The 
Chinese media transformation is political in a much deeper and wider sense than western 
theories expected. The argument that a single, dominant value system determines all of 
the important features of a media system and a society is clearly inadequate to interpret 
and deal with a transformative change of the kind that this study has examined. 
Secondly, it provides rich original material for examining power relations in 
Chinese media politics. It argues that when the framework of media governance has been 
transformed, the localities enjoy more autonomy and the centre-local relationship has 
changed dramatically. Media governance under globalization increased interactions 
among the international and national media regulators, domestic and transnational media 
players. As Chapters Five and Six demonstrate, the provincial media channels and 
TNMCs cooperate to compete with the monopoly of CCTV. This cooperation is a process 
of iterated negotiations between the state and the market. A basic principle of these 
interplays is that all participants pursue profit maximization. The market-oriented reforms 
led the CCP to reduce their involvement in the media systems. Market forces have 
become a key variable. On the one hand, the media have become an important actor in 
the market economy under the guideline of 'governmental body, enterprise operation' 
(shiye danwei, qiyefingying); on the other hand, they have to meet the market demands 
as an important industry to ensure national economic growth. The regulators may actively 
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give up their rights in controlling the media industry in detail. They may manage it at the 
macro level for the sake of pushing for further market-oriented reforms, and they may 
lose some control as a result of globalization and marketization. If the loss of control 
can be managed, or if the development of a market economy could provide enough 
compensation, the state would be satisfied with the markets. Their relationship is 
compatible and cooperative. The state carefully measures the cost of strict control. If the 
costs are higher than its expectation or the result does not challenge its power, the state 
would compromise and cooperate with the market. Ineffectiveness of the market system, 
instability of reforms, and interference by the state would cause media reforms to change 
direction. The international and national dynamics are the main factors that affect 
Chinese media governance toward democratic communication. Although the state tried to 
consolidate its strength as it found its base diminished in the reforms, the market has 
revealed its power and dismantled the state monopoly. 
Thirdly, it provides some evidence on the main hypotheses proposed in the 
literature to analyze the political, economical, and cultural determinants of transnational 
corporations (TNMCs) in China from a macro perspective. This study identifies the role 
which TNMCs play to undermine the dominance of the CCP in the Chinese media market. 
Cooperating with provincial and local media channels, TNMCs penetrate into most of the 
provinces in China. The monopoly of the party-media, for instance, CCTV in the 
television sector, has been gradually dismantled. Therefore, media structure is 
transformed from a party-monopoly into a dualistic system. 
Fourthly, it provides rich empirical data in studying media market competition and 
its consequences in China. According to this study, media competition may produce a 
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marketplace of ideas with appropriate diversity. It shows that TNMCs and domestic 
media are the two important means of pluralizing information and they both could have 
positive impacts on policy-makers. Although TNMCs are just at the beginning of 
marketing in the Chinese media market, competition has become very intense. Each city 
has several newspapers appealing to a vast range of tastes, and there are scores of 
national ones. For instance, there are about 200 newspapers in Beijing's market, three 
times more than those in Hong Kong (Li Ming, 2000). Nowadays media wars exist not 
only among domestic media but also between the domestic and foreign media. The 
competition not only involves market shares, but also human resources. Well-trained 
personnel can vote with their feet by working for foreign or joint media outlets. The 
proliferation of media outlets since the 1990s has forced editors to become 'marketeers'. 
In order to survive in the marketplace, state-owned broadcasters, traditionally 
collaborating with non-commercial interests under the support of governmental funding, 
are now beginning to find new ways to enrich their operations outside the mainstream 
governmental sectors. The alliance with commercial interests is no longer a taboo, but a 
necessity, and also a way to deal with cost-saving pressures. Since the late 1990s, some 
independent media companies have emerged, and the number has been increasing 
dramatically. In a word, the market economy has weakened the political control of the 
CCP, thus a non-state-controlled media sphere is emerging (Huang and Zhang, 
1998: 35-38). The reforms have had unintended consequences that have further 
undermined the Party's political monopoly. However, these consequences are not a result 
of 'media imperialism'. The interests of TNMCs have not overwhelmed the Chinese 
media. They conformed to Chinese regulations and their main purposes are to meet 
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audience needs in China. As Chapters Five and Six discussed, TNMCs also provide 
stimuli for the growth of Chinese indigenous media. 
In this sense, media globalization and TNMCs have created fierce market 
competition both in supply, content, and audiences. The increasing media outlets reframe 
the media structures, providing more content for audiences, and stimulating diversity of 
political awareness. The pressures imposed by globalization and TNMCs may steer the 
media governors and domestic players to pursue further reforms in industrial 
restructuring. Chinese media practitioners have been aware of media efficiency, which 
can promote entrepreneurship and engage the media industry in risk-taking and 
profit-seeking activities. Thus, they have changed their traditional media management, 
leamt governance experience from TNMCs, and have become profit-oriented. Because 
increased competition would only result in higher costs and less efficiency, Chinese 
media regulators have called for the building up of media groups in the late 1990s. 
Effective competition is a clear and indeed ideal way to avoid the substantial range of 
economic deficiencies associated with excessive market dominance. It should be pointed 
out that the market competition could not offer all the solutions for media governance. 
Market failure would not only undermine the public interest but also weaken the control 
of the regulators. 
Fifthly, and related to the previous points, this study provides rich data about the 
impact of TNMCs on broader dimensions of Chinese popular political culture devoted to 
entertainment, rather than news, current affairs and political analysis. As Chapter Six 
discussed, the de-propagandization of media culture dismantled the monopoly of Marxist 
media culture. Driven by the entertainment-orientated TNMC media outlets, Chinese 
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media practitioners have been keen to provide entertainment under intense market 
competition for the sake of meeting audience needs. 
4. SOME ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
From the previous discussion, it can be seen that TNMCs have played an important 
role in speeding up Chinese media reforms by increasing media diversity and competition. 
However, as Chan suggests, 'without appropriate social conditions, foreign media culture 
is like seed sown in barren land' (Chan, 1994a: 84). In a centralized communication 
system, central policies are the most salient factor at the national level. Other factors 
include the media's locations, levels of commercialization, political status, and the 
strength of ideological control at the local level. At the national level, according to Deng 
Xiaoping's conception of reform, the ways of transformation must comply with 
'socialism with Chinese characteristics', which aims at the elimination of class struggle 
and the establishment of a socialist market economy. Without exception, the 
transformation of Chinese media governance has been marked by the juxtaposition of 
continuous state planning and control alongside, or in conjunction with, the development 
of capitalist market competition. This juxtaposition has manifested itself in numerous and 
diverse contradictions and conflicts between media organizations (Latham, 2001: 89). On 
this basis, there are several issues for future studies. 
Firstly, conflicts between openness and authoritarian resistance inevitably emerge. 
Most interviewees pointed out that battles between CCTV and CNN or the BBC could 
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not be avoided. Until now, the TNMCs and private media have gained official approval to 
establish their distribution networks. The existence of TNMCs has undermined, as it still 
does, the CCPs power over the media sector. As China has chosen a path towards the 
global economy, the communist state has to compromise with both international and 
national market forces. The emergence of TNMCs has provided diversity and competition 
in Chinese markets. It has become an engine of change, rather than just a 'cash nexus' 
that only pursues profits. Therefore, it is worth studying further the importance and the 
impact of TNMCs. This may be further explored and assessed through the a study of of 
audience reception, audience effect, comparative studies between TNMCs and the 
Chinese media, and so on. An attempt may be made to examine the extent to which 
entertainment-orientated media might lead to a 'dumbling down' of Chinese society, 
making these media less sophisticated in the ways that they think about politics. 
Second, the press should be regarded as a political institution in its own right. Media 
governance in China has been reshaped, and media reforms were promoted, but press 
freedom appears to 'be very far away' (Herbert, 2001: 137). Instead of social 
responsibility, the control of news media is reflected in Deng Xiaoping's long-standing 
reform ideology, which frees the economy but upholds key political power. However, if 
one takes a longer view of press history, 'appropriate conditions' for media reforms and 
press freedom have never been autonomously created. Press freedom in Britain, for 
instance, was attributed partly to a heroic struggle against the state. The press only 
became free after the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, the ending of press 
licensing in 1694, Fox's Libel Act, 1792, and the repeal of 'taxes on knowledge' in 
1853-61 (Curren and Seaton, 1997: 7-9). In China, the struggle for press freedom has 
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continued since 1979. The role of the mass media in shaping pluralization and 
democratization should be carefully examined. Following this, the ways in which the 
media influence the citizens, the relations between media and public and, the contents 
provided by the media are all potentially helpful approaches in exploring the role of the 
media as a political institution. 
Third, media participation needs to be identified more precisely. Thanks to the 
intertwined logics of party, culture and market, media politics in China have their own 
system of checks and balances. Chinese media reforms under globalization have their 
own destiny, such that with every step forward, there will be three-quarters of a step back. 
The proliferation of foreign entertainment programming leads to some extent to the fear 
that 'they have seriously challenged and significantly weakened the communists' position 
and function. '(Hong, 1998: 107) Although the Chinese mass media cannot provide a 
forum like that of liberal democratic countries, it cannot be denied that the media can 
provide a space for civic discourse. While its effectiveness as a counter-hegemonic force 
is reduced by its institutional ised features and dependency upon official censorship, the 
mass media equip citizens with a proliferation of information channels to new platforms 
of communication, along with the class differentiation of society (Sun, 2002: 59-68; 
Zhang, 2002: 48-58). It implies that people can choose their sources of information and 
recognise different modes of address or different 'public spheres'. 
In short, this study has emphasized the importance of qualitative research, and for 
further study, quantitative research may be employed instead. Such quantitative research 
can be designed in different ways, with a reasonable number of selected audiences, 
TNMCs, and Chinese media practitioners. In particular, an audience survey, an optimum 
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means by which Chinese audiences' influence by TNMCs, may be measured; and the 
survey for media regulators can explore the degree to which the Chinese media 
authorities redesigned media governance when the global forces have become more 
powerful. 
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Appendix I ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEES 
In this study, 50 in-depth interviews have been conducted to examine central issues 
in Chinese media governance. The interviewees cover a range of different experiences 
related to the media sphere in China. 
Three kinds of interviewees were selected. As Figure I demonstrates, these 
interviewees include media-policy-makers (11), communication-industry representatives 
(4 1) and media researchers (3). 
Figure I Components of Interviewees 
Elmedia-policy- 
maker 
Emedia 
practitioner 
El ifled ia 
researcher 
The interviewees of media-policy-makers include some at the national level (9) and 
some at the provincial level (2). Questions to them were mainly related to the process of 
media-policy-making in China, the regulatory changes since 1990s, and the regulatory 
responses to TNMCs. The overwhelming majority of interviewees from media 
practitioners are Chinese domestic media (37), whilst 4 came from rNMCs. For those 
from TNMCs, the enquiries focused on the presence of' TNMCs in China, negotiations 
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with Chinese media regulators, and their strategies in the Chinese market. For the 
Chinese media, the enquiries were related to the transformation of media operations, 
management and culture when they faced competition from the TNMCs. The third 
category of interviewee, media researchers, can be divided into two groups: those who 
act as researchers in media institutions (2), and those who work in academic institutions 
(1). One of the purposes in selecting them was to enquire into the process of 
media-policy-making, another was to assess the extent to which the regulators take into 
account the influence of globalization and the TNMCs on Chinese media governance. 
Considering the sensitivity of the topic in China, most of the interviews were 
carried out in informal spaces, such as tea houses, coffee bars, restaurants, hotels, and 
even their home. Most of them required that no formal record was kept. Therefore, after 
the interview was finished, I wrote down the information related to this theme as soon as 
possible. 
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Appendix 2 LEGISLATION ON MASS MEDIA IN THE PRC (1992-2004) 
Television 
1. Regulations for the Administration of Radio and Television (1997) 
2. Notice of Establishing Children's Channel (2004) 
3. Measures for the Administration of landing foreign satellite television 
4. Measures for the Administration of the Examination and Approval of the 
Establishment of Radio and Television Stations (1996) 
5. Rules for the Administration of Cable Television (1994) 
6. Rules for the Administration of Television Dramas (2000) 
7. Provisional Rules for Censorship of Television Dramas (1999) 
8. Notice Regarding the Examination and Issuance of Operating Permits for 
Radio and Television Program Production and the Television Drama 
Production Permit (1998) 
9. Rules for the Administration of the Television Drama Production Permit 
(1995) 
10. Provisional Rules for the Administration of Film and Television Production 
and Operation Entities (1995) 
11. Rules for the Administration of the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Production of 
Television Dramas (Video Recordings) (1995) 
12. Notice on Further Strengthening and Improving the Administration of the 
Import and Broadcast of Foreign Films and Television Dramas (1995) 
13. Rules for the Administration of the Import and Broadcast of Foreign 
Television Programs (1994) 
14. Provisional Rules for the Administration of Television Programs from Cable 
Television Stations and Sub-Stations (1992) 
15. Standards of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television for the Censorship of 
Imported Foreign Television Dramas (1990) 
296 
Appendix 2 Legislation on Mass Media in the PRC 
Station and Broadcasting Administration 
1. Measures for the Administration of the Security of Cable Radio and Television 
Transmission Coverage Networks (2002) 
2. Provisional Rules for the Administration of the Lease and Purchase of 
Channels and Establishment of Stations Abroad (2002) 
3. Provisional Measures for the Administration of the Examination and Approval 
of the Landing of Foreign Satellite Television Channels (2001) 
4. Provisional Measures for the Administration of Urban Community Cable 
Television Systems (2001) 
5. Provisional Measures for the Administration of Guest House and Hotel 
Video-on-Demand Services (2001) 
6. Provisional Measures for the Administration of Cable Television 
Video-on-Demand Services (2001) 
7. Provisional Measures for the Administration of Governmental Purchase (2001) 
8. Provisional Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the 
Transmission of Radio, Film and Television Programs via Information 
Networks (2000) 
9. Provisional Measures for the Examination, Approval and Administration of the 
Operation of Radio and Television Program Transmission Services (1999) 
10. Measures for the Administration of the Transmission of Radio and Television 
Programs via Satellites (1997) 
11. Notice on Issues Regarding Administration of the Reception of Foreign 
Satellite Television Programs (1995) 
12. Detailed Implementing Rules for the Rules for the Administration of 
Ground-Based Reception Equipment for Satellite Television Broadcasts 
(1994) 
13. Rules for the Administration of Ground-Based Reception Equipment for 
Satellite Television Broadcasts (1993) 
14. Notice on Certain Issues Regarding the Implementation of the Measures for 
297 
Appendix 2 Legislation on Mass Media in the PRC 
the Administration of the Reception by Ground-Based Satellite Reception 
Equipment of Television Programs Transmitted by Foreign Satellites (1990) 
15. Measures for the Administration of the Reception by Ground-Based Satellite 
Reception Equipment of Television Programs Transmitted by Foreign 
Satellites (1990) 
Film 
1. Provisional Measures for Enhancing the Development of Film Industry (2004) 
2. Measures for the Administration of Foreign Investment in Cinema (2003) 
3. Measures for the Administration of Sino-foreign Film Co-production (2003) 
4. Measures for the Administration of Film Production, Distribution, and 
Exhibition (2003) 
5. Provisional Measures for the Administration of Special Films (2002) 
6. Technical Specifications for Digital Films (Provisional) (2002) 
7. Provisional Rules for the Administration of Digital Films (2002) 
8. Regulations for the Administration of Films (200 1) 
9. Detailed Implementing Rules for the Approval System for "Film Production 
Permit (Single Film)" Qualification (Trial) (2001) 
10. Rules for Administration of the Hiring of Foreign Key Creative Personnel to 
Participate in Domestic Film Production (2001) 
11. Provisional Rules for Foreign-Invested Cinemas (2000) 
12. Rules for the Censorship of Films (1997) 
13. Rules for the Administration of Sino-Foreign Cooperative Film Production 
(1994) 
Audiovisual Products 
1. Measures for the Administration of Broadcasting Equipments and Connections 
(2003) 
2. Measures for the Administration of the Import of Audiovisual Products (2002) 
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3. Measures for the Administration of Wholesale, Retail and Rental of 
Audiovisual Products (2002) 
4. Regulations for the Administration of Audiovisual Products (2001) 
5. Measures for the Administration of Sino-Foreign Cooperative Audiovisual 
Product Distribution Enterprises (2001) 
6. Detailed Implementing Rules for Use of Barcodes for Audiovisual Products 
(2000) 
7. Provisional Measures for the Administration of Audio-visual Product 
Organization (1995) 
Publishing and Printing 
1. Measures for the Administration of Foreign-Invested Enterprises Engaging in 
the Distribution of Books, Newspapers and Periodicals (2003) 
2. Provisional Rules for the Administration of Online Publishing (2002) 
3. Provisional Rules for the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Printing 
Enterprises (2002) 
4. Regulations for the Administration of Publishing (2001) 
5. Regulations for the Administration of the Printing Industry (200 1) 
6. Decree of Furthering Reforms in News, Publication, Broadcasting, and 
Audio-video Industry (2001) 
7. Measures for the Administration of Publication Barcodes (2000) 
8. Notice on Adjusting Structure of Newspapers and Periodicals (1999) 
9. Provisional Rules of Neibu Publication (1997) 
10. Notice on Adjusting Newspaper Industry (1997) 
11. Regulations for the Administration of Publications (1997) 
12. Rules for the Administration of Electronic Publications (1997) 
13. Notice on Strengthening the Administration of News, Publication, Broadcast 
and Television (1996) 
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14. Provisional Rules for Improving Policies of Cultural Economic (1996) 
15. Provisional Rules for Presidency and Editorship of Newspapers and 
Periodicals (1995) 
16. Provisional Rules for Newspaper Management (1995, ) 
17. Regulations for Advertising in PRC (1995) 
18. Notice on Supporting Cultural Enterprises by the State Administration of Tax 
(1993) 
19. Notice on Supporting Cultural Enterprises by the Ministry of Finance (1993) 
20. Provisional Rules for Deducing Tax on Cultural Enterprises by the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Administration of Tax (1994) 
2 1. Measures on Annual-Listed-Systern of Newspapers (1994) 
22. Measures on Training System of Publication, Newspapers, Periodicals and 
Elect-Publication (1994) 
23. Notice on Issues of Newspaper Group (1994) 
24. Notice on Establishment of Newspaper, Periodical and Publication Groups 
(1994) 
25. Notice on Containing Foreign-joint Venture of Newspapers, Periodicals and 
Publications (1994) 
26. Provisional Rules for Sponsorship and Management of Publication Units 
(1993) 
27. Notice on Strengthening Journalist Moral Education and Containing 'Payment 
News'by the CPD and SAPP (1993) 
28. Secrecy Rules in ResPect of News Publishing (1992) 
29. Provisional Rules for the Administration of Periodicals (1988) 
Intellectual Property 
1. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Regarding the 
Applicable Laws for the Hearing of Civil Trademark Dispute Cases (2002) 
2. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Regarding the 
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Applicable Laws for the Hearing of Civil Copyright Dispute Cases (2002) 
3. Implementing Rules for the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China 
(Revised 2002) 
4. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (2nd Revised 2002) 
5. Regulations for the Implementation of the Copyright Law of the People's 
Republic of China (2002) 
6. Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised 2001) 
Advertising 
1. Reply Regarding Relevant Issues Concerning the Establishment of Advertising 
Companies by News Entities (1999) 
2. Urgent Notice Regarding the Strict Prohibition on Randomly Inserting and 
Excessively Broadcasting Television Advertisements (1999) 
3. Notice on Strengthening the Administration of Direct Television Sales 
Advertising (1998) 
4. Notice on Issues Relating to the Establishment of Branches of 
Forei gn-Invested Advertising Enterprises (1995) 
5. Notice Regarding Relevant Issues Relating to the Implementation of the 
Certain Rules for the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Advertising 
Enterprises (1995) 
6. Certain Rules for the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Advertising 
Enterprises (1994) 
7. Advertising Law of the People's Republic of China (Excerpts) (1994) 
8. Detailed Implementing Rules for the Regulations on the Administration of 
Advertising (1988) 
9. Regulations for the Administration of Advertising (1987) 
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Internet and Telecommunications 
1. Measures for the Administration of Audi-visual Programme Disseminating in 
the Intemet (2003) 
2. Measures for the Administration to Stat. Tel-communication Product (2003) 
3. Decision by the NCP on maintaining Internet Security (2000) 
4. Regulations for the Administration of Security of Computer Information 
(1994). 
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